Strategic Investment: Myanmar’s Competitive Edge in ASEAN
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Foreign Direct Investment, or FDI, plays a major role in economic growth across South-East Asia. In the ASEAN region, foreign investment has helped countries build industries, create jobs, and improve technology. Myanmar, as a member of ASEAN, has strong potential to benefit from strategic investment if it focuses on its competitive strengths and long-term development goals.Although Myanmar faces economic and political challenges, it also has clear advantages that can attract investors who are looking for growth opportunities in emerging markets. Understanding and promoting these advantages is essential for Myanmar’s future position within ASEAN.The Importance of Strategic InvestmentStrategic investment means attracting investment that supports national development goals. This includes investment in manufacturing, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and services that create long-term value. In ASEAN, countries that have successfully attracted strategic FDI have seen improvements in productivity, exports, and living standards.According to ASEAN investment reports, total FDI inflows into ASEAN exceeded US$220 billion in recent years, making the region one of the top investment destinations in the world. While countries like Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia receive large shares, frontier economies such as Myanmar remain important for future expansion.For Myanmar, FDI is especially important because domestic capital is limited. Foreign investors can bring not only money, but also management skills, technology, and access to global markets.Myanmar’s Competitive Edge in ASEAN1. Large and Young WorkforceMyanmar has a population of approximately 54 million people. More than 65 per cent of the population is of working age, between 15 and 64 years old. The median age of Myanmar’s population is about 29 years, which is younger than that of many ASEAN countries, such as Thailand and Singapore.The total labour force is estimated at over 30 million people. Wages in Myanmar remain lower than in several neighbouring ASEAN economies, especially for basic manufacturing and labour-intensive industries. This gives Myanmar a cost advantage for investors in sectors such as garments, food processing, and light manufacturing.A young workforce also means long-term labour availability, which is important for investors planning multi-year or multi-decade projects.2. Strategic Geographic LocationMyanmar is located between South Asia, South-East Asia, and China. It shares borders with five countries: China, India, Thailand, Laos, and Bangladesh. This location gives Myanmar strong potential as a regional trade and logistics link.With improved transport corridors, ports, and border trade facilities, Myanmar can serve as a bridge between major markets. Projects such as special economic zones and cross-border highways increase the country’s attractiveness to investors involved in regional supply chains.3. Natural Resources and Energy PotentialMyanmar is rich in natural resources. It has significant reserves of natural gas, hydropower, minerals, and agricultural land. Natural gas exports have historically been one of the country’s largest sources of foreign income.Myanmar’s hydropower potential is estimated at more than 100,000 megawatts, one of the highest levels in Southeast Asia. Responsible and well-managed investment in energy can support industrial development and improve electricity access for businesses and households.Agriculture also remains a key strength. About 50 per cent of Myanmar’s workforce is employed in agriculture, and the country has strong potential in rice, beans, pulses, fisheries, and agro-processing industries.4. Access to the ASEAN MarketASEAN has a combined population of more than 660 million people and a total GDP exceeding US$3 trillion. As an ASEAN member, Myanmar benefits from regional trade agreements, reduced tariffs, and investment cooperation frameworks.For foreign investors, producing in Myanmar can provide access not only to the domestic market but also to the wider ASEAN market. This is especially attractive for companies looking to diversify production locations and reduce over-dependence on a single country.Comparison with OtherASEAN EconomiesASEAN countries differ in terms of development levels. Singapore is a global financial hub. Vietnam has become a manufacturing centre. Thailand and Malaysia have strong industrial bases. Myanmar is still at an early stage of industrialization, but this also means there is room for rapid growth.Investors who enter early can benefit from first-mover advantages, lower costs, and long- term market expansion. This is why frontier ASEAN economies continue to attract interest despite higher risks.Challenges That Must BeAddressed1. Infrastructure GapsInfrastructure remains one of Myanmar’s biggest challenges. Electricity supply is limited and unreliable in many areas. Road, port, and railway networks need upgrading to support large-scale industrial activity.Without strong infrastructure, production costs increase, and investor confidence decreases.Infrastructure investment is therefore essential for improving competitiveness.2. Regulatory and Institutional IssuesClear laws, transparent procedures, and consistent policy implementation are critical for attracting FDI. Investors need confidence that rules will not change suddenly and that contracts will be respected.Research on ASEAN shows that regulatory quality and political stability are among the most important factors influencing investment decisions. Strengthening institutions and improving governance will directly support Myanmar’s investment environment.3. Skills and Human CapitalWhile Myanmar has a large labour force, skill levels remain uneven. To attract higher-value investment in technology, engineering, and services, the country needs better education and vocational training systems.Investment in human capital will allow Myanmar to move beyond low-cost labour and toward productivity-based competitiveness.Policy Directions for Strategic InvestmentTo strengthen its competitive edge, Myanmar should focus on the following areas:1. Improve vocational training and technical education to match industry needs2. Simplify investment procedures and strengthen investor protection3. Prioritize infrastructure development, especially power and transport4. Promote responsible investment that supports sustainable development5. Deepen cooperation with ASEAN partners and regional investorsConclusionMyanmar stands at an important crossroads. As an ASEAN member with a young population, rich resources, and a strategic location, it has clear competitive advantages for strategic investment. At the same time, challenges related to infrastructure, institutions, and skills must be addressed carefully and consistently.If Myanmar can focus on long-term reforms and smart investment strategies, it can strengthen its position within ASEAN and become a competitive destination for foreign investors. Strategic investment is not only about attracting capital. It is about building a stronger and more inclusive economy for the future.Sources1. ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Investment Report 2024. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.2. Asada, H (2021). Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Myanmar.Bulletin of Applied Economics, 8 (1).3. Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO). Policy Review on Myanmar Economy: What Myanmar Can Learn from FDI from East Asian Countries.4. Ramirez, M D, and Tretter, B. (2013). The Effect of Myanmar’s Foreign Investment Policies on FDI Inflows. International Journal of Accounting and Economics Studies.5. World Bank. World Development Indicators.6. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). World Investment Report.gnlm

Foreign Direct Investment, or FDI, plays a major role in economic growth across South-East Asia. In the ASEAN region, foreign investment has helped countries build industries, create jobs, and improve technology. Myanmar, as a member of ASEAN, has strong potential to benefit from strategic investment if it focuses on its competitive strengths and long-term development goals.
Although Myanmar faces economic and political challenges, it also has clear advantages that can attract investors who are looking for growth opportunities in emerging markets. Understanding and promoting these advantages is essential for Myanmar’s future position within ASEAN.

The Importance of Strategic Investment
Strategic investment means attracting investment that supports national development goals. This includes investment in manufacturing, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and services that create long-term value. In ASEAN, countries that have successfully attracted strategic FDI have seen improvements in productivity, exports, and living standards.
According to ASEAN investment reports, total FDI inflows into ASEAN exceeded US$220 billion in recent years, making the region one of the top investment destinations in the world. While countries like Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia receive large shares, frontier economies such as Myanmar remain important for future expansion.
For Myanmar, FDI is especially important because domestic capital is limited. Foreign investors can bring not only money, but also management skills, technology, and access to global markets.

Myanmar’s Competitive Edge in ASEAN
1. Large and Young Workforce
Myanmar has a population of approximately 54 million people. More than 65 per cent of the population is of working age, between 15 and 64 years old. The median age of Myanmar’s population is about 29 years, which is younger than that of many ASEAN countries, such as Thailand and Singapore.
The total labour force is estimated at over 30 million people. Wages in Myanmar remain lower than in several neighbouring ASEAN economies, especially for basic manufacturing and labour-intensive industries. This gives Myanmar a cost advantage for investors in sectors such as garments, food processing, and light manufacturing.
A young workforce also means long-term labour availability, which is important for investors planning multi-year or multi-decade projects.

2. Strategic Geographic Location
Myanmar is located between South Asia, South-East Asia, and China. It shares borders with five countries: China, India, Thailand, Laos, and Bangladesh. This location gives Myanmar strong potential as a regional trade and logistics link.
With improved transport corridors, ports, and border trade facilities, Myanmar can serve as a bridge between major markets. Projects such as special economic zones and cross-border highways increase the country’s attractiveness to investors involved in regional supply chains.

3. Natural Resources and Energy Potential
Myanmar is rich in natural resources. It has significant reserves of natural gas, hydropower, minerals, and agricultural land. Natural gas exports have historically been one of the country’s largest sources of foreign income.
Myanmar’s hydropower potential is estimated at more than 100,000 megawatts, one of the highest levels in Southeast Asia. Responsible and well-managed investment in energy can support industrial development and improve electricity access for businesses and households.
Agriculture also remains a key strength. About 50 per cent of Myanmar’s workforce is employed in agriculture, and the country has strong potential in rice, beans, pulses, fisheries, and agro-processing industries.

4. Access to the ASEAN Market
ASEAN has a combined population of more than 660 million people and a total GDP exceeding US$3 trillion. As an ASEAN member, Myanmar benefits from regional trade agreements, reduced tariffs, and investment cooperation frameworks.
For foreign investors, producing in Myanmar can provide access not only to the domestic market but also to the wider ASEAN market. This is especially attractive for companies looking to diversify production locations and reduce over-dependence on a single country.

Comparison with Other
ASEAN Economies
ASEAN countries differ in terms of development levels. Singapore is a global financial hub. Vietnam has become a manufacturing centre. Thailand and Malaysia have strong industrial bases. Myanmar is still at an early stage of industrialization, but this also means there is room for rapid growth.
Investors who enter early can benefit from first-mover advantages, lower costs, and long- term market expansion. This is why frontier ASEAN economies continue to attract interest despite higher risks.

Challenges That Must Be
Addressed
1. Infrastructure Gaps
Infrastructure remains one of Myanmar’s biggest challenges. Electricity supply is limited and unreliable in many areas. Road, port, and railway networks need upgrading to support large-scale industrial activity.
Without strong infrastructure, production costs increase, and investor confidence decreases.
Infrastructure investment is therefore essential for improving competitiveness.

2. Regulatory and Institutional Issues
Clear laws, transparent procedures, and consistent policy implementation are critical for attracting FDI. Investors need confidence that rules will not change suddenly and that contracts will be respected.
Research on ASEAN shows that regulatory quality and political stability are among the most important factors influencing investment decisions. Strengthening institutions and improving governance will directly support Myanmar’s investment environment.

3. Skills and Human Capital
While Myanmar has a large labour force, skill levels remain uneven. To attract higher-value investment in technology, engineering, and services, the country needs better education and vocational training systems.
Investment in human capital will allow Myanmar to move beyond low-cost labour and toward productivity-based competitiveness.

Policy Directions for Strategic Investment
To strengthen its competitive edge, Myanmar should focus on the following areas:
1. Improve vocational training and technical education to match industry needs
2. Simplify investment procedures and strengthen investor protection
3. Prioritize infrastructure development, especially power and transport
4. Promote responsible investment that supports sustainable development
5. Deepen cooperation with ASEAN partners and regional investors

Conclusion
Myanmar stands at an important crossroads. As an ASEAN member with a young population, rich resources, and a strategic location, it has clear competitive advantages for strategic investment. At the same time, challenges related to infrastructure, institutions, and skills must be addressed carefully and consistently.
If Myanmar can focus on long-term reforms and smart investment strategies, it can strengthen its position within ASEAN and become a competitive destination for foreign investors. Strategic investment is not only about attracting capital. It is about building a stronger and more inclusive economy for the future.

Sources
1. ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Investment Report 2024. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.
2. Asada, H (2021). Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Myanmar.
Bulletin of Applied Economics, 8 (1).
3. Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO). Policy Review on Myanmar Economy: What Myanmar Can Learn from FDI from East Asian Countries.
4. Ramirez, M D, and Tretter, B. (2013). The Effect of Myanmar’s Foreign Investment Policies on FDI Inflows. International Journal of Accounting and Economics Studies.
5. World Bank. World Development Indicators.
6. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). World Investment Report.

gnlm

Dr Kyaw Linn Htun – Public Administration

Foreign Direct Investment, or FDI, plays a major role in economic growth across South-East Asia. In the ASEAN region, foreign investment has helped countries build industries, create jobs, and improve technology. Myanmar, as a member of ASEAN, has strong potential to benefit from strategic investment if it focuses on its competitive strengths and long-term development goals.
Although Myanmar faces economic and political challenges, it also has clear advantages that can attract investors who are looking for growth opportunities in emerging markets. Understanding and promoting these advantages is essential for Myanmar’s future position within ASEAN.

The Importance of Strategic Investment
Strategic investment means attracting investment that supports national development goals. This includes investment in manufacturing, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and services that create long-term value. In ASEAN, countries that have successfully attracted strategic FDI have seen improvements in productivity, exports, and living standards.
According to ASEAN investment reports, total FDI inflows into ASEAN exceeded US$220 billion in recent years, making the region one of the top investment destinations in the world. While countries like Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia receive large shares, frontier economies such as Myanmar remain important for future expansion.
For Myanmar, FDI is especially important because domestic capital is limited. Foreign investors can bring not only money, but also management skills, technology, and access to global markets.

Myanmar’s Competitive Edge in ASEAN
1. Large and Young Workforce
Myanmar has a population of approximately 54 million people. More than 65 per cent of the population is of working age, between 15 and 64 years old. The median age of Myanmar’s population is about 29 years, which is younger than that of many ASEAN countries, such as Thailand and Singapore.
The total labour force is estimated at over 30 million people. Wages in Myanmar remain lower than in several neighbouring ASEAN economies, especially for basic manufacturing and labour-intensive industries. This gives Myanmar a cost advantage for investors in sectors such as garments, food processing, and light manufacturing.
A young workforce also means long-term labour availability, which is important for investors planning multi-year or multi-decade projects.

2. Strategic Geographic Location
Myanmar is located between South Asia, South-East Asia, and China. It shares borders with five countries: China, India, Thailand, Laos, and Bangladesh. This location gives Myanmar strong potential as a regional trade and logistics link.
With improved transport corridors, ports, and border trade facilities, Myanmar can serve as a bridge between major markets. Projects such as special economic zones and cross-border highways increase the country’s attractiveness to investors involved in regional supply chains.

3. Natural Resources and Energy Potential
Myanmar is rich in natural resources. It has significant reserves of natural gas, hydropower, minerals, and agricultural land. Natural gas exports have historically been one of the country’s largest sources of foreign income.
Myanmar’s hydropower potential is estimated at more than 100,000 megawatts, one of the highest levels in Southeast Asia. Responsible and well-managed investment in energy can support industrial development and improve electricity access for businesses and households.
Agriculture also remains a key strength. About 50 per cent of Myanmar’s workforce is employed in agriculture, and the country has strong potential in rice, beans, pulses, fisheries, and agro-processing industries.

4. Access to the ASEAN Market
ASEAN has a combined population of more than 660 million people and a total GDP exceeding US$3 trillion. As an ASEAN member, Myanmar benefits from regional trade agreements, reduced tariffs, and investment cooperation frameworks.
For foreign investors, producing in Myanmar can provide access not only to the domestic market but also to the wider ASEAN market. This is especially attractive for companies looking to diversify production locations and reduce over-dependence on a single country.

Comparison with Other
ASEAN Economies
ASEAN countries differ in terms of development levels. Singapore is a global financial hub. Vietnam has become a manufacturing centre. Thailand and Malaysia have strong industrial bases. Myanmar is still at an early stage of industrialization, but this also means there is room for rapid growth.
Investors who enter early can benefit from first-mover advantages, lower costs, and long- term market expansion. This is why frontier ASEAN economies continue to attract interest despite higher risks.

Challenges That Must Be
Addressed
1. Infrastructure Gaps
Infrastructure remains one of Myanmar’s biggest challenges. Electricity supply is limited and unreliable in many areas. Road, port, and railway networks need upgrading to support large-scale industrial activity.
Without strong infrastructure, production costs increase, and investor confidence decreases.
Infrastructure investment is therefore essential for improving competitiveness.

2. Regulatory and Institutional Issues
Clear laws, transparent procedures, and consistent policy implementation are critical for attracting FDI. Investors need confidence that rules will not change suddenly and that contracts will be respected.
Research on ASEAN shows that regulatory quality and political stability are among the most important factors influencing investment decisions. Strengthening institutions and improving governance will directly support Myanmar’s investment environment.

3. Skills and Human Capital
While Myanmar has a large labour force, skill levels remain uneven. To attract higher-value investment in technology, engineering, and services, the country needs better education and vocational training systems.
Investment in human capital will allow Myanmar to move beyond low-cost labour and toward productivity-based competitiveness.

Policy Directions for Strategic Investment
To strengthen its competitive edge, Myanmar should focus on the following areas:
1. Improve vocational training and technical education to match industry needs
2. Simplify investment procedures and strengthen investor protection
3. Prioritize infrastructure development, especially power and transport
4. Promote responsible investment that supports sustainable development
5. Deepen cooperation with ASEAN partners and regional investors

Conclusion
Myanmar stands at an important crossroads. As an ASEAN member with a young population, rich resources, and a strategic location, it has clear competitive advantages for strategic investment. At the same time, challenges related to infrastructure, institutions, and skills must be addressed carefully and consistently.
If Myanmar can focus on long-term reforms and smart investment strategies, it can strengthen its position within ASEAN and become a competitive destination for foreign investors. Strategic investment is not only about attracting capital. It is about building a stronger and more inclusive economy for the future.

Sources
1. ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Investment Report 2024. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.
2. Asada, H (2021). Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Myanmar.
Bulletin of Applied Economics, 8 (1).
3. Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO). Policy Review on Myanmar Economy: What Myanmar Can Learn from FDI from East Asian Countries.
4. Ramirez, M D, and Tretter, B. (2013). The Effect of Myanmar’s Foreign Investment Policies on FDI Inflows. International Journal of Accounting and Economics Studies.
5. World Bank. World Development Indicators.
6. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). World Investment Report.

gnlm

Mekong Ganga Quick Impact Projects:Unlocking a stream of developmental partnership
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गङ्गे तव सुधा भवति जनपदेऽपि साधनम्शुभोऽयं प्रवाहो दीप्यते समृद्धौ जनानाम्O Ganga,Your waters are like nectar, becoming a means of prosperity for the land.Your auspicious flow shines as a source of well-being and abundance for the people.The Ganga is the sacred river of India, whose banks, central to many Hindu epics, have nurtured and nourished ancient Indian culture and tradition over millennia. The Mekong is similarly revered in folk traditions of the Mekong Region and its people as “the River of the Lord Buddha”. These rivers flow as living symbols of faith, purity, and sustenance for millions, venerated as sacred, shaping the imagination and livelihoods of the thriving communities along their banks. Just as these two sacred rivers have sustained civilizations for centuries through agriculture, fisheries, and trade, the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) initiative between India and five ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) draws its sustenance from the same spirit. In particular, the Quick Impact Projects or QIPs under the MGC initiative channel the same nurturing essence into contemporary development efforts, transforming local aspirations into economic progress and shared prosperity.The QIP scheme was launched by the Government of India in 2015 to deliver short-gestation, high-impact development outcomes across partner countries, including Myanmar. QIPs act like a modern, practical version of our belief that small, timely interventions can water and irrigate local hopes and produce visible benefits fast, helping unlock the underlying potential for wider socio-economic development of the areas around it. Over 175 QIPs have been undertaken under the MGC initiative so far.Each QIP is kept deliberately compact, capped at US$50,000 and typically implemented within a year, so results are immediate and easily seen by communities. The funding envelope behind these interventions has grown over time, reflecting increased commitment and broader ambition: the India-CLMV Revolving Fund began at US$1 million per year, was raised to US$1.25 million and later to US$2 million to support more projects and a deeper reach. In Myanmar, the Framework Agreement of 2021, renewed in 2025, supports grassroots initiatives across renewable energy, civic infrastructure, agriculture, education, health, handloom and disaster risk reduction with a committed annual contribution that enables rapid, tangible work on the ground. It is heartening to note that 13 such projects have been inaugurated over the last twelve months.The value of QIPs lies in their clarity of purpose and speed of delivery. A modest solar-water supply system sustains a round-the-year water supply for village households and for agricultural plantations and livestock, especially through dry months in water-scarce areas, turning subsistence plots into surplus income sources. Expressing the community’s gratitude for one such QIP in Magyisaunt village in Mandalay region, a local villager shared, “I am very thankful to the Government of India and the Dry Zone Greening Department for their collaboration in donating water, as this is incredibly helpful not only for the residents of Magyisaunt Village, Mandalay Region but also for the students, teachers, and school staff.” Similarly, the new village community centre in Lahe Township of Naga Self-Administered Zone provides space for youth, women and the community in general to come together to discuss and deliver modest day-to-day socio-economic activities. The residents also expressed their hope that similar regional development initiatives would continue in the long run.These voices underscore an essential design choice of QIPs that developmental projects should be implemented in consultation and coordination with local bodies and community members so that priorities and outcomes truly match needs and local ownership. A refurbished training centre in Yangon or a renovated girls’ school in Mandalay with modern computers, teaching aids, and e-books makes an immediate difference to study hours and attendance. Many beneficiary institutions of QIPs in Myanmar have expressed appreciation for India’s support, noting that their new or upgraded facilities have strengthened capabilities and enhanced efficiency. These are not abstract wins – they are the kinds of changes people notice within weeks, and strengthen trust between citizens and domestic institutions, as well as with development cooperation partners.Beyond their immediate results, QIPs create a cascading local value. Short-term physical and social infrastructure reduces household costs, improves resilience to shocks and catalyzes microenterprise growth. Culturally focused projects are deepening people-to-people ties and strengthening long-term goodwill across the Mekong-Ganga region. Procurement from Indian vendors, where feasible, also links local demand to broader supply chains, expanding the economic footprint of each project beyond its initial investment. By choosing projects with clear, visible returns, QIPs build public confidence and create the political and social space for larger development programs.The recent renewal of the umbrella agreement between the Governments of India and Myanmar for another five years until 2030 enables continuity and scale, helping partners plan for sustained engagement and replicate successful models across numerous districts and states/regions of Myanmar. This continuity is essential for turning one-off gains into lasting improvements in livelihoods, health and education outcomes.A diverse range of 10 new initiatives across key socio-economic sectors in Myanmar, expected to commence later this year, will prioritize vulnerable but high-need areas such as earthquake relief and reconstruction, cultural preservation, agriculture, education, renewable energy, and disaster resilience – reflecting the comprehensive and people-centric nature of India’s development partnership. Together, these projects embody the spirit of the MGC — fostering sustainable development, cultural connectivity, and grassroots cooperation between India and Myanmar.Quick Impact Projects demonstrate that well-targeted, small-scale investments can produce big returns in human welfare. They embody the holy Ganga’s ancient promise in a practical form, modest, life-affirming flows that generate renewal and prosperity, much like the folk narratives of the Mekong, which is believed to bestow fertility and protection upon riverside communities. When communities see results quickly and are involved in design and operation, projects stop being external aid and become local achievements. Those achievements, narrated by teachers, farmers, health workers and youth leaders, are the true measure of success.The lasting legacy of these projects will be measured in daily routines restored, small businesses sustained and new civic confidence built, which are modern proofs of the promise that when people are allowed to take the lead in small ways, it unlocks new energies and prosperity follows on a large scale. It is this spirit of partnership and local ownership that lies at the heart of India’s endeavours to share the fruits of its own development with its neighbours.gnlm

गङ्गे तव सुधा भवति जनपदेऽपि साधनम्
शुभोऽयं प्रवाहो दीप्यते समृद्धौ जनानाम्

O Ganga,
Your waters are like nectar, becoming a means of prosperity for the land.
Your auspicious flow shines as a source of well-being and abundance for the people.

The Ganga is the sacred river of India, whose banks, central to many Hindu epics, have nurtured and nourished ancient Indian culture and tradition over millennia. The Mekong is similarly revered in folk traditions of the Mekong Region and its people as “the River of the Lord Buddha”. These rivers flow as living symbols of faith, purity, and sustenance for millions, venerated as sacred, shaping the imagination and livelihoods of the thriving communities along their banks. Just as these two sacred rivers have sustained civilizations for centuries through agriculture, fisheries, and trade, the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) initiative between India and five ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) draws its sustenance from the same spirit. In particular, the Quick Impact Projects or QIPs under the MGC initiative channel the same nurturing essence into contemporary development efforts, transforming local aspirations into economic progress and shared prosperity.
The QIP scheme was launched by the Government of India in 2015 to deliver short-gestation, high-impact development outcomes across partner countries, including Myanmar. QIPs act like a modern, practical version of our belief that small, timely interventions can water and irrigate local hopes and produce visible benefits fast, helping unlock the underlying potential for wider socio-economic development of the areas around it. Over 175 QIPs have been undertaken under the MGC initiative so far.
Each QIP is kept deliberately compact, capped at US$50,000 and typically implemented within a year, so results are immediate and easily seen by communities. The funding envelope behind these interventions has grown over time, reflecting increased commitment and broader ambition: the India-CLMV Revolving Fund began at US$1 million per year, was raised to US$1.25 million and later to US$2 million to support more projects and a deeper reach. In Myanmar, the Framework Agreement of 2021, renewed in 2025, supports grassroots initiatives across renewable energy, civic infrastructure, agriculture, education, health, handloom and disaster risk reduction with a committed annual contribution that enables rapid, tangible work on the ground. It is heartening to note that 13 such projects have been inaugurated over the last twelve months.
The value of QIPs lies in their clarity of purpose and speed of delivery. A modest solar-water supply system sustains a round-the-year water supply for village households and for agricultural plantations and livestock, especially through dry months in water-scarce areas, turning subsistence plots into surplus income sources. Expressing the community’s gratitude for one such QIP in Magyisaunt village in Mandalay region, a local villager shared, “I am very thankful to the Government of India and the Dry Zone Greening Department for their collaboration in donating water, as this is incredibly helpful not only for the residents of Magyisaunt Village, Mandalay Region but also for the students, teachers, and school staff.” Similarly, the new village community centre in Lahe Township of Naga Self-Administered Zone provides space for youth, women and the community in general to come together to discuss and deliver modest day-to-day socio-economic activities. The residents also expressed their hope that similar regional development initiatives would continue in the long run.
These voices underscore an essential design choice of QIPs that developmental projects should be implemented in consultation and coordination with local bodies and community members so that priorities and outcomes truly match needs and local ownership. A refurbished training centre in Yangon or a renovated girls’ school in Mandalay with modern computers, teaching aids, and e-books makes an immediate difference to study hours and attendance. Many beneficiary institutions of QIPs in Myanmar have expressed appreciation for India’s support, noting that their new or upgraded facilities have strengthened capabilities and enhanced efficiency. These are not abstract wins – they are the kinds of changes people notice within weeks, and strengthen trust between citizens and domestic institutions, as well as with development cooperation partners.
Beyond their immediate results, QIPs create a cascading local value. Short-term physical and social infrastructure reduces household costs, improves resilience to shocks and catalyzes microenterprise growth. Culturally focused projects are deepening people-to-people ties and strengthening long-term goodwill across the Mekong-Ganga region. Procurement from Indian vendors, where feasible, also links local demand to broader supply chains, expanding the economic footprint of each project beyond its initial investment. By choosing projects with clear, visible returns, QIPs build public confidence and create the political and social space for larger development programs.
The recent renewal of the umbrella agreement between the Governments of India and Myanmar for another five years until 2030 enables continuity and scale, helping partners plan for sustained engagement and replicate successful models across numerous districts and states/regions of Myanmar. This continuity is essential for turning one-off gains into lasting improvements in livelihoods, health and education outcomes.
A diverse range of 10 new initiatives across key socio-economic sectors in Myanmar, expected to commence later this year, will prioritize vulnerable but high-need areas such as earthquake relief and reconstruction, cultural preservation, agriculture, education, renewable energy, and disaster resilience – reflecting the comprehensive and people-centric nature of India’s development partnership. Together, these projects embody the spirit of the MGC — fostering sustainable development, cultural connectivity, and grassroots cooperation between India and Myanmar.
Quick Impact Projects demonstrate that well-targeted, small-scale investments can produce big returns in human welfare. They embody the holy Ganga’s ancient promise in a practical form, modest, life-affirming flows that generate renewal and prosperity, much like the folk narratives of the Mekong, which is believed to bestow fertility and protection upon riverside communities. When communities see results quickly and are involved in design and operation, projects stop being external aid and become local achievements. Those achievements, narrated by teachers, farmers, health workers and youth leaders, are the true measure of success.
The lasting legacy of these projects will be measured in daily routines restored, small businesses sustained and new civic confidence built, which are modern proofs of the promise that when people are allowed to take the lead in small ways, it unlocks new energies and prosperity follows on a large scale. It is this spirit of partnership and local ownership that lies at the heart of India’s endeavours to share the fruits of its own development with its neighbours.

gnlm

Abhay Thakur, Ambassador of India to Myanmar

गङ्गे तव सुधा भवति जनपदेऽपि साधनम्
शुभोऽयं प्रवाहो दीप्यते समृद्धौ जनानाम्

O Ganga,
Your waters are like nectar, becoming a means of prosperity for the land.
Your auspicious flow shines as a source of well-being and abundance for the people.

The Ganga is the sacred river of India, whose banks, central to many Hindu epics, have nurtured and nourished ancient Indian culture and tradition over millennia. The Mekong is similarly revered in folk traditions of the Mekong Region and its people as “the River of the Lord Buddha”. These rivers flow as living symbols of faith, purity, and sustenance for millions, venerated as sacred, shaping the imagination and livelihoods of the thriving communities along their banks. Just as these two sacred rivers have sustained civilizations for centuries through agriculture, fisheries, and trade, the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) initiative between India and five ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) draws its sustenance from the same spirit. In particular, the Quick Impact Projects or QIPs under the MGC initiative channel the same nurturing essence into contemporary development efforts, transforming local aspirations into economic progress and shared prosperity.
The QIP scheme was launched by the Government of India in 2015 to deliver short-gestation, high-impact development outcomes across partner countries, including Myanmar. QIPs act like a modern, practical version of our belief that small, timely interventions can water and irrigate local hopes and produce visible benefits fast, helping unlock the underlying potential for wider socio-economic development of the areas around it. Over 175 QIPs have been undertaken under the MGC initiative so far.
Each QIP is kept deliberately compact, capped at US$50,000 and typically implemented within a year, so results are immediate and easily seen by communities. The funding envelope behind these interventions has grown over time, reflecting increased commitment and broader ambition: the India-CLMV Revolving Fund began at US$1 million per year, was raised to US$1.25 million and later to US$2 million to support more projects and a deeper reach. In Myanmar, the Framework Agreement of 2021, renewed in 2025, supports grassroots initiatives across renewable energy, civic infrastructure, agriculture, education, health, handloom and disaster risk reduction with a committed annual contribution that enables rapid, tangible work on the ground. It is heartening to note that 13 such projects have been inaugurated over the last twelve months.
The value of QIPs lies in their clarity of purpose and speed of delivery. A modest solar-water supply system sustains a round-the-year water supply for village households and for agricultural plantations and livestock, especially through dry months in water-scarce areas, turning subsistence plots into surplus income sources. Expressing the community’s gratitude for one such QIP in Magyisaunt village in Mandalay region, a local villager shared, “I am very thankful to the Government of India and the Dry Zone Greening Department for their collaboration in donating water, as this is incredibly helpful not only for the residents of Magyisaunt Village, Mandalay Region but also for the students, teachers, and school staff.” Similarly, the new village community centre in Lahe Township of Naga Self-Administered Zone provides space for youth, women and the community in general to come together to discuss and deliver modest day-to-day socio-economic activities. The residents also expressed their hope that similar regional development initiatives would continue in the long run.
These voices underscore an essential design choice of QIPs that developmental projects should be implemented in consultation and coordination with local bodies and community members so that priorities and outcomes truly match needs and local ownership. A refurbished training centre in Yangon or a renovated girls’ school in Mandalay with modern computers, teaching aids, and e-books makes an immediate difference to study hours and attendance. Many beneficiary institutions of QIPs in Myanmar have expressed appreciation for India’s support, noting that their new or upgraded facilities have strengthened capabilities and enhanced efficiency. These are not abstract wins – they are the kinds of changes people notice within weeks, and strengthen trust between citizens and domestic institutions, as well as with development cooperation partners.
Beyond their immediate results, QIPs create a cascading local value. Short-term physical and social infrastructure reduces household costs, improves resilience to shocks and catalyzes microenterprise growth. Culturally focused projects are deepening people-to-people ties and strengthening long-term goodwill across the Mekong-Ganga region. Procurement from Indian vendors, where feasible, also links local demand to broader supply chains, expanding the economic footprint of each project beyond its initial investment. By choosing projects with clear, visible returns, QIPs build public confidence and create the political and social space for larger development programs.
The recent renewal of the umbrella agreement between the Governments of India and Myanmar for another five years until 2030 enables continuity and scale, helping partners plan for sustained engagement and replicate successful models across numerous districts and states/regions of Myanmar. This continuity is essential for turning one-off gains into lasting improvements in livelihoods, health and education outcomes.
A diverse range of 10 new initiatives across key socio-economic sectors in Myanmar, expected to commence later this year, will prioritize vulnerable but high-need areas such as earthquake relief and reconstruction, cultural preservation, agriculture, education, renewable energy, and disaster resilience – reflecting the comprehensive and people-centric nature of India’s development partnership. Together, these projects embody the spirit of the MGC — fostering sustainable development, cultural connectivity, and grassroots cooperation between India and Myanmar.
Quick Impact Projects demonstrate that well-targeted, small-scale investments can produce big returns in human welfare. They embody the holy Ganga’s ancient promise in a practical form, modest, life-affirming flows that generate renewal and prosperity, much like the folk narratives of the Mekong, which is believed to bestow fertility and protection upon riverside communities. When communities see results quickly and are involved in design and operation, projects stop being external aid and become local achievements. Those achievements, narrated by teachers, farmers, health workers and youth leaders, are the true measure of success.
The lasting legacy of these projects will be measured in daily routines restored, small businesses sustained and new civic confidence built, which are modern proofs of the promise that when people are allowed to take the lead in small ways, it unlocks new energies and prosperity follows on a large scale. It is this spirit of partnership and local ownership that lies at the heart of India’s endeavours to share the fruits of its own development with its neighbours.

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Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities
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In today’s world, major global trade routes are facing a noticeable decline in traffic. Traditional international maritime corridors—such as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal—are seeing reduced trade flows as a result of escalating geopolitical tensions. The Russia–Ukraine war, the Iran–Israel conflict and broader instability across the Middle East, the intensifying strategic rivalry between China and the United States, and prolonged conflicts between India and Pakistan have all contributed to disruptions in maritime commerce. Due to the war in Ukraine, trade routes between Russia and Europe have shrunk by as much as 60 percent. At the same time, economic sanctions imposed between Iran and Western nations have severely disrupted energy exports from the Persian Gulf region. As a result of such conflicts, global trade is rapidly shifting away from traditional routes and toward alliance-based networks. Initiatives such as the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC), and the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) have emerged as major overland and multimodal routes connecting allied nations along north–south and east–west axes. At the same time, efforts to expand and identify new geopolitical and geo-economic corridors have brought increasing attention to the Arctic Ocean along the world’s northern rim. This region is emerging as a potential hub for the shortest strategic Lines of Communication (LOCs), offering new possibilities for global connectivity and trade. Russia’s strategic development of its northern maritime routes—particularly its efforts to expand and operationalize the Maritime Multilateral Collegium, a naval consortium among allied nations—highlights the growing significance of Sea Power in the contemporary era. These developments represent some of the most notable transformations in global trade dynamics. Analyses indicate that by 2030, up to 40 percent of international trade could be rerouted through these emerging corridors, reflecting their rapid rise in strategic and economic importance.With major neighboring countries advancing their own connectivity initiatives—China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Thailand’s “One Port, Two Sides” project, and India’s various international trade corridor plans—Myanmar has a strategic opportunity to leverage its advantageous geopolitical location. By acting at the right moment and utilizing these regional frameworks, the country could establish itself as a key node in Asia’s emerging trade architecture.Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC) Eastern Maritime Corridor During the Eastern Economic Forum held in 2019, Russia and India held bilateral discussions and reached an initial agreement to establish direct maritime connectivity between Russia’s port of Vladivostok and India’s port of Chennai. The primary objective of the Eastern Maritime Corridor is to reduce both transit time and transportation costs for the movement of goods between Russia and India. At present, the western maritime route connecting India and Russia—from India’s Port of Mumbai to Russia’s Port of Saint Petersburg—covers a distance of approximately 8,675 nautical miles, requiring around 40 days of transit. In the future, the Eastern Maritime Corridor connecting India’s Port of Chennai and Russia’s Port of Vladivostok will span approximately 5,647 nautical miles, reducing the transit time to around 28 days. Compared to the current western maritime route, this represents a shortening of nearly 3,000 nautical miles and a saving of roughly 12 days in shipping time.The Eastern Maritime Corridor will pass through the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea, navigating near the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Malacca Strait, before entering the Bay of Bengal and ultimately reaching Chennai via the Nicobar Islands. If realized, this maritime route could serve as an optimal gateway not only for the countries directly involved but also for Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea region, including Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia, facilitating enhanced trade and connectivity across the region. International North-South Transport Corridor - INSTC International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) Launched in 2018, the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is being developed as a multimodal trade network linking India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, several Central Asian states, and parts of Europe. The corridor integrates maritime, rail, and road systems to facilitate more efficient transport of goods across these regions, creating a comprehensive north–south connectivity framework. The INSTC is designed as a key tri-modal corridor that links Russia and Asia by traversing the Caspian Sea. Along the Eastern Route, overland connections—via rail and road—link Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and India. The Central Route will combine maritime and overland transport, linking Russia, the Caspian Sea, Iran, and India. This route crosses the Caspian Sea, transporting goods from Russia’s Port of Astrakhan to Iran’s Port of Bandar-e-Anzali. The Western Route will link Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and India through overland transport—using rail and road networks. This multimodal transport corridor spans approximately 4,500 miles and is expected to offer significant savings in both time and cost compared with current shipping routes that rely on the Suez Canal. Studies indicate that the INSTC could reduce the transport distance for goods shipped from Russia to India by up to 40 percent. It is also expected to lower overall transportation costs by around 30 percent, while cutting transit time by 25 to 40 days compared with traditional routes. North-South Corridor Russia and India are focusing on developing promising production and market-expansion value chains across Eurasia. With the objective of realizing a broader Eurasian trade space, both countries are working to strengthen and interlink the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor and the International North–South Transport Corridor. These combined efforts aim to enhance connectivity and support deeper economic integration throughout the Eurasian region. The corridor is expected to bring substantial benefits to the countries along its route by boosting trade flows. For Myanmar, strategically located between the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, timely and effective utilization of these opportunities could yield significant advantages for national economic development.India-Middle East-Europe Corridor - IMECThe India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) is an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. The corridor aims to stimulate economic growth by facilitating smoother trade flows and fostering closer commercial linkages across these regions. The corridor is planned as a route from India to Europe, passing through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Greece. At the 2023 G20 Summit held in India, the governments of India, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy, and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The corridor is structured into two separate routes. The eastern route will connect the western coastal port of Mundra in India with Fujairah in the UAE, while goods from Saudi Arabia and Jordan will be transported by rail to Israel’s Port of Haifa. The western route will link Israel’s Port of Haifa to multiple ports in Europe, including Marseille in France, as well as ports in Italy and Greece. India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) The IMEC represents India’s new corridor designed to enhance economic integration by linking Asia with Europe. Italy has shown a strong inclination to distance itself from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and amid divergences within the G7, the IMEC project has emerged as an alternative framework. The IMEC corridor has evolved into a multimodal initiative, incorporating both rail and maritime routes, that connects India with the Middle East and Europe. The combined GDP of the IMEC countries—including the European Union—is estimated at approximately USD 47 trillion, representing roughly 40 percent of the world’s total GDP. Within the project, reliable and cost-effective transport systems—including both maritime and rail networks—will be established for the cross-border movement of goods and services. Like the Suez Canal, the north–south transport corridors, and China’s Belt and Road routes, this project will complement existing maritime and rail transport networks by facilitating smoother trade and logistics between India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Europe. India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) By linking India with the Middle East and Europe, the IMEC corridor strengthens India’s geopolitical influence and positions the country as a more active player in both regional and global affairs. In addition, the corridor could facilitate smoother and more reliable flows of India’s critical natural resources, thereby supporting the country’s energy security and strengthening its capacity to meet domestic and industrial energy demands.Opportunities and ChallengesThe India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) has the potential to emerge as a direct competitor to China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for a variety of strategic and economic reasons. The strategic northern alignment of IMEC is designed to facilitate trade between India, the Middle East, and Europe. Analyses suggest that, compared with some of the longer and more complex routes under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), IMEC could offer greater efficiency and lower transportation costs.India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) The IMEC corridor is expected to boost regional trade while attracting investment into India. By enhancing diplomatic ties and fostering political goodwill, it can strengthen India’s market presence and promote comprehensive economic development across the country. Exports from India to continental Europe could see transportation costs reduced by approximately 30 percent and transit times shortened by around 40 percent compared with the current Suez Canal route. Connecting India’s two largest trade partners—the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—through the IMEC corridor could further bolster India’s position as a major global power. Just as the IMEC corridor presents significant opportunities, it also comes with its share of challenges that must be addressed. The corridor faces several geopolitical and operational challenges. Some Middle Eastern countries lack well-developed production capacities, business operating costs are high, and key nations such as Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Qatar are not participating. Additionally, certain geographic constraints arising from the corridor’s location present further limitations that need to be managed. Moreover, the corridor will need to navigate a range of regional conflict-related challenges, such as disruptions to maritime trade caused by the Israel–Hamas conflict and the activities of Houthi rebels in Yemen affecting Red Sea shipping. Effectively managing these security risks will be essential to ensuring uninterrupted trade flows. Through the IMEC project, India is not only building new infrastructure but also creating alternative pathways for global partnerships. The corridor facilitates the bridging of differences and the transformation of potential challenges into opportunities, fostering collaboration and enhancing India’s strategic and economic engagement worldwide. The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) represents a strategic advancement that goes beyond a mere economic initiative. By enhancing India’s energy security, strengthening transportation and logistics resilience, promoting economic prosperity, and supporting national security, the corridor positions India as a more active player in both regional and global affairs. It is expected to bolster India’s geopolitical influence and expand its strategic footprint across Eurasia. The Maritime Collegium of the Russian Federation On August 13, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed and officially announced the establishment of the “Russian Maritime Collegium.” Today, Russia’s Maritime Collegium seeks to fully develop the Blue Economy by connecting global maritime trade routes and economic corridors. To achieve this, it is working to establish a “Multilateral Maritime Collegium” that brings together partner countries, creating an integrated framework for international maritime cooperation. The envisioned Multilateral Maritime Collegium is expected to include key countries from Russia-led groupings such as BRICS, SCO, and CIS. It aims to facilitate coordinated connectivity across the Indo-Pacific region, the Middle East, East and Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa, promoting harmonized maritime cooperation among participating nations. Russian transport routesRussia has established the Multilateral Maritime Collegium with the objective of enhancing its control and influence over Arctic and northern maritime routes, which are central to its national maritime interests. The initiative is also intended to integrate these routes with international maritime networks, creating a coordinated framework for global maritime economic engagement. Furthermore, following the inauguration of President Donald Trump’s administration, Russia observed U.S. efforts to assert control over Greenland and advance a “unipolar world” strategy. In response, Russia sought to promote a “multipolar world” by establishing the Multilateral Maritime Collegium, a framework designed to unite partner countries around shared national economic interests and foster coordinated engagement in global maritime affairs.China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a significant framework of cooperation for Myanmar, offering numerous opportunities in economic development, transportation connectivity, and regional infrastructure expansion. By linking with this major global initiative, Myanmar has the opportunity to leverage its strategic geographic position to establish itself as a central hub for regional connectivity and trade. In particular, the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) serves as a central pillar of this connectivity, with the potential to drive development across ports, highways, railways, energy infrastructure, and special economic zones. China-Myanmar Economic CorridorThese developments could provide critical support for modernizing Myanmar’s essential infrastructure sector, helping to upgrade and expand the country’s foundational facilities to meet current and future needs. Improved stability in electricity supply and enhanced transportation infrastructure will boost domestic production capacity and create a favorable environment to attract foreign investment. Moreover, the corridor is expected to open major gateways for Myanmar’s abundant yet underutilized natural resources, agricultural products, and human capital to access global markets. For Myanmar, linking with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could provide significant leverage in terms of strategic geopolitical importance and offer substantial economic opportunities. Myanmar shares an extensive border with China and occupies a strategically advantageous position with direct access to the Indian Ocean. It is precisely because of this strategic advantage that Myanmar plays a crucial role as a key focal point within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), serving as a central component of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The CMEC projects include the development of deep-sea ports such as Kyaukpyu, the construction of major energy transmission lines, and the enhancement of transportation infrastructure. These initiatives are expected not only to enhance Myanmar’s domestic economy but also to function as a land bridge, facilitating smoother trade and investment flows to neighboring countries such as China and other Southeast Asian nations. Especially, projects related to Kyaukpyu Port are expected to elevate Myanmar’s status as a major port on the Indian Ocean, positioning it as a key player in regional maritime trade and enhancing its significance in the broader logistics and shipping network.Thailand’s "One Port, Two Sides" Thailand’s proposed land bridge projectThe Thai government has issued a draft law for a new land bridge project—a high-value overland transport corridor linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. This initiative, valued at several billion dollars, aims to establish a strategic trade route facilitating faster and more efficient regional commerce. The project is slated for completion by 2030 and is estimated to require an investment of approximately 1 trillion baht (around USD 29 billion). The new overland corridor project includes two deep-sea ports in Thailand: one at Ranong District on the western coast along the Andaman Sea, and another at Chon Phon District on the eastern coast along the Gulf of Thailand. These two ports will be connected by both railway and road networks, ensuring seamless overland transportation along the corridor. The total estimated cost for the entire project is approximately USD 35.6 billion. Foreign investors will be allowed to hold more than 50 percent ownership in joint ventures and domestic companies involved in the project. The Thai government aims to avoid relying solely on China for investment, actively seeking to attract capital from Saudi Arabia and other countries as well. The initiative also aims to establish the “Southern Special Economic Corridor” to further promote economic development in Thailand’s southern region. The Thai government has attracted interest from over 100 international investors, including some of the world’s largest shipping companies. Construction for the project is planned to begin in the third quarter of 2026, with completion targeted for 2030.Myanmar Strategic Pivot .... Myanmar Strategic PivotAmid the rapidly evolving geopolitical and economic landscape, the emergence of new international trade route networks presents Myanmar with significant opportunities. It is crucial for the country to strategically position itself to leverage these developments and maximize the benefits for national growth and regional integration. Russia, leveraging its strategic geographic position, is actively developing new north-to-south trade corridors. Currently, it is collaborating with India, Iran, and Azerbaijan to advance the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, which will connect eastern Russian cities by sea to India. Additionally, Russia is engaging in cooperative initiatives with China within the Arctic region, further enhancing its reach and influence in global maritime trade networks.From China’s perspective, leveraging its strategic geographic position, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is being implemented as a major east-to-west international trade corridor. When combined with Russia’s emerging north-to-south trade routes, these corridors are creating critical junctions where the two networks intersect. Myanmar, due to its strategic location, sits squarely at one of these pivotal points, positioning the country as a key regional hub for trade and connectivity. In future global trade networks, Myanmar’s strategically located zones—such as Thilawa Deep-Sea Port and its associated special economic zones—are well-positioned to generate significant opportunities in maritime trade and related economic activities. Myanmar’s Thilawa Deep-Sea Port occupies a strategically important location along the maritime route connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, underscoring the country’s critical geopolitical and economic position. For example, from Thilawa Deep-Sea Port, Myanmar’s strategic location allows overland connections to key cities such as Bangkok in Thailand, Phnom Penh in Cambodia, and Ho Chi Minh City and Vũng Tàu in Vietnam, ultimately linking to the South China Sea. By overland distance, the route spans approximately 800 kilometers, compared with the more than 2,000 nautical miles by sea from Thilawa Deep-Sea Port to Vũng Tàu Port in Vietnam, making it roughly one-third the distance. In other words, this corridor represents the shortest route connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The Shortest Route Connecting the Indian Ocean and Pacific OceanThus, by strategically leveraging Myanmar’s geographic pivot point, the country can effectively participate in international overland and maritime trade corridor projects connecting partner and neighboring countries. This coordinated engagement can serve as a key catalyst for building a sovereign state that is not only sustainable and resilient but also comprehensive and prosperous in its long-term development.မောင်မိုး| ၂၅-၈-၂၀၂၅

In today’s world, major global trade routes are facing a noticeable decline in traffic. Traditional international maritime corridors—such as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal—are seeing reduced trade flows as a result of escalating geopolitical tensions. The Russia–Ukraine war, the Iran–Israel conflict and broader instability across the Middle East, the intensifying strategic rivalry between China and the United States, and prolonged conflicts between India and Pakistan have all contributed to disruptions in maritime commerce. Due to the war in Ukraine, trade routes between Russia and Europe have shrunk by as much as 60 percent. At the same time, economic sanctions imposed between Iran and Western nations have severely disrupted energy exports from the Persian Gulf region. As a result of such conflicts, global trade is rapidly shifting away from traditional routes and toward alliance-based networks. Initiatives such as the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC), and the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) have emerged as major overland and multimodal routes connecting allied nations along north–south and east–west axes. 

At the same time, efforts to expand and identify new geopolitical and geo-economic corridors have brought increasing attention to the Arctic Ocean along the world’s northern rim. This region is emerging as a potential hub for the shortest strategic Lines of Communication (LOCs), offering new possibilities for global connectivity and trade. Russia’s strategic development of its northern maritime routes—particularly its efforts to expand and operationalize the Maritime Multilateral Collegium, a naval consortium among allied nations—highlights the growing significance of Sea Power in the contemporary era. These developments represent some of the most notable transformations in global trade dynamics. Analyses indicate that by 2030, up to 40 percent of international trade could be rerouted through these emerging corridors, reflecting their rapid rise in strategic and economic importance.

With major neighboring countries advancing their own connectivity initiatives—China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Thailand’s “One Port, Two Sides” project, and India’s various international trade corridor plans—Myanmar has a strategic opportunity to leverage its advantageous geopolitical location. By acting at the right moment and utilizing these regional frameworks, the country could establish itself as a key node in Asia’s emerging trade architecture.

Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC) 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

 

Eastern Maritime Corridor

 

During the Eastern Economic Forum held in 2019, Russia and India held bilateral discussions and reached an initial agreement to establish direct maritime connectivity between Russia’s port of Vladivostok and India’s port of Chennai. The primary objective of the Eastern Maritime Corridor is to reduce both transit time and transportation costs for the movement of goods between Russia and India. At present, the western maritime route connecting India and Russia—from India’s Port of Mumbai to Russia’s Port of Saint Petersburg—covers a distance of approximately 8,675 nautical miles, requiring around 40 days of transit. In the future, the Eastern Maritime Corridor connecting India’s Port of Chennai and Russia’s Port of Vladivostok will span approximately 5,647 nautical miles, reducing the transit time to around 28 days. Compared to the current western maritime route, this represents a shortening of nearly 3,000 nautical miles and a saving of roughly 12 days in shipping time.

The Eastern Maritime Corridor will pass through the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea, navigating near the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Malacca Strait, before entering the Bay of Bengal and ultimately reaching Chennai via the Nicobar Islands. If realized, this maritime route could serve as an optimal gateway not only for the countries directly involved but also for Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea region, including Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia, facilitating enhanced trade and connectivity across the region.

 

 International North-South Transport Corridor - INSTC

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

 

International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

          

Launched in 2018, the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is being developed as a multimodal trade network linking India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, several Central Asian states, and parts of Europe. The corridor integrates maritime, rail, and road systems to facilitate more efficient transport of goods across these regions, creating a comprehensive north–south connectivity framework. The INSTC is designed as a key tri-modal corridor that links Russia and Asia by traversing the Caspian Sea. Along the Eastern Route, overland connections—via rail and road—link Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and India. The Central Route will combine maritime and overland transport, linking Russia, the Caspian Sea, Iran, and India. This route crosses the Caspian Sea, transporting goods from Russia’s Port of Astrakhan to Iran’s Port of Bandar-e-Anzali. The Western Route will link Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and India through overland transport—using rail and road networks. This multimodal transport corridor spans approximately 4,500 miles and is expected to offer significant savings in both time and cost compared with current shipping routes that rely on the Suez Canal. Studies indicate that the INSTC could reduce the transport distance for goods shipped from Russia to India by up to 40 percent. It is also expected to lower overall transportation costs by around 30 percent, while cutting transit time by 25 to 40 days compared with traditional routes.

 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

 

North-South Corridor

 

          Russia and India are focusing on developing promising production and market-expansion value chains across Eurasia. With the objective of realizing a broader Eurasian trade space, both countries are working to strengthen and interlink the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor and the International North–South Transport Corridor. These combined efforts aim to enhance connectivity and support deeper economic integration throughout the Eurasian region. The corridor is expected to bring substantial benefits to the countries along its route by boosting trade flows. For Myanmar, strategically located between the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, timely and effective utilization of these opportunities could yield significant advantages for national economic development.

India-Middle East-Europe Corridor - IMEC

The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) is an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. The corridor aims to stimulate economic growth by facilitating smoother trade flows and fostering closer commercial linkages across these regions. The corridor is planned as a route from India to Europe, passing through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Greece.  At the 2023 G20 Summit held in India, the governments of India, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy, and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).  The corridor is structured into two separate routes. The eastern route will connect the western coastal port of Mundra in India with Fujairah in the UAE, while goods from Saudi Arabia and Jordan will be transported by rail to Israel’s Port of Haifa. The western route will link Israel’s Port of Haifa to multiple ports in Europe, including Marseille in France, as well as ports in Italy and Greece. 

 

India-Middle East- Europe Economic Corridor: What is the New Spice Route  IMEC?

India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC)

          

The IMEC represents India’s new corridor designed to enhance economic integration by linking Asia with Europe. 

Italy has shown a strong inclination to distance itself from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and amid divergences within the G7, the IMEC project has emerged as an alternative framework. The IMEC corridor has evolved into a multimodal initiative, incorporating both rail and maritime routes, that connects India with the Middle East and Europe. The combined GDP of the IMEC countries—including the European Union—is estimated at approximately USD 47 trillion, representing roughly 40 percent of the world’s total GDP. 

Within the project, reliable and cost-effective transport systems—including both maritime and rail networks—will be established for the cross-border movement of goods and services. Like the Suez Canal, the north–south transport corridors, and China’s Belt and Road routes, this project will complement existing maritime and rail transport networks by facilitating smoother trade and logistics between India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Europe.

 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) 

By linking India with the Middle East and Europe, the IMEC corridor strengthens India’s geopolitical influence and positions the country as a more active player in both regional and global affairs. In addition, the corridor could facilitate smoother and more reliable flows of India’s critical natural resources, thereby supporting the country’s energy security and strengthening its capacity to meet domestic and industrial energy demands.

Opportunities and Challenges

The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) has the potential to emerge as a direct competitor to China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for a variety of strategic and economic reasons. The strategic northern alignment of IMEC is designed to facilitate trade between India, the Middle East, and Europe. Analyses suggest that, compared with some of the longer and more complex routes under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), IMEC could offer greater efficiency and lower transportation costs.

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor picks up historical trade routes (Elmurod Usubaliev/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)

          The IMEC corridor is expected to boost regional trade while attracting investment into India. By enhancing diplomatic ties and fostering political goodwill, it can strengthen India’s market presence and promote comprehensive economic development across the country. Exports from India to continental Europe could see transportation costs reduced by approximately 30 percent and transit times shortened by around 40 percent compared with the current Suez Canal route. Connecting India’s two largest trade partners—the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—through the IMEC corridor could further bolster India’s position as a major global power. 

Just as the IMEC corridor presents significant opportunities, it also comes with its share of challenges that must be addressed. The corridor faces several geopolitical and operational challenges. Some Middle Eastern countries lack well-developed production capacities, business operating costs are high, and key nations such as Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Qatar are not participating. Additionally, certain geographic constraints arising from the corridor’s location present further limitations that need to be managed. Moreover, the corridor will need to navigate a range of regional conflict-related challenges, such as disruptions to maritime trade caused by the Israel–Hamas conflict and the activities of Houthi rebels in Yemen affecting Red Sea shipping. Effectively managing these security risks will be essential to ensuring uninterrupted trade flows. Through the IMEC project, India is not only building new infrastructure but also creating alternative pathways for global partnerships. The corridor facilitates the bridging of differences and the transformation of potential challenges into opportunities, fostering collaboration and enhancing India’s strategic and economic engagement worldwide. The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) represents a strategic advancement that goes beyond a mere economic initiative. By enhancing India’s energy security, strengthening transportation and logistics resilience, promoting economic prosperity, and supporting national security, the corridor positions India as a more active player in both regional and global affairs. It is expected to bolster India’s geopolitical influence and expand its strategic footprint across Eurasia.

 

The  Maritime Collegium of the Russian Federation  

 

On August 13, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed and officially announced the establishment of the “Russian Maritime Collegium.” Today, Russia’s Maritime Collegium seeks to fully develop the Blue Economy by connecting global maritime trade routes and economic corridors. To achieve this, it is working to establish a “Multilateral Maritime Collegium” that brings together partner countries, creating an integrated framework for international maritime cooperation. The envisioned Multilateral Maritime Collegium is expected to include key countries from Russia-led groupings such as BRICS, SCO, and CIS. It aims to facilitate coordinated connectivity across the Indo-Pacific region, the Middle East, East and Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa, promoting harmonized maritime cooperation among participating nations.

 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

 

Russian transport routes

Russia has established the Multilateral Maritime Collegium with the objective of enhancing its control and influence over Arctic and northern maritime routes, which are central to its national maritime interests. The initiative is also intended to integrate these routes with international maritime networks, creating a coordinated framework for global maritime economic engagement. Furthermore, following the inauguration of President Donald Trump’s administration, Russia observed U.S. efforts to assert control over Greenland and advance a “unipolar world” strategy. In response, Russia sought to promote a “multipolar world” by establishing the Multilateral Maritime Collegium, a framework designed to unite partner countries around shared national economic interests and foster coordinated engagement in global maritime affairs.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a significant framework of cooperation for Myanmar, offering numerous opportunities in economic development, transportation connectivity, and regional infrastructure expansion. By linking with this major global initiative, Myanmar has the opportunity to leverage its strategic geographic position to establish itself as a central hub for regional connectivity and trade. In particular, the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) serves as a central pillar of this connectivity, with the potential to drive development across ports, highways, railways, energy infrastructure, and special economic zones. 

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) | Download ...

China-Myanmar Economic Corridor

These developments could provide critical support for modernizing Myanmar’s essential infrastructure sector, helping to upgrade and expand the country’s foundational facilities to meet current and future needs. Improved stability in electricity supply and enhanced transportation infrastructure will boost domestic production capacity and create a favorable environment to attract foreign investment. Moreover, the corridor is expected to open major gateways for Myanmar’s abundant yet underutilized natural resources, agricultural products, and human capital to access global markets. 

For Myanmar, linking with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could provide significant leverage in terms of strategic geopolitical importance and offer substantial economic opportunities. Myanmar shares an extensive border with China and occupies a strategically advantageous position with direct access to the Indian Ocean. It is precisely because of this strategic advantage that Myanmar plays a crucial role as a key focal point within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), serving as a central component of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The CMEC projects include the development of deep-sea ports such as Kyaukpyu, the construction of major energy transmission lines, and the enhancement of transportation infrastructure. These initiatives are expected not only to enhance Myanmar’s domestic economy but also to function as a land bridge, facilitating smoother trade and investment flows to neighboring countries such as China and other Southeast Asian nations. Especially, projects related to Kyaukpyu Port are expected to elevate Myanmar’s status as a major port on the Indian Ocean, positioning it as a key player in regional maritime trade and enhancing its significance in the broader logistics and shipping network.

Thailand’s "One Port, Two Sides" 

Thailand's Kra Land Bridge (Might) Reshape Asia

 

Thailand’s proposed land bridge project

The Thai government has issued a draft law for a new land bridge project—a high-value overland transport corridor linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. This initiative, valued at several billion dollars, aims to establish a strategic trade route facilitating faster and more efficient regional commerce. The project is slated for completion by 2030 and is estimated to require an investment of approximately 1 trillion baht (around USD 29 billion). The new overland corridor project includes two deep-sea ports in Thailand: one at Ranong District on the western coast along the Andaman Sea, and another at Chon Phon District on the eastern coast along the Gulf of Thailand. These two ports will be connected by both railway and road networks, ensuring seamless overland transportation along the corridor. The total estimated cost for the entire project is approximately USD 35.6 billion. Foreign investors will be allowed to hold more than 50 percent ownership in joint ventures and domestic companies involved in the project. The Thai government aims to avoid relying solely on China for investment, actively seeking to attract capital from Saudi Arabia and other countries as well. The initiative also aims to establish the “Southern Special Economic Corridor” to further promote economic development in Thailand’s southern region. The Thai government has attracted interest from over 100 international investors, including some of the world’s largest shipping companies. Construction for the project is planned to begin in the third quarter of 2026, with completion targeted for 2030.

Myanmar Strategic Pivot ....

 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

Myanmar Strategic Pivot

Amid the rapidly evolving geopolitical and economic landscape, the emergence of new international trade route networks presents Myanmar with significant opportunities. It is crucial for the country to strategically position itself to leverage these developments and maximize the benefits for national growth and regional integration. Russia, leveraging its strategic geographic position, is actively developing new north-to-south trade corridors. Currently, it is collaborating with India, Iran, and Azerbaijan to advance the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, which will connect eastern Russian cities by sea to India. Additionally, Russia is engaging in cooperative initiatives with China within the Arctic region, further enhancing its reach and influence in global maritime trade networks.

From China’s perspective, leveraging its strategic geographic position, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is being implemented as a major east-to-west international trade corridor. When combined with Russia’s emerging north-to-south trade routes, these corridors are creating critical junctions where the two networks intersect. Myanmar, due to its strategic location, sits squarely at one of these pivotal points, positioning the country as a key regional hub for trade and connectivity. In future global trade networks, Myanmar’s strategically located zones—such as Thilawa Deep-Sea Port and its associated special economic zones—are well-positioned to generate significant opportunities in maritime trade and related economic activities. Myanmar’s Thilawa Deep-Sea Port occupies a strategically important location along the maritime route connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, underscoring the country’s critical geopolitical and economic position. For example, from Thilawa Deep-Sea Port, Myanmar’s strategic location allows overland connections to key cities such as Bangkok in Thailand, Phnom Penh in Cambodia, and Ho Chi Minh City and Vũng Tàu in Vietnam, ultimately linking to the South China Sea. By overland distance, the route spans approximately 800 kilometers, compared with the more than 2,000 nautical miles by sea from Thilawa Deep-Sea Port to Vũng Tàu Port in Vietnam, making it roughly one-third the distance. In other words, this corridor represents the shortest route connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

 

The Shortest Route Connecting the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean

Thus, by strategically leveraging Myanmar’s geographic pivot point, the country can effectively participate in international overland and maritime trade corridor projects connecting partner and neighboring countries. This coordinated engagement can serve as a key catalyst for building a sovereign state that is not only sustainable and resilient but also comprehensive and prosperous in its long-term development.

မောင်မိုး| ၂၅-၈-၂၀၂၅

Maung Moe

In today’s world, major global trade routes are facing a noticeable decline in traffic. Traditional international maritime corridors—such as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal—are seeing reduced trade flows as a result of escalating geopolitical tensions. The Russia–Ukraine war, the Iran–Israel conflict and broader instability across the Middle East, the intensifying strategic rivalry between China and the United States, and prolonged conflicts between India and Pakistan have all contributed to disruptions in maritime commerce. Due to the war in Ukraine, trade routes between Russia and Europe have shrunk by as much as 60 percent. At the same time, economic sanctions imposed between Iran and Western nations have severely disrupted energy exports from the Persian Gulf region. As a result of such conflicts, global trade is rapidly shifting away from traditional routes and toward alliance-based networks. Initiatives such as the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC), and the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) have emerged as major overland and multimodal routes connecting allied nations along north–south and east–west axes. 

At the same time, efforts to expand and identify new geopolitical and geo-economic corridors have brought increasing attention to the Arctic Ocean along the world’s northern rim. This region is emerging as a potential hub for the shortest strategic Lines of Communication (LOCs), offering new possibilities for global connectivity and trade. Russia’s strategic development of its northern maritime routes—particularly its efforts to expand and operationalize the Maritime Multilateral Collegium, a naval consortium among allied nations—highlights the growing significance of Sea Power in the contemporary era. These developments represent some of the most notable transformations in global trade dynamics. Analyses indicate that by 2030, up to 40 percent of international trade could be rerouted through these emerging corridors, reflecting their rapid rise in strategic and economic importance.

With major neighboring countries advancing their own connectivity initiatives—China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Thailand’s “One Port, Two Sides” project, and India’s various international trade corridor plans—Myanmar has a strategic opportunity to leverage its advantageous geopolitical location. By acting at the right moment and utilizing these regional frameworks, the country could establish itself as a key node in Asia’s emerging trade architecture.

Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC) 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

 

Eastern Maritime Corridor

 

During the Eastern Economic Forum held in 2019, Russia and India held bilateral discussions and reached an initial agreement to establish direct maritime connectivity between Russia’s port of Vladivostok and India’s port of Chennai. The primary objective of the Eastern Maritime Corridor is to reduce both transit time and transportation costs for the movement of goods between Russia and India. At present, the western maritime route connecting India and Russia—from India’s Port of Mumbai to Russia’s Port of Saint Petersburg—covers a distance of approximately 8,675 nautical miles, requiring around 40 days of transit. In the future, the Eastern Maritime Corridor connecting India’s Port of Chennai and Russia’s Port of Vladivostok will span approximately 5,647 nautical miles, reducing the transit time to around 28 days. Compared to the current western maritime route, this represents a shortening of nearly 3,000 nautical miles and a saving of roughly 12 days in shipping time.

The Eastern Maritime Corridor will pass through the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea, navigating near the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Malacca Strait, before entering the Bay of Bengal and ultimately reaching Chennai via the Nicobar Islands. If realized, this maritime route could serve as an optimal gateway not only for the countries directly involved but also for Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea region, including Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia, facilitating enhanced trade and connectivity across the region.

 

 International North-South Transport Corridor - INSTC

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

 

International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

          

Launched in 2018, the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is being developed as a multimodal trade network linking India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, several Central Asian states, and parts of Europe. The corridor integrates maritime, rail, and road systems to facilitate more efficient transport of goods across these regions, creating a comprehensive north–south connectivity framework. The INSTC is designed as a key tri-modal corridor that links Russia and Asia by traversing the Caspian Sea. Along the Eastern Route, overland connections—via rail and road—link Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and India. The Central Route will combine maritime and overland transport, linking Russia, the Caspian Sea, Iran, and India. This route crosses the Caspian Sea, transporting goods from Russia’s Port of Astrakhan to Iran’s Port of Bandar-e-Anzali. The Western Route will link Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and India through overland transport—using rail and road networks. This multimodal transport corridor spans approximately 4,500 miles and is expected to offer significant savings in both time and cost compared with current shipping routes that rely on the Suez Canal. Studies indicate that the INSTC could reduce the transport distance for goods shipped from Russia to India by up to 40 percent. It is also expected to lower overall transportation costs by around 30 percent, while cutting transit time by 25 to 40 days compared with traditional routes.

 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

 

North-South Corridor

 

          Russia and India are focusing on developing promising production and market-expansion value chains across Eurasia. With the objective of realizing a broader Eurasian trade space, both countries are working to strengthen and interlink the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor and the International North–South Transport Corridor. These combined efforts aim to enhance connectivity and support deeper economic integration throughout the Eurasian region. The corridor is expected to bring substantial benefits to the countries along its route by boosting trade flows. For Myanmar, strategically located between the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, timely and effective utilization of these opportunities could yield significant advantages for national economic development.

India-Middle East-Europe Corridor - IMEC

The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) is an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. The corridor aims to stimulate economic growth by facilitating smoother trade flows and fostering closer commercial linkages across these regions. The corridor is planned as a route from India to Europe, passing through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Greece.  At the 2023 G20 Summit held in India, the governments of India, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy, and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).  The corridor is structured into two separate routes. The eastern route will connect the western coastal port of Mundra in India with Fujairah in the UAE, while goods from Saudi Arabia and Jordan will be transported by rail to Israel’s Port of Haifa. The western route will link Israel’s Port of Haifa to multiple ports in Europe, including Marseille in France, as well as ports in Italy and Greece. 

 

India-Middle East- Europe Economic Corridor: What is the New Spice Route  IMEC?

India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC)

          

The IMEC represents India’s new corridor designed to enhance economic integration by linking Asia with Europe. 

Italy has shown a strong inclination to distance itself from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and amid divergences within the G7, the IMEC project has emerged as an alternative framework. The IMEC corridor has evolved into a multimodal initiative, incorporating both rail and maritime routes, that connects India with the Middle East and Europe. The combined GDP of the IMEC countries—including the European Union—is estimated at approximately USD 47 trillion, representing roughly 40 percent of the world’s total GDP. 

Within the project, reliable and cost-effective transport systems—including both maritime and rail networks—will be established for the cross-border movement of goods and services. Like the Suez Canal, the north–south transport corridors, and China’s Belt and Road routes, this project will complement existing maritime and rail transport networks by facilitating smoother trade and logistics between India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Europe.

 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) 

By linking India with the Middle East and Europe, the IMEC corridor strengthens India’s geopolitical influence and positions the country as a more active player in both regional and global affairs. In addition, the corridor could facilitate smoother and more reliable flows of India’s critical natural resources, thereby supporting the country’s energy security and strengthening its capacity to meet domestic and industrial energy demands.

Opportunities and Challenges

The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) has the potential to emerge as a direct competitor to China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for a variety of strategic and economic reasons. The strategic northern alignment of IMEC is designed to facilitate trade between India, the Middle East, and Europe. Analyses suggest that, compared with some of the longer and more complex routes under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), IMEC could offer greater efficiency and lower transportation costs.

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor picks up historical trade routes (Elmurod Usubaliev/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)

          The IMEC corridor is expected to boost regional trade while attracting investment into India. By enhancing diplomatic ties and fostering political goodwill, it can strengthen India’s market presence and promote comprehensive economic development across the country. Exports from India to continental Europe could see transportation costs reduced by approximately 30 percent and transit times shortened by around 40 percent compared with the current Suez Canal route. Connecting India’s two largest trade partners—the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—through the IMEC corridor could further bolster India’s position as a major global power. 

Just as the IMEC corridor presents significant opportunities, it also comes with its share of challenges that must be addressed. The corridor faces several geopolitical and operational challenges. Some Middle Eastern countries lack well-developed production capacities, business operating costs are high, and key nations such as Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Qatar are not participating. Additionally, certain geographic constraints arising from the corridor’s location present further limitations that need to be managed. Moreover, the corridor will need to navigate a range of regional conflict-related challenges, such as disruptions to maritime trade caused by the Israel–Hamas conflict and the activities of Houthi rebels in Yemen affecting Red Sea shipping. Effectively managing these security risks will be essential to ensuring uninterrupted trade flows. Through the IMEC project, India is not only building new infrastructure but also creating alternative pathways for global partnerships. The corridor facilitates the bridging of differences and the transformation of potential challenges into opportunities, fostering collaboration and enhancing India’s strategic and economic engagement worldwide. The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) represents a strategic advancement that goes beyond a mere economic initiative. By enhancing India’s energy security, strengthening transportation and logistics resilience, promoting economic prosperity, and supporting national security, the corridor positions India as a more active player in both regional and global affairs. It is expected to bolster India’s geopolitical influence and expand its strategic footprint across Eurasia.

 

The  Maritime Collegium of the Russian Federation  

 

On August 13, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed and officially announced the establishment of the “Russian Maritime Collegium.” Today, Russia’s Maritime Collegium seeks to fully develop the Blue Economy by connecting global maritime trade routes and economic corridors. To achieve this, it is working to establish a “Multilateral Maritime Collegium” that brings together partner countries, creating an integrated framework for international maritime cooperation. The envisioned Multilateral Maritime Collegium is expected to include key countries from Russia-led groupings such as BRICS, SCO, and CIS. It aims to facilitate coordinated connectivity across the Indo-Pacific region, the Middle East, East and Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa, promoting harmonized maritime cooperation among participating nations.

 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

 

Russian transport routes

Russia has established the Multilateral Maritime Collegium with the objective of enhancing its control and influence over Arctic and northern maritime routes, which are central to its national maritime interests. The initiative is also intended to integrate these routes with international maritime networks, creating a coordinated framework for global maritime economic engagement. Furthermore, following the inauguration of President Donald Trump’s administration, Russia observed U.S. efforts to assert control over Greenland and advance a “unipolar world” strategy. In response, Russia sought to promote a “multipolar world” by establishing the Multilateral Maritime Collegium, a framework designed to unite partner countries around shared national economic interests and foster coordinated engagement in global maritime affairs.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a significant framework of cooperation for Myanmar, offering numerous opportunities in economic development, transportation connectivity, and regional infrastructure expansion. By linking with this major global initiative, Myanmar has the opportunity to leverage its strategic geographic position to establish itself as a central hub for regional connectivity and trade. In particular, the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) serves as a central pillar of this connectivity, with the potential to drive development across ports, highways, railways, energy infrastructure, and special economic zones. 

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) | Download ...

China-Myanmar Economic Corridor

These developments could provide critical support for modernizing Myanmar’s essential infrastructure sector, helping to upgrade and expand the country’s foundational facilities to meet current and future needs. Improved stability in electricity supply and enhanced transportation infrastructure will boost domestic production capacity and create a favorable environment to attract foreign investment. Moreover, the corridor is expected to open major gateways for Myanmar’s abundant yet underutilized natural resources, agricultural products, and human capital to access global markets. 

For Myanmar, linking with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could provide significant leverage in terms of strategic geopolitical importance and offer substantial economic opportunities. Myanmar shares an extensive border with China and occupies a strategically advantageous position with direct access to the Indian Ocean. It is precisely because of this strategic advantage that Myanmar plays a crucial role as a key focal point within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), serving as a central component of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The CMEC projects include the development of deep-sea ports such as Kyaukpyu, the construction of major energy transmission lines, and the enhancement of transportation infrastructure. These initiatives are expected not only to enhance Myanmar’s domestic economy but also to function as a land bridge, facilitating smoother trade and investment flows to neighboring countries such as China and other Southeast Asian nations. Especially, projects related to Kyaukpyu Port are expected to elevate Myanmar’s status as a major port on the Indian Ocean, positioning it as a key player in regional maritime trade and enhancing its significance in the broader logistics and shipping network.

Thailand’s "One Port, Two Sides" 

Thailand's Kra Land Bridge (Might) Reshape Asia

 

Thailand’s proposed land bridge project

The Thai government has issued a draft law for a new land bridge project—a high-value overland transport corridor linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. This initiative, valued at several billion dollars, aims to establish a strategic trade route facilitating faster and more efficient regional commerce. The project is slated for completion by 2030 and is estimated to require an investment of approximately 1 trillion baht (around USD 29 billion). The new overland corridor project includes two deep-sea ports in Thailand: one at Ranong District on the western coast along the Andaman Sea, and another at Chon Phon District on the eastern coast along the Gulf of Thailand. These two ports will be connected by both railway and road networks, ensuring seamless overland transportation along the corridor. The total estimated cost for the entire project is approximately USD 35.6 billion. Foreign investors will be allowed to hold more than 50 percent ownership in joint ventures and domestic companies involved in the project. The Thai government aims to avoid relying solely on China for investment, actively seeking to attract capital from Saudi Arabia and other countries as well. The initiative also aims to establish the “Southern Special Economic Corridor” to further promote economic development in Thailand’s southern region. The Thai government has attracted interest from over 100 international investors, including some of the world’s largest shipping companies. Construction for the project is planned to begin in the third quarter of 2026, with completion targeted for 2030.

Myanmar Strategic Pivot ....

 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

Myanmar Strategic Pivot

Amid the rapidly evolving geopolitical and economic landscape, the emergence of new international trade route networks presents Myanmar with significant opportunities. It is crucial for the country to strategically position itself to leverage these developments and maximize the benefits for national growth and regional integration. Russia, leveraging its strategic geographic position, is actively developing new north-to-south trade corridors. Currently, it is collaborating with India, Iran, and Azerbaijan to advance the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, which will connect eastern Russian cities by sea to India. Additionally, Russia is engaging in cooperative initiatives with China within the Arctic region, further enhancing its reach and influence in global maritime trade networks.

From China’s perspective, leveraging its strategic geographic position, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is being implemented as a major east-to-west international trade corridor. When combined with Russia’s emerging north-to-south trade routes, these corridors are creating critical junctions where the two networks intersect. Myanmar, due to its strategic location, sits squarely at one of these pivotal points, positioning the country as a key regional hub for trade and connectivity. In future global trade networks, Myanmar’s strategically located zones—such as Thilawa Deep-Sea Port and its associated special economic zones—are well-positioned to generate significant opportunities in maritime trade and related economic activities. Myanmar’s Thilawa Deep-Sea Port occupies a strategically important location along the maritime route connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, underscoring the country’s critical geopolitical and economic position. For example, from Thilawa Deep-Sea Port, Myanmar’s strategic location allows overland connections to key cities such as Bangkok in Thailand, Phnom Penh in Cambodia, and Ho Chi Minh City and Vũng Tàu in Vietnam, ultimately linking to the South China Sea. By overland distance, the route spans approximately 800 kilometers, compared with the more than 2,000 nautical miles by sea from Thilawa Deep-Sea Port to Vũng Tàu Port in Vietnam, making it roughly one-third the distance. In other words, this corridor represents the shortest route connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

 

Emerging Global Trade Corridor Networks and Myanmar’s Strategic Pivot Opportunities

 

The Shortest Route Connecting the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean

Thus, by strategically leveraging Myanmar’s geographic pivot point, the country can effectively participate in international overland and maritime trade corridor projects connecting partner and neighboring countries. This coordinated engagement can serve as a key catalyst for building a sovereign state that is not only sustainable and resilient but also comprehensive and prosperous in its long-term development.

မောင်မိုး| ၂၅-၈-၂၀၂၅

80% of Ayeyawady beach hotels booked for Thadingyut
-
During the upcoming long Thadingyut holiday in October, 80 per cent of hotel rooms at seaside resorts including Chaungtha, Ngwehsaung, and Shwethaungyan beaches, and Goyangyi Island have already been booked in advance by domestic and foreign tourists, according to the Directorate of Hotels and Tourism.In the Ayeyawady Region, these seaside resorts possess favourable geographical conditions along the coastline and coastal areas. The regional government is striving to develop them into a vibrant and sustainable tourism industry while also establishing them as long-term competitive tourist destinations. During public holidays, the influx of visitors to these beach resorts contributes not only to the growth of the tourism sector but also to the expansion of related services and the creation of job opportunities for local communities.In the four seaside resorts of the Ayeyawady Region, more than 500,000 visitors arrived annually in 2023 and 2024. By August 2025, a total of 159,213 tourists had visited. Local hotel and guesthouse operators estimated that, starting from this Thadingyut holiday and throughout the open tourism season, the number of visitors will surpass last year’s figures.In the Ayeyawady Region, the Ngwehsaung and Chaungtha beaches, which have good transportation access and sufficient infrastructure, are popular destinations regularly visited by both domestic and international travellers each year. Although reaching Goyangyi Island and Shwethaungyan Beach takes more time, their natural beauty continues to attract visitors. Hotel and guesthouse operators have observed that if transportation access is further improved, the number of tourists visiting these destinations could increase even more.“In the Thadingyut holiday, tourists are expected to flock to the beaches of the Ayeyawady Region. About 80 per cent of the rooms at the four main beaches have been booked in advance. In Ngwehsaung, there are 38 hotels, guesthouses, and lodges; in Chaungtha and Shwethaungyan, another 38; and including Goyangyi Island, a total of 49,197 rooms are open for visitors. Tourism is an industry that succeeds only through collective effort. It is also a smokeless income-generating sector and can uplift the socio-economic status of a region. With hotel bookings already reaching 80 per cent for the Thadingyut holiday, new job opportunities are opening up, and the industry is bringing benefits to the country. Hotels are urged to provide the best possible service, while tourists are kindly requested to work together in ensuring that the natural beauty of the beaches is preserved and not harmed,” said U Aung Thu Oo, director of the directorate.The government also extends visa relaxation on the visa on arrival year by year to promote the tourism industry, and the dtirector of flights from Yangon to Pathein can earn a higher income like Thailand. The Ayeyawady Region government make efforts to attract international travellers by cooperating with different departments, hotelier committees and associations.

During the upcoming long Thadingyut holiday in October, 80 per cent of hotel rooms at seaside resorts including Chaungtha, Ngwehsaung, and Shwethaungyan beaches, and Goyangyi Island have already been booked in advance by domestic and foreign tourists, according to the Directorate of Hotels and Tourism.
In the Ayeyawady Region, these seaside resorts possess favourable geographical conditions along the coastline and coastal areas. The regional government is striving to develop them into a vibrant and sustainable tourism industry while also establishing them as long-term competitive tourist destinations. During public holidays, the influx of visitors to these beach resorts contributes not only to the growth of the tourism sector but also to the expansion of related services and the creation of job opportunities for local communities.
In the four seaside resorts of the Ayeyawady Region, more than 500,000 visitors arrived annually in 2023 and 2024. By August 2025, a total of 159,213 tourists had visited. Local hotel and guesthouse operators estimated that, starting from this Thadingyut holiday and throughout the open tourism season, the number of visitors will surpass last year’s figures.
In the Ayeyawady Region, the Ngwehsaung and Chaungtha beaches, which have good transportation access and sufficient infrastructure, are popular destinations regularly visited by both domestic and international travellers each year. Although reaching Goyangyi Island and Shwethaungyan Beach takes more time, their natural beauty continues to attract visitors. Hotel and guesthouse operators have observed that if transportation access is further improved, the number of tourists visiting these destinations could increase even more.
“In the Thadingyut holiday, tourists are expected to flock to the beaches of the Ayeyawady Region. About 80 per cent of the rooms at the four main beaches have been booked in advance. In Ngwehsaung, there are 38 hotels, guesthouses, and lodges; in Chaungtha and Shwethaungyan, another 38; and including Goyangyi Island, a total of 49,197 rooms are open for visitors. Tourism is an industry that succeeds only through collective effort. It is also a smokeless income-generating sector and can uplift the socio-economic status of a region. With hotel bookings already reaching 80 per cent for the Thadingyut holiday, new job opportunities are opening up, and the industry is bringing benefits to the country. Hotels are urged to provide the best possible service, while tourists are kindly requested to work together in ensuring that the natural beauty of the beaches is preserved and not harmed,” said U Aung Thu Oo, director of the directorate.
The government also extends visa relaxation on the visa on arrival year by year to promote the tourism industry, and the dtirector of flights from Yangon to Pathein can earn a higher income like Thailand. The Ayeyawady Region government make efforts to attract international travellers by cooperating with different departments, hotelier committees and associations.

Nyein Thu (MNA)/KTZH

During the upcoming long Thadingyut holiday in October, 80 per cent of hotel rooms at seaside resorts including Chaungtha, Ngwehsaung, and Shwethaungyan beaches, and Goyangyi Island have already been booked in advance by domestic and foreign tourists, according to the Directorate of Hotels and Tourism.
In the Ayeyawady Region, these seaside resorts possess favourable geographical conditions along the coastline and coastal areas. The regional government is striving to develop them into a vibrant and sustainable tourism industry while also establishing them as long-term competitive tourist destinations. During public holidays, the influx of visitors to these beach resorts contributes not only to the growth of the tourism sector but also to the expansion of related services and the creation of job opportunities for local communities.
In the four seaside resorts of the Ayeyawady Region, more than 500,000 visitors arrived annually in 2023 and 2024. By August 2025, a total of 159,213 tourists had visited. Local hotel and guesthouse operators estimated that, starting from this Thadingyut holiday and throughout the open tourism season, the number of visitors will surpass last year’s figures.
In the Ayeyawady Region, the Ngwehsaung and Chaungtha beaches, which have good transportation access and sufficient infrastructure, are popular destinations regularly visited by both domestic and international travellers each year. Although reaching Goyangyi Island and Shwethaungyan Beach takes more time, their natural beauty continues to attract visitors. Hotel and guesthouse operators have observed that if transportation access is further improved, the number of tourists visiting these destinations could increase even more.
“In the Thadingyut holiday, tourists are expected to flock to the beaches of the Ayeyawady Region. About 80 per cent of the rooms at the four main beaches have been booked in advance. In Ngwehsaung, there are 38 hotels, guesthouses, and lodges; in Chaungtha and Shwethaungyan, another 38; and including Goyangyi Island, a total of 49,197 rooms are open for visitors. Tourism is an industry that succeeds only through collective effort. It is also a smokeless income-generating sector and can uplift the socio-economic status of a region. With hotel bookings already reaching 80 per cent for the Thadingyut holiday, new job opportunities are opening up, and the industry is bringing benefits to the country. Hotels are urged to provide the best possible service, while tourists are kindly requested to work together in ensuring that the natural beauty of the beaches is preserved and not harmed,” said U Aung Thu Oo, director of the directorate.
The government also extends visa relaxation on the visa on arrival year by year to promote the tourism industry, and the dtirector of flights from Yangon to Pathein can earn a higher income like Thailand. The Ayeyawady Region government make efforts to attract international travellers by cooperating with different departments, hotelier committees and associations.

Silk Road cinema connecting cultures and forging cooperation across borders
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In 2025, the Belt and Road Initiative will celebrate 12 years of global cooperation between more than 150 countries. Beyond trade and infrastructure, its heartbeat lies in bringing people closer together.Film, as a universal language, has emerged as a medium for cultural exchange. To advance this vision, the Silk Road International Film Festival (SRIFF) was launched in the very year the initiative began, weaving stories that unite cultures along historic trade routes.This year, the festival takes place between 22 and 26 September in Fuzhou, Fujian Province, under the theme “Silk Road Connects the World, Film Festival Illuminates Fuzhou”. SRIFF fosters understanding across the Silk RoadUnlike other global film festivals, SRIFF places a special focus on countries along the Silk Road. This focus reflects the festival’s mission to carry forward the ancient spirit of connection by providing a stage to showcase each nation’s unique culture and charm, while fostering trust, respect, and mutual understanding among countries.This is where cinema becomes more than entertainment. It has become a bridge of understanding. Through stories that resonate emotionally, films allow audiences to step into different cultures, societies, and experiences.As acclaimed director Christopher Nolan once noted, cinema is not only about telling a character’s story, but it’s about letting audiences see the world through that character’s eyes, and ultimately understand them on a deeper level. A golden opportunity for international filmsChina’s film market is vast and has become one of the most important markets for international cinema. As the world’s second-largest box office, it generated about $5.56 billion in revenue, second only to the US and Canada, according to Forbes. With more than 90,000 cinema screens, the largest network worldwide, China represents a remarkable opportunity for filmmakers.Although Hollywood films dominate imports, there is growing space for films from Silk Road countries in the Chinese market. Chinese audiences are open to global storytelling, as seen in successes like Bad Genius (Thailand, 2020), A Place Called Silence (Malaysia, 2022), and No Prior Appointment (Iran, 2025).In this context, SRIFF plays an essential role. This year, nearly 90 domestic and international films are being screened across nine cities in Fujian Province.Selected from 2,560 submissions spanning 120 countries and regions, the lineup honours the 120th anniversary of Chinese cinema, highlights works from countries along the Silk Road, such as Whispers in the Dabbas (Indonesia, 2025) and Close up Kopitian (Malaysia, 2025).It offers filmmakers a valuable gateway to China’s massive box office market. SRIFF promotes co-productionsEntering China’s film market is no small feat, as international films must meet criteria and navigate approval procedures. Co-productions, however, offer a promising solution. Treated as domestic films in both countries, they face fewer distribution barriers, allowing filmmakers to create content that resonates with audiences on both sides.SRIFF plays a pivotal role in promoting such collaborations, providing a platform for dialogue between filmmakers and policymakers. This year, officials from ten Silk Road countries, including Malaysia, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and Nepal, offered insights into their domestic filmmaking and distribution policies.Malaysia, for example, offers up to a 35 per cent cash rebate for films incorporating local culture. Dato Kamil Othman, chairman of the National Film Development Corporation, encourages historical co-productions between China and Malaysia, such as stories about Zheng He’s voyages to Southeast Asia, reflecting the shared heritage of many Malaysians with China.Uzbekistan, with over a century of cinematic history, is producing around 55 historical films, 20 of which are slated for international co-production. The country aims to showcase its world cultural heritage alongside China, offering modern infrastructure, skilled professionals, and cost-effective production opportunities.Indonesia presents a different kind of potential. While domestic films have dominated its box offices since 2022, the nation, with only 2,300 cinemas and more than 300 ethnic cultures spread across nearly 2000 islands, offers ample room for international filmmakers to invest and explore.Nepal is also opening its doors. KP Pathak, director of the Nepal International Film Festival, noted that Chinese films such as Up in the Wind (2013) have been successfully shot in Nepali resorts. The country looks forward to co-productions that highlight the Himalayas, ancient temples, and bring Nepali cinema to a global audience.As the proverb goes, “many hands make light work”. With diverse storytelling, scenic locations, skilled crews, and talented screenwriters, co-productions not only appeal to target audiences but also smooth the path for distribution. In today’s competitive landscape, these collaborations are increasingly essential for filmmakers seeking both creative and market success.The Silk Road International Film Festival leaves a powerful message: Cinema is not only entertainment, but a bridge that crosses borders. It opens new pathways for co-productions, cultural exchanges, and shared storytelling. Though words may vary, the language of film speaks to every heart. It celebrates diverse civilizations along the Silk Road, bringing hearts closer together across the world.mitv
In 2025, the Belt and Road Initiative will celebrate 12 years of global cooperation between more than 150 countries. Beyond trade and infrastructure, its heartbeat lies in bringing people closer together.
Film, as a universal language, has emerged as a medium for cultural exchange. To advance this vision, the Silk Road International Film Festival (SRIFF) was launched in the very year the initiative began, weaving stories that unite cultures along historic trade routes.
This year, the festival takes place between 22 and 26 September in Fuzhou, Fujian Province, under the theme “Silk Road Connects the World, Film Festival Illuminates Fuzhou”.
 
SRIFF fosters understanding across the Silk Road
Unlike other global film festivals, SRIFF places a special focus on countries along the Silk Road. This focus reflects the festival’s mission to carry forward the ancient spirit of connection by providing a stage to showcase each nation’s unique culture and charm, while fostering trust, respect, and mutual understanding among countries.
This is where cinema becomes more than entertainment. It has become a bridge of understanding. Through stories that resonate emotionally, films allow audiences to step into different cultures, societies, and experiences.
As acclaimed director Christopher Nolan once noted, cinema is not only about telling a character’s story, but it’s about letting audiences see the world through that character’s eyes, and ultimately understand them on a deeper level.
 
A golden opportunity for international films
China’s film market is vast and has become one of the most important markets for international cinema. As the world’s second-largest box office, it generated about $5.56 billion in revenue, second only to the US and Canada, according to Forbes. With more than 90,000 cinema screens, the largest network worldwide, China represents a remarkable opportunity for filmmakers.
Although Hollywood films dominate imports, there is growing space for films from Silk Road countries in the Chinese market. Chinese audiences are open to global storytelling, as seen in successes like Bad Genius (Thailand, 2020), A Place Called Silence (Malaysia, 2022), and No Prior Appointment (Iran, 2025).
In this context, SRIFF plays an essential role. This year, nearly 90 domestic and international films are being screened across nine cities in Fujian Province.
Selected from 2,560 submissions spanning 120 countries and regions, the lineup honours the 120th anniversary of Chinese cinema, highlights works from countries along the Silk Road, such as Whispers in the Dabbas (Indonesia, 2025) and Close up Kopitian (Malaysia, 2025).
It offers filmmakers a valuable gateway to China’s massive box office market.
 
SRIFF promotes co-productions
Entering China’s film market is no small feat, as international films must meet criteria and navigate approval procedures. Co-productions, however, offer a promising solution. Treated as domestic films in both countries, they face fewer distribution barriers, allowing filmmakers to create content that resonates with audiences on both sides.
SRIFF plays a pivotal role in promoting such collaborations, providing a platform for dialogue between filmmakers and policymakers. This year, officials from ten Silk Road countries, including Malaysia, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and Nepal, offered insights into their domestic filmmaking and distribution policies.
Malaysia, for example, offers up to a 35 per cent cash rebate for films incorporating local culture. Dato Kamil Othman, chairman of the National Film Development Corporation, encourages historical co-productions between China and Malaysia, such as stories about Zheng He’s voyages to Southeast Asia, reflecting the shared heritage of many Malaysians with China.
Uzbekistan, with over a century of cinematic history, is producing around 55 historical films, 20 of which are slated for international co-production. The country aims to showcase its world cultural heritage alongside China, offering modern infrastructure, skilled professionals, and cost-effective production opportunities.
Indonesia presents a different kind of potential. While domestic films have dominated its box offices since 2022, the nation, with only 2,300 cinemas and more than 300 ethnic cultures spread across nearly 2000 islands, offers ample room for international filmmakers to invest and explore.
Nepal is also opening its doors. KP Pathak, director of the Nepal International Film Festival, noted that Chinese films such as Up in the Wind (2013) have been successfully shot in Nepali resorts. The country looks forward to co-productions that highlight the Himalayas, ancient temples, and bring Nepali cinema to a global audience.
As the proverb goes, “many hands make light work”. With diverse storytelling, scenic locations, skilled crews, and talented screenwriters, co-productions not only appeal to target audiences but also smooth the path for distribution. In today’s competitive landscape, these collaborations are increasingly essential for filmmakers seeking both creative and market success.
The Silk Road International Film Festival leaves a powerful message: Cinema is not only entertainment, but a bridge that crosses borders. It opens new pathways for co-productions, cultural exchanges, and shared storytelling. Though words may vary, the language of film speaks to every heart. It celebrates diverse civilizations along the Silk Road, bringing hearts closer together across the world.
mitv
Chen Ziqi, reporter from CGTN
In 2025, the Belt and Road Initiative will celebrate 12 years of global cooperation between more than 150 countries. Beyond trade and infrastructure, its heartbeat lies in bringing people closer together.
Film, as a universal language, has emerged as a medium for cultural exchange. To advance this vision, the Silk Road International Film Festival (SRIFF) was launched in the very year the initiative began, weaving stories that unite cultures along historic trade routes.
This year, the festival takes place between 22 and 26 September in Fuzhou, Fujian Province, under the theme “Silk Road Connects the World, Film Festival Illuminates Fuzhou”.
 
SRIFF fosters understanding across the Silk Road
Unlike other global film festivals, SRIFF places a special focus on countries along the Silk Road. This focus reflects the festival’s mission to carry forward the ancient spirit of connection by providing a stage to showcase each nation’s unique culture and charm, while fostering trust, respect, and mutual understanding among countries.
This is where cinema becomes more than entertainment. It has become a bridge of understanding. Through stories that resonate emotionally, films allow audiences to step into different cultures, societies, and experiences.
As acclaimed director Christopher Nolan once noted, cinema is not only about telling a character’s story, but it’s about letting audiences see the world through that character’s eyes, and ultimately understand them on a deeper level.
 
A golden opportunity for international films
China’s film market is vast and has become one of the most important markets for international cinema. As the world’s second-largest box office, it generated about $5.56 billion in revenue, second only to the US and Canada, according to Forbes. With more than 90,000 cinema screens, the largest network worldwide, China represents a remarkable opportunity for filmmakers.
Although Hollywood films dominate imports, there is growing space for films from Silk Road countries in the Chinese market. Chinese audiences are open to global storytelling, as seen in successes like Bad Genius (Thailand, 2020), A Place Called Silence (Malaysia, 2022), and No Prior Appointment (Iran, 2025).
In this context, SRIFF plays an essential role. This year, nearly 90 domestic and international films are being screened across nine cities in Fujian Province.
Selected from 2,560 submissions spanning 120 countries and regions, the lineup honours the 120th anniversary of Chinese cinema, highlights works from countries along the Silk Road, such as Whispers in the Dabbas (Indonesia, 2025) and Close up Kopitian (Malaysia, 2025).
It offers filmmakers a valuable gateway to China’s massive box office market.
 
SRIFF promotes co-productions
Entering China’s film market is no small feat, as international films must meet criteria and navigate approval procedures. Co-productions, however, offer a promising solution. Treated as domestic films in both countries, they face fewer distribution barriers, allowing filmmakers to create content that resonates with audiences on both sides.
SRIFF plays a pivotal role in promoting such collaborations, providing a platform for dialogue between filmmakers and policymakers. This year, officials from ten Silk Road countries, including Malaysia, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and Nepal, offered insights into their domestic filmmaking and distribution policies.
Malaysia, for example, offers up to a 35 per cent cash rebate for films incorporating local culture. Dato Kamil Othman, chairman of the National Film Development Corporation, encourages historical co-productions between China and Malaysia, such as stories about Zheng He’s voyages to Southeast Asia, reflecting the shared heritage of many Malaysians with China.
Uzbekistan, with over a century of cinematic history, is producing around 55 historical films, 20 of which are slated for international co-production. The country aims to showcase its world cultural heritage alongside China, offering modern infrastructure, skilled professionals, and cost-effective production opportunities.
Indonesia presents a different kind of potential. While domestic films have dominated its box offices since 2022, the nation, with only 2,300 cinemas and more than 300 ethnic cultures spread across nearly 2000 islands, offers ample room for international filmmakers to invest and explore.
Nepal is also opening its doors. KP Pathak, director of the Nepal International Film Festival, noted that Chinese films such as Up in the Wind (2013) have been successfully shot in Nepali resorts. The country looks forward to co-productions that highlight the Himalayas, ancient temples, and bring Nepali cinema to a global audience.
As the proverb goes, “many hands make light work”. With diverse storytelling, scenic locations, skilled crews, and talented screenwriters, co-productions not only appeal to target audiences but also smooth the path for distribution. In today’s competitive landscape, these collaborations are increasingly essential for filmmakers seeking both creative and market success.
The Silk Road International Film Festival leaves a powerful message: Cinema is not only entertainment, but a bridge that crosses borders. It opens new pathways for co-productions, cultural exchanges, and shared storytelling. Though words may vary, the language of film speaks to every heart. It celebrates diverse civilizations along the Silk Road, bringing hearts closer together across the world.
mitv
European Union as a Supporter of the Progressive Garment Industry of Myanmar
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Myanmar began exporting garments in 1994, but the industry’s growth accelerated only after international sanctions were lifted in the 2010s. The European Union (EU) suspended its sanctions against Myanmar in 2012 and opened an office in Myanmar in 2013. This paved the way for Myanmar to gain duty-free access to the EU market under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) and the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative in 2013.1 Myanmar’s main exports to the EU are textiles, footwear, rice, and gems.2EU as the Top Destination for Myanmar’s Garment ExportsAccording to the World Bank, the value of Myanmar’s garment exports surged from US$0.9 billion in 2010 to US$5.5 billion in 2022, a six-fold increase. A major turning point for the industry came in 2013 when the EU granted Myanmar under the GSP initiative. This preferential access proved highly beneficial, with EU countries receiving over half of Myanmar’s total garment exports. By 2022, garment exports accounted for one-third of Myanmar’s total export value. The sector’s primary income, generated through CMP services, represented approximately one-third of the total garment export value, or about three per cent of Myanmar’s GDP.3Since the mid-2010s, the EU has been the leading market for Myanmar’s garment exports. Currently, a significant 38 per cent of Myanmar’s garment factories rely on the EU as their primary market. In 2022, the EU received 52 per cent of Myanmar’s total garment exports. Other key markets included Japan at 18%, the United Kingdom at 10 per cent, the United States at six per cent, and Korea at four per cent. This data highlights the EU’s crucial role in supporting and sustaining Myanmar’s garment industry.Supporting the State’s Core Policy of Job Creation and Income Generation4Amidst different core policy areas of Myanmar, a core national policy has been to create employment opportunities alongside income generation for its people. In this regard, Myanmar’s garment industry has proven to be the largest source of jobs, especially for young, migrant women from rural areas. Despite a decline in exports in 2020 and 2021 due to political changes and the COVID-19 pandemic, the sector rebounded strongly. By 2022, export levels had exceeded those of 2019, with an average of 95 per cent of garment factories resuming operations at their previous capacity to produce exports.According to World Bank data, as of January 2022, Myanmar’s garment sector employed around 500,000 workers as a major source of employment. This represented 2.3 per cent of the country’s total employment and 23 per cent of all jobs within the manufacturing sector. By the end of 2022, the number of workers was estimated to have grown to 700,000, with current estimates now at around 800,000. Notably, 85 per cent of the workers are women in Myanmar’s garment sector.In 2022, 34 per cent of garment factories in Myanmar raised their wages, leading to a five per cent average wage increase across the manufacturing sector compared to the previous year. This positive trend was reinforced by a national policy change, which increased the minimum wage from 4,800 to 5,800 Kyats in 2023. According to the World Bank, this enabled some factories, especially those that export to the EU, to boost their workers’ wages by an additional 10 per cent to 20 per cent in 2023.Although the share of Myanmar’s garment sector in the global garment trade is small, local garment entrepreneurs believe they can be competitive in the international market. They state that the main reasons for this are the abundant workforce and low wages.Myanmar’s Policy for Connecting with Migrant Workers AbroadTo ensure that workers going abroad for employment do so in a systematic and legal manner, the Overseas Employment Law was enacted, and efforts are underway to approve and enact an amended law to align with the current situation. The Five-Year National-level Action Plan for the management of labour migration to other countries has been drafted and implemented for the first and second times. To assist Myanmar workers abroad, labour attachés have been appointed in Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Japan. In countries where there are no labour attachés, the Myanmar embassies are collaborating to provide any assistance to Myanmar workers.5Trade SituationAccording to the official EU website6 for Myanmar, over 90 per cent of Myanmar’s exports were shipped to the EU, with preferential tariff rates under the EBA scheme in 2023. This shows that Myanmar is significantly benefiting from the EU’s EBA scheme. In 2023, Myanmar’s total exports to the EU under the EBA preferential system were valued at approximately €3.4 billion (US$3.7 billion) while imports reached €3.0 billion (US$3.2 billion).7 8In 2024, the EU stood as Myanmar’s 4th largest trading partner, accounting for 10.3 per cent of the total trade in goods. Conversely, Myanmar ranked as the EU’s 75th largest trading partner, making up 0.1 per cent of the EU’s total trade in goods. Similarly, total trade volume between the EU and Myanmar amounted to €3.6 billion (US$3.9 billion) in 2024, while the EU’s imports from Myanmar were primarily textiles, valued at €3.1 billion (US$3.4 billion). Meanwhile, the EU’s exports to Myanmar mainly consisted of transport equipment, accounting for €458 million (US$495.60 million). Additionally, volume of trade services in 2023 reached €346 million (US$374.41 million) between them.Investment SituationAccording to the official EU website for Myanmar, the volume of EU investment in Myanmar reached €251 million (US$271.61 million) in 2023. In the same year, Myanmar’s FDI in the EU amounted to €7 million (US$7.57 million).Code of Conduct for European Union Delegation Staff Serving AbroadAs members of the EU Delegation serving abroad, staff must primarily adhere to the following principles:(‌a) Adherence to the EU’s Laws9. All actions of the delegation must strictly comply with the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and their subsequent laws, regulations, directives, and decisions. Furthermore, they must act in accordance with the EU’s external action policies, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), trade policy, and development cooperation. For instance, when managing aid projects, the delegation must strictly follow the EU’s procurement and financial regulations.(b) International Law. Staff of the EU delegations must respect international diplomatic law, particularly the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961)10. Specifically, under Article 41, while delegates have privileges and immunities, they are obligated to respect the laws of the host country. Failure to comply with these laws can lead to the host country declaring the diplomat or delegate “persona non grata”, which is the most severe penalty for a diplomatic representative. This results in sending them back to the home country or terminating their functions. Additionally, under Article 31, their immunity does not exempt them from the jurisdiction of their home state. In cases of serious crimes, if the host country formally requests that the EU waive its diplomatic immunity to allow for prosecution, the EU may choose to waive immunity to demonstrate its commitment to justice and maintain good relations with the host country.(c) Adherence to Financial Regulations11. A core responsibility of the EU Delegation is to manage projects funded by the EU. This includes ensuring that contracts are awarded through fair and transparent processes (tendering and procurement) and that funds are used for their intended official purpose. The delegation that acts fraudulently or mismanagement is subject to financial audits and must take the necessary actions. All financial operations must be fully compliant with the EU’s Financial Regulation to ensure accountability.In short, the EU Delegation’s legal and professional responsibilities are a blend of diplomatic duties. They must respect and adhere to the legal systems of the European Union, international law, and relevant laws of the host country. This mission involves a combination of upholding EU values like democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, providing development aid and fostering cooperation, engaging in public diplomacy and communication, and managing trade and economic relations.As a result, the assistance provided by the EU delegation to Myanmar – in order to maintain the Myanmar-EU economic relationship – is an expression of “understanding Myanmar”. Specifically, providing duty-free access for Myanmar’s garment exports under the EBA (Everything But Arms) scheme helps support the livelihoods and regular incomes of approximately 800,000 workers, 85 per cent of whom are women.1. Resilience Amid Constraints: Myanmar’s Garment Industry in 2023. World Bank. 2023. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099113023044018823/pdf/P50066309dcb060600981407177 a6346276.pdf2. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and- regions/myanmar_en3. Resilience Amid Constraints: Myanmar’s Garment Industry in 2023. World Bank. 2023. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099113023044018823/pdf/P50066309dcb060600981407177 a6346276.pdf4. Resilience Amid Constraints: Myanmar’s Garment Industry in 2023. World Bank. 2023. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099113023044018823/pdf/P50066309dcb060600981407177 a6346276.pdf5. https://www.moi.gov.mm/news/631516. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and- regions/myanmar_en7. https://gsphub.eu/country-info/Myanmar8. https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/eur-usd-20239. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_21/oj/eng10. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf11. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0605GNLM

Myanmar began exporting garments in 1994, but the industry’s growth accelerated only after international sanctions were lifted in the 2010s. The European Union (EU) suspended its sanctions against Myanmar in 2012 and opened an office in Myanmar in 2013. This paved the way for Myanmar to gain duty-free access to the EU market under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) and the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative in 2013.1 Myanmar’s main exports to the EU are textiles, footwear, rice, and gems.2

EU as the Top Destination for Myanmar’s Garment Exports
According to the World Bank, the value of Myanmar’s garment exports surged from US$0.9 billion in 2010 to US$5.5 billion in 2022, a six-fold increase. A major turning point for the industry came in 2013 when the EU granted Myanmar under the GSP initiative. This preferential access proved highly beneficial, with EU countries receiving over half of Myanmar’s total garment exports. By 2022, garment exports accounted for one-third of Myanmar’s total export value. The sector’s primary income, generated through CMP services, represented approximately one-third of the total garment export value, or about three per cent of Myanmar’s GDP.3
Since the mid-2010s, the EU has been the leading market for Myanmar’s garment exports. Currently, a significant 38 per cent of Myanmar’s garment factories rely on the EU as their primary market. In 2022, the EU received 52 per cent of Myanmar’s total garment exports. Other key markets included Japan at 18%, the United Kingdom at 10 per cent, the United States at six per cent, and Korea at four per cent. This data highlights the EU’s crucial role in supporting and sustaining Myanmar’s garment industry.
Supporting the State’s Core Policy of Job Creation and Income Generation4
Amidst different core policy areas of Myanmar, a core national policy has been to create employment opportunities alongside income generation for its people. In this regard, Myanmar’s garment industry has proven to be the largest source of jobs, especially for young, migrant women from rural areas. Despite a decline in exports in 2020 and 2021 due to political changes and the COVID-19 pandemic, the sector rebounded strongly. By 2022, export levels had exceeded those of 2019, with an average of 95 per cent of garment factories resuming operations at their previous capacity to produce exports.
According to World Bank data, as of January 2022, Myanmar’s garment sector employed around 500,000 workers as a major source of employment. This represented 2.3 per cent of the country’s total employment and 23 per cent of all jobs within the manufacturing sector. By the end of 2022, the number of workers was estimated to have grown to 700,000, with current estimates now at around 800,000. Notably, 85 per cent of the workers are women in Myanmar’s garment sector.
In 2022, 34 per cent of garment factories in Myanmar raised their wages, leading to a five per cent average wage increase across the manufacturing sector compared to the previous year. This positive trend was reinforced by a national policy change, which increased the minimum wage from 4,800 to 5,800 Kyats in 2023. According to the World Bank, this enabled some factories, especially those that export to the EU, to boost their workers’ wages by an additional 10 per cent to 20 per cent in 2023.
Although the share of Myanmar’s garment sector in the global garment trade is small, local garment entrepreneurs believe they can be competitive in the international market. They state that the main reasons for this are the abundant workforce and low wages.
Myanmar’s Policy for Connecting with Migrant Workers Abroad
To ensure that workers going abroad for employment do so in a systematic and legal manner, the Overseas Employment Law was enacted, and efforts are underway to approve and enact an amended law to align with the current situation. The Five-Year National-level Action Plan for the management of labour migration to other countries has been drafted and implemented for the first and second times. To assist Myanmar workers abroad, labour attachés have been appointed in Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Japan. In countries where there are no labour attachés, the Myanmar embassies are collaborating to provide any assistance to Myanmar workers.5
Trade Situation
According to the official EU website6 for Myanmar, over 90 per cent of Myanmar’s exports were shipped to the EU, with preferential tariff rates under the EBA scheme in 2023. This shows that Myanmar is significantly benefiting from the EU’s EBA scheme. In 2023, Myanmar’s total exports to the EU under the EBA preferential system were valued at approximately €3.4 billion (US$3.7 billion) while imports reached €3.0 billion (US$3.2 billion).7 8
In 2024, the EU stood as Myanmar’s 4th largest trading partner, accounting for 10.3 per cent of the total trade in goods. Conversely, Myanmar ranked as the EU’s 75th largest trading partner, making up 0.1 per cent of the EU’s total trade in goods. Similarly, total trade volume between the EU and Myanmar amounted to €3.6 billion (US$3.9 billion) in 2024, while the EU’s imports from Myanmar were primarily textiles, valued at €3.1 billion (US$3.4 billion). Meanwhile, the EU’s exports to Myanmar mainly consisted of transport equipment, accounting for €458 million (US$495.60 million). Additionally, volume of trade services in 2023 reached €346 million (US$374.41 million) between them.
Investment Situation
According to the official EU website for Myanmar, the volume of EU investment in Myanmar reached €251 million (US$271.61 million) in 2023. In the same year, Myanmar’s FDI in the EU amounted to €7 million (US$7.57 million).
Code of Conduct for European Union Delegation Staff Serving Abroad
As members of the EU Delegation serving abroad, staff must primarily adhere to the following principles:
(‌a) Adherence to the EU’s Laws9. All actions of the delegation must strictly comply with the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and their subsequent laws, regulations, directives, and decisions. Furthermore, they must act in accordance with the EU’s external action policies, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), trade policy, and development cooperation. For instance, when managing aid projects, the delegation must strictly follow the EU’s procurement and financial regulations.
(b) International Law. Staff of the EU delegations must respect international diplomatic law, particularly the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961)10. Specifically, under Article 41, while delegates have privileges and immunities, they are obligated to respect the laws of the host country. Failure to comply with these laws can lead to the host country declaring the diplomat or delegate “persona non grata”, which is the most severe penalty for a diplomatic representative. This results in sending them back to the home country or terminating their functions. Additionally, under Article 31, their immunity does not exempt them from the jurisdiction of their home state. In cases of serious crimes, if the host country formally requests that the EU waive its diplomatic immunity to allow for prosecution, the EU may choose to waive immunity to demonstrate its commitment to justice and maintain good relations with the host country.
(c) Adherence to Financial Regulations11. A core responsibility of the EU Delegation is to manage projects funded by the EU. This includes ensuring that contracts are awarded through fair and transparent processes (tendering and procurement) and that funds are used for their intended official purpose. The delegation that acts fraudulently or mismanagement is subject to financial audits and must take the necessary actions. All financial operations must be fully compliant with the EU’s Financial Regulation to ensure accountability.
In short, the EU Delegation’s legal and professional responsibilities are a blend of diplomatic duties. They must respect and adhere to the legal systems of the European Union, international law, and relevant laws of the host country. This mission involves a combination of upholding EU values like democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, providing development aid and fostering cooperation, engaging in public diplomacy and communication, and managing trade and economic relations.
As a result, the assistance provided by the EU delegation to Myanmar – in order to maintain the Myanmar-EU economic relationship – is an expression of “understanding Myanmar”. Specifically, providing duty-free access for Myanmar’s garment exports under the EBA (Everything But Arms) scheme helps support the livelihoods and regular incomes of approximately 800,000 workers, 85 per cent of whom are women.

1. Resilience Amid Constraints: Myanmar’s Garment Industry in 2023. World Bank. 2023. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099113023044018823/pdf/P50066309dcb060600981407177 a6346276.pdf
2. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and- regions/myanmar_en
3. Resilience Amid Constraints: Myanmar’s Garment Industry in 2023. World Bank. 2023. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099113023044018823/pdf/P50066309dcb060600981407177 a6346276.pdf
4. Resilience Amid Constraints: Myanmar’s Garment Industry in 2023. World Bank. 2023. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099113023044018823/pdf/P50066309dcb060600981407177 a6346276.pdf
5. https://www.moi.gov.mm/news/63151
6. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and- regions/myanmar_en
7. https://gsphub.eu/country-info/Myanmar
8. https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/eur-usd-2023
9. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_21/oj/eng
10. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf
11. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0605

GNLM

Moe Pya

Myanmar began exporting garments in 1994, but the industry’s growth accelerated only after international sanctions were lifted in the 2010s. The European Union (EU) suspended its sanctions against Myanmar in 2012 and opened an office in Myanmar in 2013. This paved the way for Myanmar to gain duty-free access to the EU market under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) and the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative in 2013.1 Myanmar’s main exports to the EU are textiles, footwear, rice, and gems.2

EU as the Top Destination for Myanmar’s Garment Exports
According to the World Bank, the value of Myanmar’s garment exports surged from US$0.9 billion in 2010 to US$5.5 billion in 2022, a six-fold increase. A major turning point for the industry came in 2013 when the EU granted Myanmar under the GSP initiative. This preferential access proved highly beneficial, with EU countries receiving over half of Myanmar’s total garment exports. By 2022, garment exports accounted for one-third of Myanmar’s total export value. The sector’s primary income, generated through CMP services, represented approximately one-third of the total garment export value, or about three per cent of Myanmar’s GDP.3
Since the mid-2010s, the EU has been the leading market for Myanmar’s garment exports. Currently, a significant 38 per cent of Myanmar’s garment factories rely on the EU as their primary market. In 2022, the EU received 52 per cent of Myanmar’s total garment exports. Other key markets included Japan at 18%, the United Kingdom at 10 per cent, the United States at six per cent, and Korea at four per cent. This data highlights the EU’s crucial role in supporting and sustaining Myanmar’s garment industry.
Supporting the State’s Core Policy of Job Creation and Income Generation4
Amidst different core policy areas of Myanmar, a core national policy has been to create employment opportunities alongside income generation for its people. In this regard, Myanmar’s garment industry has proven to be the largest source of jobs, especially for young, migrant women from rural areas. Despite a decline in exports in 2020 and 2021 due to political changes and the COVID-19 pandemic, the sector rebounded strongly. By 2022, export levels had exceeded those of 2019, with an average of 95 per cent of garment factories resuming operations at their previous capacity to produce exports.
According to World Bank data, as of January 2022, Myanmar’s garment sector employed around 500,000 workers as a major source of employment. This represented 2.3 per cent of the country’s total employment and 23 per cent of all jobs within the manufacturing sector. By the end of 2022, the number of workers was estimated to have grown to 700,000, with current estimates now at around 800,000. Notably, 85 per cent of the workers are women in Myanmar’s garment sector.
In 2022, 34 per cent of garment factories in Myanmar raised their wages, leading to a five per cent average wage increase across the manufacturing sector compared to the previous year. This positive trend was reinforced by a national policy change, which increased the minimum wage from 4,800 to 5,800 Kyats in 2023. According to the World Bank, this enabled some factories, especially those that export to the EU, to boost their workers’ wages by an additional 10 per cent to 20 per cent in 2023.
Although the share of Myanmar’s garment sector in the global garment trade is small, local garment entrepreneurs believe they can be competitive in the international market. They state that the main reasons for this are the abundant workforce and low wages.
Myanmar’s Policy for Connecting with Migrant Workers Abroad
To ensure that workers going abroad for employment do so in a systematic and legal manner, the Overseas Employment Law was enacted, and efforts are underway to approve and enact an amended law to align with the current situation. The Five-Year National-level Action Plan for the management of labour migration to other countries has been drafted and implemented for the first and second times. To assist Myanmar workers abroad, labour attachés have been appointed in Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Japan. In countries where there are no labour attachés, the Myanmar embassies are collaborating to provide any assistance to Myanmar workers.5
Trade Situation
According to the official EU website6 for Myanmar, over 90 per cent of Myanmar’s exports were shipped to the EU, with preferential tariff rates under the EBA scheme in 2023. This shows that Myanmar is significantly benefiting from the EU’s EBA scheme. In 2023, Myanmar’s total exports to the EU under the EBA preferential system were valued at approximately €3.4 billion (US$3.7 billion) while imports reached €3.0 billion (US$3.2 billion).7 8
In 2024, the EU stood as Myanmar’s 4th largest trading partner, accounting for 10.3 per cent of the total trade in goods. Conversely, Myanmar ranked as the EU’s 75th largest trading partner, making up 0.1 per cent of the EU’s total trade in goods. Similarly, total trade volume between the EU and Myanmar amounted to €3.6 billion (US$3.9 billion) in 2024, while the EU’s imports from Myanmar were primarily textiles, valued at €3.1 billion (US$3.4 billion). Meanwhile, the EU’s exports to Myanmar mainly consisted of transport equipment, accounting for €458 million (US$495.60 million). Additionally, volume of trade services in 2023 reached €346 million (US$374.41 million) between them.
Investment Situation
According to the official EU website for Myanmar, the volume of EU investment in Myanmar reached €251 million (US$271.61 million) in 2023. In the same year, Myanmar’s FDI in the EU amounted to €7 million (US$7.57 million).
Code of Conduct for European Union Delegation Staff Serving Abroad
As members of the EU Delegation serving abroad, staff must primarily adhere to the following principles:
(‌a) Adherence to the EU’s Laws9. All actions of the delegation must strictly comply with the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and their subsequent laws, regulations, directives, and decisions. Furthermore, they must act in accordance with the EU’s external action policies, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), trade policy, and development cooperation. For instance, when managing aid projects, the delegation must strictly follow the EU’s procurement and financial regulations.
(b) International Law. Staff of the EU delegations must respect international diplomatic law, particularly the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961)10. Specifically, under Article 41, while delegates have privileges and immunities, they are obligated to respect the laws of the host country. Failure to comply with these laws can lead to the host country declaring the diplomat or delegate “persona non grata”, which is the most severe penalty for a diplomatic representative. This results in sending them back to the home country or terminating their functions. Additionally, under Article 31, their immunity does not exempt them from the jurisdiction of their home state. In cases of serious crimes, if the host country formally requests that the EU waive its diplomatic immunity to allow for prosecution, the EU may choose to waive immunity to demonstrate its commitment to justice and maintain good relations with the host country.
(c) Adherence to Financial Regulations11. A core responsibility of the EU Delegation is to manage projects funded by the EU. This includes ensuring that contracts are awarded through fair and transparent processes (tendering and procurement) and that funds are used for their intended official purpose. The delegation that acts fraudulently or mismanagement is subject to financial audits and must take the necessary actions. All financial operations must be fully compliant with the EU’s Financial Regulation to ensure accountability.
In short, the EU Delegation’s legal and professional responsibilities are a blend of diplomatic duties. They must respect and adhere to the legal systems of the European Union, international law, and relevant laws of the host country. This mission involves a combination of upholding EU values like democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, providing development aid and fostering cooperation, engaging in public diplomacy and communication, and managing trade and economic relations.
As a result, the assistance provided by the EU delegation to Myanmar – in order to maintain the Myanmar-EU economic relationship – is an expression of “understanding Myanmar”. Specifically, providing duty-free access for Myanmar’s garment exports under the EBA (Everything But Arms) scheme helps support the livelihoods and regular incomes of approximately 800,000 workers, 85 per cent of whom are women.

1. Resilience Amid Constraints: Myanmar’s Garment Industry in 2023. World Bank. 2023. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099113023044018823/pdf/P50066309dcb060600981407177 a6346276.pdf
2. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and- regions/myanmar_en
3. Resilience Amid Constraints: Myanmar’s Garment Industry in 2023. World Bank. 2023. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099113023044018823/pdf/P50066309dcb060600981407177 a6346276.pdf
4. Resilience Amid Constraints: Myanmar’s Garment Industry in 2023. World Bank. 2023. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099113023044018823/pdf/P50066309dcb060600981407177 a6346276.pdf
5. https://www.moi.gov.mm/news/63151
6. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and- regions/myanmar_en
7. https://gsphub.eu/country-info/Myanmar
8. https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/eur-usd-2023
9. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_21/oj/eng
10. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf
11. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0605

GNLM

Salmon in the Desert? How Xinjiang is Farming the Impossible
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When people think of Xinjiang, they picture vast deserts and scorching summers. After all, it is the region with the largest desert area in China, including the Taklamakan Desert. Dry and sandy landscapes are indeed one side of Xinjiang’s identity.Yet it’s not the whole story. The region is rich in freshwater and saline resources, with diverse lakes and rivers feeding thriving ecosystems. The Tarim River, China’s longest inland river and the world’s fifth largest, stretches 2,179 kilometres across an immense basin. Bosten Lake, the country’s largest inland freshwater lake, covers 1,646 square kilometres and yields about 5,000 tonnes of freshwater fish annually.In this land of contrasts, salmon farming has found an unlikely home. In 2024, Xinjiang produced over 8,000 tonnes of salmon, with exports reaching Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The question is: how did salmon thrive so far from the ocean?Ideal natural conditions nurture salmonCounterintuitively, Xinjiang’s natural environment is perfect for salmon farming. Surrounded by mountains, the region collects pure glacial meltwater in its basins, with temperatures between 8° and 18°C throughout the year and high oxygen levels. These are ideal conditions for cold-water fish to thrive. According to Xinjiang’s Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, a Spanish trader once praised Xinjiang salmon for its freshness, clean taste, and well-distributed fat, making it especially well-suited for sashimi.Green tech powers salmon farmingIn Nilka County, northwest Xinjiang, salmon have been raised through cage aquaculture in the Jilintai Reservoir since 2014. After imported fish eggs hatch and the fry grow, the little fish are sorted into different cages by size once they reach around 150 grammes. Over time, cage farming has now evolved into a smarter, greener model.The eco-friendly net cage farming system addresses the pollution issues of traditional cages, maintaining excellent water quality both upstream and downstream. At the farming base, real-time electronic screens track oxygen, temperature, and cleanliness of the water. Underwater cleaning robots, equipped with sonar imaging and optical zoom cameras, can remove waste with precision. Outside the cages, filter-feeding fish further help consume uneaten feed drifting in the water, creating a natural cleanup procedure.Feeding has also gone high-tech. A smart delivery system determines how much food the fish need at each growth stage, cutting down on waste and reducing labour costs.In early 2025, the farming base in Nilka released 9.1 million fish fry, with an expected annual output of 8,000 tonnes.From reservoir to dining tablesAfter three years, fully grown salmon are harvested. Workers use a fish pump to gently move the salmon through a tube directly onto the assembly line, a method that minimizes injury and preserves quality. The fish are then rapidly cooled to below 5°C before being transported to the processing plant, where they are transformed into a variety of products, including fresh-cut and quick-frozen salmon.With the support of the government, local farms work with research institutes to expand product lines. Today, Xinjiang salmon not only reach tables across China but are also exported to Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. At Yining customs in Xinjiang, chilled salmon can now pass inspection in just 30 minutes, ensuring freshness for domestic and overseas markets.Salmon farming lifts livesToday, more than 800 professionals are employed at the salmon farming base in Nilka County, with 60 per cent being local Xinjiang people. Many of them once relied on traditional farming or herding, which are easily affected by the weather. Now, frontline workers at the base earn over $840 a month, about $100 higher than the local average wage. Thanks to these opportunities, 609 families have been lifted out of poverty, and nearly 400 individuals have obtained licences as professional aquaculture workers.To help staff establish themselves and feel a sense of belonging, the central government invested nearly $7 million in building dormitories last year. Another $2.8 million has been allocated for staff housing in the county, enabling workers to purchase their own homes with subsidies ranging from $20,000 to $40,000.Beyond salmon: Broader aquaculture potentialSalmon farming is part of a bigger vision for fisheries in Xinjiang. Developing aquaculture not only boosts food supply but also improves fragile ecosystems. On saline-alkali lands, authorities are applying a model known as “fish to reduce salinity and alkalinity”, which increases biodiversity while rehabilitating soils.The results are already visible. At Swan Lake, after fish farming was introduced, the number of bird species rose sharply, attracting more wild birds to settle in the area. This demonstrates how aquaculture is contributing to both economic and environmental sustainability.Salmon farming mirrors Xinjiang’s growthChinese President Xi Jinping has urged thorough, meticulous, and sustained efforts to build a beautiful Xinjiang, where ecosystems thrive and people live and work in contentment, as part of China’s broader modernization.The salmon industry is a microcosm of this vision by leveraging the region’s natural advantages, cutting-edge green technology, and strong community support. Xinjiang may be home to China’s largest desert, but it is also a land of rivers, lakes, and ingenuity. By turning unlikely conditions into opportunities, the region has transformed salmon farming from an improbable dream into a sustainable industry, proving that even in the desert, new life can flourish.GNLM

When people think of Xinjiang, they picture vast deserts and scorching summers. After all, it is the region with the largest desert area in China, including the Taklamakan Desert. Dry and sandy landscapes are indeed one side of Xinjiang’s identity.
Yet it’s not the whole story. The region is rich in freshwater and saline resources, with diverse lakes and rivers feeding thriving ecosystems. The Tarim River, China’s longest inland river and the world’s fifth largest, stretches 2,179 kilometres across an immense basin. Bosten Lake, the country’s largest inland freshwater lake, covers 1,646 square kilometres and yields about 5,000 tonnes of freshwater fish annually.
In this land of contrasts, salmon farming has found an unlikely home. In 2024, Xinjiang produced over 8,000 tonnes of salmon, with exports reaching Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The question is: how did salmon thrive so far from the ocean?

Ideal natural conditions nurture salmon
Counterintuitively, Xinjiang’s natural environment is perfect for salmon farming. Surrounded by mountains, the region collects pure glacial meltwater in its basins, with temperatures between 8° and 18°C throughout the year and high oxygen levels. These are ideal conditions for cold-water fish to thrive. According to Xinjiang’s Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, a Spanish trader once praised Xinjiang salmon for its freshness, clean taste, and well-distributed fat, making it especially well-suited for sashimi.

Green tech powers salmon farming
In Nilka County, northwest Xinjiang, salmon have been raised through cage aquaculture in the Jilintai Reservoir since 2014. After imported fish eggs hatch and the fry grow, the little fish are sorted into different cages by size once they reach around 150 grammes. Over time, cage farming has now evolved into a smarter, greener model.
The eco-friendly net cage farming system addresses the pollution issues of traditional cages, maintaining excellent water quality both upstream and downstream. At the farming base, real-time electronic screens track oxygen, temperature, and cleanliness of the water. Underwater cleaning robots, equipped with sonar imaging and optical zoom cameras, can remove waste with precision. Outside the cages, filter-feeding fish further help consume uneaten feed drifting in the water, creating a natural cleanup procedure.
Feeding has also gone high-tech. A smart delivery system determines how much food the fish need at each growth stage, cutting down on waste and reducing labour costs.
In early 2025, the farming base in Nilka released 9.1 million fish fry, with an expected annual output of 8,000 tonnes.

From reservoir to dining tables
After three years, fully grown salmon are harvested. Workers use a fish pump to gently move the salmon through a tube directly onto the assembly line, a method that minimizes injury and preserves quality. The fish are then rapidly cooled to below 5°C before being transported to the processing plant, where they are transformed into a variety of products, including fresh-cut and quick-frozen salmon.
With the support of the government, local farms work with research institutes to expand product lines. Today, Xinjiang salmon not only reach tables across China but are also exported to Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. At Yining customs in Xinjiang, chilled salmon can now pass inspection in just 30 minutes, ensuring freshness for domestic and overseas markets.
Salmon farming lifts lives
Today, more than 800 professionals are employed at the salmon farming base in Nilka County, with 60 per cent being local Xinjiang people. Many of them once relied on traditional farming or herding, which are easily affected by the weather. Now, frontline workers at the base earn over $840 a month, about $100 higher than the local average wage. Thanks to these opportunities, 609 families have been lifted out of poverty, and nearly 400 individuals have obtained licences as professional aquaculture workers.
To help staff establish themselves and feel a sense of belonging, the central government invested nearly $7 million in building dormitories last year. Another $2.8 million has been allocated for staff housing in the county, enabling workers to purchase their own homes with subsidies ranging from $20,000 to $40,000.

Beyond salmon: Broader aquaculture potential
Salmon farming is part of a bigger vision for fisheries in Xinjiang. Developing aquaculture not only boosts food supply but also improves fragile ecosystems. On saline-alkali lands, authorities are applying a model known as “fish to reduce salinity and alkalinity”, which increases biodiversity while rehabilitating soils.
The results are already visible. At Swan Lake, after fish farming was introduced, the number of bird species rose sharply, attracting more wild birds to settle in the area. This demonstrates how aquaculture is contributing to both economic and environmental sustainability.

Salmon farming mirrors Xinjiang’s growth
Chinese President Xi Jinping has urged thorough, meticulous, and sustained efforts to build a beautiful Xinjiang, where ecosystems thrive and people live and work in contentment, as part of China’s broader modernization.
The salmon industry is a microcosm of this vision by leveraging the region’s natural advantages, cutting-edge green technology, and strong community support. Xinjiang may be home to China’s largest desert, but it is also a land of rivers, lakes, and ingenuity. By turning unlikely conditions into opportunities, the region has transformed salmon farming from an improbable dream into a sustainable industry, proving that even in the desert, new life can flourish.

GNLM

Chen Ziqi, a reporter from CGTN

When people think of Xinjiang, they picture vast deserts and scorching summers. After all, it is the region with the largest desert area in China, including the Taklamakan Desert. Dry and sandy landscapes are indeed one side of Xinjiang’s identity.
Yet it’s not the whole story. The region is rich in freshwater and saline resources, with diverse lakes and rivers feeding thriving ecosystems. The Tarim River, China’s longest inland river and the world’s fifth largest, stretches 2,179 kilometres across an immense basin. Bosten Lake, the country’s largest inland freshwater lake, covers 1,646 square kilometres and yields about 5,000 tonnes of freshwater fish annually.
In this land of contrasts, salmon farming has found an unlikely home. In 2024, Xinjiang produced over 8,000 tonnes of salmon, with exports reaching Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The question is: how did salmon thrive so far from the ocean?

Ideal natural conditions nurture salmon
Counterintuitively, Xinjiang’s natural environment is perfect for salmon farming. Surrounded by mountains, the region collects pure glacial meltwater in its basins, with temperatures between 8° and 18°C throughout the year and high oxygen levels. These are ideal conditions for cold-water fish to thrive. According to Xinjiang’s Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, a Spanish trader once praised Xinjiang salmon for its freshness, clean taste, and well-distributed fat, making it especially well-suited for sashimi.

Green tech powers salmon farming
In Nilka County, northwest Xinjiang, salmon have been raised through cage aquaculture in the Jilintai Reservoir since 2014. After imported fish eggs hatch and the fry grow, the little fish are sorted into different cages by size once they reach around 150 grammes. Over time, cage farming has now evolved into a smarter, greener model.
The eco-friendly net cage farming system addresses the pollution issues of traditional cages, maintaining excellent water quality both upstream and downstream. At the farming base, real-time electronic screens track oxygen, temperature, and cleanliness of the water. Underwater cleaning robots, equipped with sonar imaging and optical zoom cameras, can remove waste with precision. Outside the cages, filter-feeding fish further help consume uneaten feed drifting in the water, creating a natural cleanup procedure.
Feeding has also gone high-tech. A smart delivery system determines how much food the fish need at each growth stage, cutting down on waste and reducing labour costs.
In early 2025, the farming base in Nilka released 9.1 million fish fry, with an expected annual output of 8,000 tonnes.

From reservoir to dining tables
After three years, fully grown salmon are harvested. Workers use a fish pump to gently move the salmon through a tube directly onto the assembly line, a method that minimizes injury and preserves quality. The fish are then rapidly cooled to below 5°C before being transported to the processing plant, where they are transformed into a variety of products, including fresh-cut and quick-frozen salmon.
With the support of the government, local farms work with research institutes to expand product lines. Today, Xinjiang salmon not only reach tables across China but are also exported to Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. At Yining customs in Xinjiang, chilled salmon can now pass inspection in just 30 minutes, ensuring freshness for domestic and overseas markets.
Salmon farming lifts lives
Today, more than 800 professionals are employed at the salmon farming base in Nilka County, with 60 per cent being local Xinjiang people. Many of them once relied on traditional farming or herding, which are easily affected by the weather. Now, frontline workers at the base earn over $840 a month, about $100 higher than the local average wage. Thanks to these opportunities, 609 families have been lifted out of poverty, and nearly 400 individuals have obtained licences as professional aquaculture workers.
To help staff establish themselves and feel a sense of belonging, the central government invested nearly $7 million in building dormitories last year. Another $2.8 million has been allocated for staff housing in the county, enabling workers to purchase their own homes with subsidies ranging from $20,000 to $40,000.

Beyond salmon: Broader aquaculture potential
Salmon farming is part of a bigger vision for fisheries in Xinjiang. Developing aquaculture not only boosts food supply but also improves fragile ecosystems. On saline-alkali lands, authorities are applying a model known as “fish to reduce salinity and alkalinity”, which increases biodiversity while rehabilitating soils.
The results are already visible. At Swan Lake, after fish farming was introduced, the number of bird species rose sharply, attracting more wild birds to settle in the area. This demonstrates how aquaculture is contributing to both economic and environmental sustainability.

Salmon farming mirrors Xinjiang’s growth
Chinese President Xi Jinping has urged thorough, meticulous, and sustained efforts to build a beautiful Xinjiang, where ecosystems thrive and people live and work in contentment, as part of China’s broader modernization.
The salmon industry is a microcosm of this vision by leveraging the region’s natural advantages, cutting-edge green technology, and strong community support. Xinjiang may be home to China’s largest desert, but it is also a land of rivers, lakes, and ingenuity. By turning unlikely conditions into opportunities, the region has transformed salmon farming from an improbable dream into a sustainable industry, proving that even in the desert, new life can flourish.

GNLM

To Engage or Not to Engage
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Russia and Belarus are already in the deep. China and India have done it long ago. So have some countries of Southeast Asia. ASEAN is now doing it using a different approach. Trump and the USA have done it too. Hey, we are talking about engaging the Myanmar government. So, who is left to engage the current legitimate government now?AussiesAustralia has been supportive of Myanmar since its opening up in 2011. They have participated in offshore oil and gas tenders and many other businesses dealing with the government. With many underground resources in Myanmar, it would be a lose-lose situation if Aussies remain aloof to engagement.They wanted the market economy, competitive pricing and democracy. How to have a market economy, if all the resources can only be sold to one buyer, i.e., China. So that itself is a dilemma. How can Myanmar be helped to move more towards a more market and competitive economy if Australia refuses to participate in the economy, especially in the natural resources sector?GangnamKorea is one of the few countries that the Myanmar people love, admire and look forward to working there. Korea and Japan are consistently ranked as countries with the best labour conditions based on a survey of Myanmar workers. Korea took a step higher with the legislation that foreign workers in Korea cannot be paid lower than Koreans with equal qualifications and experience, hence providing the highest take-home pay for foreign workers.The Korean government also wants to engage, but they have to rely on the US in case of war with its super-friendly northern neighbour, i.e., watch US actions before their initiation. Their reliance on Uncle Sam becomes even more inevitable, as they rightly worry that North Korea sent fighters to join the Russian Army to fight against Ukraine. And Myanmar, being the long-time ally of Russia, is not making the initiation of engagement any easier.Rising SunJapan, like Korea, is continuing all engagement at the humanitarian and general public level, from continuing recruitment of Myanmar workers to donating to the quake victims through various associations. And it has to take cues from the USA, too.With many Japanese entities running away from Myanmar, the ‘first to leave and last to arrive’ nation is exactly looking after its own interests, despite its affinity to Myanmar.The old richThe diplomats stationed locally do want to engage more, in a private capacity, with the top decision makers of the nation. Yet the Union is not keen. So the only way out seems to be to entice the Union leaders far away with some tenable deeds and get the green light from them to take the engagement to the next level.Why non-engagement is bad for Myanmar and the WorldLet’s give the example using Wa and the rare earth. Wa, an independent state, is the largest self-administrative region in the eastern Shan State. Even the Myanmar military cannot go into their region without prior approval from them. According to the CIA Handbook 2019, Wa is already the third largest exporter of rare earth in the world and 100 per cent of its rare earth is exported to China. Kachin and Shan state armies are also contributing to China’s stockpile of rare earth through their respective exports. The result is that now China is controlling 90+ per cent of the global rare earth inventory.The USA, the EU and Australia could have participated to absorb the supply, thereby retaining some form of control over the rare earth global supply. Without engaging Myanmar, they are deprived of that unique opportunity. And Myanmar lose out too as it loses competitive pricing due to having only one monopolistic buyer. Simple argument perhaps, but the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.GNLM

Russia and Belarus are already in the deep. China and India have done it long ago. So have some countries of Southeast Asia. ASEAN is now doing it using a different approach. Trump and the USA have done it too. Hey, we are talking about engaging the Myanmar government. So, who is left to engage the current legitimate government now?

Aussies
Australia has been supportive of Myanmar since its opening up in 2011. They have participated in offshore oil and gas tenders and many other businesses dealing with the government. With many underground resources in Myanmar, it would be a lose-lose situation if Aussies remain aloof to engagement.
They wanted the market economy, competitive pricing and democracy. How to have a market economy, if all the resources can only be sold to one buyer, i.e., China. So that itself is a dilemma. How can Myanmar be helped to move more towards a more market and competitive economy if Australia refuses to participate in the economy, especially in the natural resources sector?

Gangnam
Korea is one of the few countries that the Myanmar people love, admire and look forward to working there. Korea and Japan are consistently ranked as countries with the best labour conditions based on a survey of Myanmar workers. Korea took a step higher with the legislation that foreign workers in Korea cannot be paid lower than Koreans with equal qualifications and experience, hence providing the highest take-home pay for foreign workers.
The Korean government also wants to engage, but they have to rely on the US in case of war with its super-friendly northern neighbour, i.e., watch US actions before their initiation. Their reliance on Uncle Sam becomes even more inevitable, as they rightly worry that North Korea sent fighters to join the Russian Army to fight against Ukraine. And Myanmar, being the long-time ally of Russia, is not making the initiation of engagement any easier.

Rising Sun
Japan, like Korea, is continuing all engagement at the humanitarian and general public level, from continuing recruitment of Myanmar workers to donating to the quake victims through various associations. And it has to take cues from the USA, too.
With many Japanese entities running away from Myanmar, the ‘first to leave and last to arrive’ nation is exactly looking after its own interests, despite its affinity to Myanmar.

The old rich
The diplomats stationed locally do want to engage more, in a private capacity, with the top decision makers of the nation. Yet the Union is not keen. So the only way out seems to be to entice the Union leaders far away with some tenable deeds and get the green light from them to take the engagement to the next level.

Why non-engagement is bad for Myanmar and the World
Let’s give the example using Wa and the rare earth. Wa, an independent state, is the largest self-administrative region in the eastern Shan State. Even the Myanmar military cannot go into their region without prior approval from them. According to the CIA Handbook 2019, Wa is already the third largest exporter of rare earth in the world and 100 per cent of its rare earth is exported to China. Kachin and Shan state armies are also contributing to China’s stockpile of rare earth through their respective exports. The result is that now China is controlling 90+ per cent of the global rare earth inventory.
The USA, the EU and Australia could have participated to absorb the supply, thereby retaining some form of control over the rare earth global supply. Without engaging Myanmar, they are deprived of that unique opportunity. And Myanmar lose out too as it loses competitive pricing due to having only one monopolistic buyer. Simple argument perhaps, but the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

GNLM
U AC

Russia and Belarus are already in the deep. China and India have done it long ago. So have some countries of Southeast Asia. ASEAN is now doing it using a different approach. Trump and the USA have done it too. Hey, we are talking about engaging the Myanmar government. So, who is left to engage the current legitimate government now?

Aussies
Australia has been supportive of Myanmar since its opening up in 2011. They have participated in offshore oil and gas tenders and many other businesses dealing with the government. With many underground resources in Myanmar, it would be a lose-lose situation if Aussies remain aloof to engagement.
They wanted the market economy, competitive pricing and democracy. How to have a market economy, if all the resources can only be sold to one buyer, i.e., China. So that itself is a dilemma. How can Myanmar be helped to move more towards a more market and competitive economy if Australia refuses to participate in the economy, especially in the natural resources sector?

Gangnam
Korea is one of the few countries that the Myanmar people love, admire and look forward to working there. Korea and Japan are consistently ranked as countries with the best labour conditions based on a survey of Myanmar workers. Korea took a step higher with the legislation that foreign workers in Korea cannot be paid lower than Koreans with equal qualifications and experience, hence providing the highest take-home pay for foreign workers.
The Korean government also wants to engage, but they have to rely on the US in case of war with its super-friendly northern neighbour, i.e., watch US actions before their initiation. Their reliance on Uncle Sam becomes even more inevitable, as they rightly worry that North Korea sent fighters to join the Russian Army to fight against Ukraine. And Myanmar, being the long-time ally of Russia, is not making the initiation of engagement any easier.

Rising Sun
Japan, like Korea, is continuing all engagement at the humanitarian and general public level, from continuing recruitment of Myanmar workers to donating to the quake victims through various associations. And it has to take cues from the USA, too.
With many Japanese entities running away from Myanmar, the ‘first to leave and last to arrive’ nation is exactly looking after its own interests, despite its affinity to Myanmar.

The old rich
The diplomats stationed locally do want to engage more, in a private capacity, with the top decision makers of the nation. Yet the Union is not keen. So the only way out seems to be to entice the Union leaders far away with some tenable deeds and get the green light from them to take the engagement to the next level.

Why non-engagement is bad for Myanmar and the World
Let’s give the example using Wa and the rare earth. Wa, an independent state, is the largest self-administrative region in the eastern Shan State. Even the Myanmar military cannot go into their region without prior approval from them. According to the CIA Handbook 2019, Wa is already the third largest exporter of rare earth in the world and 100 per cent of its rare earth is exported to China. Kachin and Shan state armies are also contributing to China’s stockpile of rare earth through their respective exports. The result is that now China is controlling 90+ per cent of the global rare earth inventory.
The USA, the EU and Australia could have participated to absorb the supply, thereby retaining some form of control over the rare earth global supply. Without engaging Myanmar, they are deprived of that unique opportunity. And Myanmar lose out too as it loses competitive pricing due to having only one monopolistic buyer. Simple argument perhaps, but the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

GNLM
The US will not Win against China
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With the first meeting between China and US trade officials in Geneva over, the two global giants agree to continue to negotiate without setting specific deadlines or targets. The Trump administration, as usual, exaggerates to claim empty victory over successful negotiations, yet the battle is far from over. Trump has given in, lowering the tariffs from the impossibly high 145 per cent. The trade war talk is taking its toll on US consumers, with Walmart, the US’s largest retailer, raising prices every month, citing Trump’s tariffs as a reason.The predictionIn the end, when the dust settles, the world trading system will go forward with or without the US. The US is already getting isolated even from its closest allies, such as Canada, Mexico and the EU, and it would end up getting isolated from the rest of the world too. The world with continue with the renewed commitment to the formal rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The rules may not be perfect, but they are the best we have at present.The Trump version is slightly different. He wants the US to remain at the centre of power, the system and the US dollar as the main trade currency. The officials have been quite explicit about that, saying other countries would fall in line with the US against China, i.e., join the US side in its trade war against China. Totally unreachable dream, knowing how much homework China has already done in the past five years in the global south, for most of them to be on the Chinese side. Being on the Chinese side means development, being on the Western and US side means ideologies and systems that have no proven record of making any developing countries prosper.The reasonsIf you look at what real economic power the US maintains today, it is a far cry from the rhetoric that the Trump administration touted. The idea that the US market is central to every economy and using the threat of cutting exporting countries out of the US market would make them kowtow to all their whims and whistles is as outdated nowadays. It may have been true 25 years ago, but the consumer power is no longer centralized in the US alone. The numbers simply do not support that theory. The US imports are no longer substantial enough for most countries to alter their whole foreign policy and economic orientation because of that threat, barring Mexico, Germany (~70 per cent of their exports to the US) perhaps.The US imports only 12 per cent or so of the world’s exports. It’s just not that significant anymore at this point in time, after the enormous growth of China and some countries of the global south.The counter to all these facts and figures was that when the US blocks China’s exports, China would be forced to flood the EU with its wares, forcing Europe to eventually put up barriers against China, which would be equivalent to joining the trade war with the US. That could be what the Trump people are hoping for, but again, the figures do not support that either.China currently only exports about $450 billion a year to the US. Its total export to the whole world is $3,600 billion. The exports to the US have come down significantly in the past ten years because of anti-China policies. The long-term master planner, China, has already diversified its trade. What do you think the same Chinese leadership under President Xi has been doing in the past ten years? Just ignoring US threats and not preparing for any eventual possibilities? So the idea that China would flood the world markets with its inexpensive goods if the US market is cut off is merely a fantasy. The US simply does not have the power to do that anymore.Another factor is that China’s favour is the US being a deficit country with a lot, really a lot of debts. These debt instruments are being held by their major trading partners/adversaries like China, Japan, etc. In the event of a real tit for tat war, once these countries sell their bond holdings, the demand for US debt will be cut significantly, thereby raising interest rates and receiving downward credit ratings, causing it to pay more interest (in billions of $). With current yearly deficits in trillions, it’s a bitter pill that the US simply cannot swallow. A recent anecdote of Japan and China selling US bonds in response to Trump’s threats forces the treasury rates above five per cent, causing markets to free-fall in US stocks. These directly affect 401K (US pension schemes) and make the retirement funds of US workers smaller.If we use Trump’s words on Zelensky, ‘Trump simply does not have the cards’. Trump does not have a strong hand against China. He is overestimating his hand in his bluff. When Trump was barking from afar, Xi again did his work by visiting some Southeast Asian countries, further augmenting their trade ties with these countries.The US is now just a shadow of its past. It is a diminishing superpower in the world now. China’s economy has overtaken the US in the past two years, and the reversal of fortunes is not in sight. The US is no longer indispensable in the world economy.With the non-US dollar trades on the uptrend and with BRICS planning a new global currency (BRICS pay is already in place), the privileged position and sanction-imposing power of the US$ would be over in less than 10 years.What about us?The current position of multilateralism in international relations might serve Myanmar good before the year 2000. Maybe it is time to rethink this guiding principle for the coming decades. Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, etc., have become richer than Myanmar by sticking to and getting help from their northern friendly neighbour. Instead of appeasing the West, Western puppets and the US, where the help comes with attachments, ideologies and dogmas of faith, our orientation might require readjustment, to cater for the need to at least catch up with our neighbours and get out of the poverty trap.GNLM

With the first meeting between China and US trade officials in Geneva over, the two global giants agree to continue to negotiate without setting specific deadlines or targets. The Trump administration, as usual, exaggerates to claim empty victory over successful negotiations, yet the battle is far from over. Trump has given in, lowering the tariffs from the impossibly high 145 per cent. The trade war talk is taking its toll on US consumers, with Walmart, the US’s largest retailer, raising prices every month, citing Trump’s tariffs as a reason.

The prediction
In the end, when the dust settles, the world trading system will go forward with or without the US. The US is already getting isolated even from its closest allies, such as Canada, Mexico and the EU, and it would end up getting isolated from the rest of the world too. The world with continue with the renewed commitment to the formal rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The rules may not be perfect, but they are the best we have at present.
The Trump version is slightly different. He wants the US to remain at the centre of power, the system and the US dollar as the main trade currency. The officials have been quite explicit about that, saying other countries would fall in line with the US against China, i.e., join the US side in its trade war against China. Totally unreachable dream, knowing how much homework China has already done in the past five years in the global south, for most of them to be on the Chinese side. Being on the Chinese side means development, being on the Western and US side means ideologies and systems that have no proven record of making any developing countries prosper.

The reasons
If you look at what real economic power the US maintains today, it is a far cry from the rhetoric that the Trump administration touted. The idea that the US market is central to every economy and using the threat of cutting exporting countries out of the US market would make them kowtow to all their whims and whistles is as outdated nowadays. It may have been true 25 years ago, but the consumer power is no longer centralized in the US alone. The numbers simply do not support that theory. The US imports are no longer substantial enough for most countries to alter their whole foreign policy and economic orientation because of that threat, barring Mexico, Germany (~70 per cent of their exports to the US) perhaps.
The US imports only 12 per cent or so of the world’s exports. It’s just not that significant anymore at this point in time, after the enormous growth of China and some countries of the global south.
The counter to all these facts and figures was that when the US blocks China’s exports, China would be forced to flood the EU with its wares, forcing Europe to eventually put up barriers against China, which would be equivalent to joining the trade war with the US. That could be what the Trump people are hoping for, but again, the figures do not support that either.
China currently only exports about $450 billion a year to the US. Its total export to the whole world is $3,600 billion. The exports to the US have come down significantly in the past ten years because of anti-China policies. The long-term master planner, China, has already diversified its trade. What do you think the same Chinese leadership under President Xi has been doing in the past ten years? Just ignoring US threats and not preparing for any eventual possibilities? So the idea that China would flood the world markets with its inexpensive goods if the US market is cut off is merely a fantasy. The US simply does not have the power to do that anymore.
Another factor is that China’s favour is the US being a deficit country with a lot, really a lot of debts. These debt instruments are being held by their major trading partners/adversaries like China, Japan, etc. In the event of a real tit for tat war, once these countries sell their bond holdings, the demand for US debt will be cut significantly, thereby raising interest rates and receiving downward credit ratings, causing it to pay more interest (in billions of $). With current yearly deficits in trillions, it’s a bitter pill that the US simply cannot swallow. A recent anecdote of Japan and China selling US bonds in response to Trump’s threats forces the treasury rates above five per cent, causing markets to free-fall in US stocks. These directly affect 401K (US pension schemes) and make the retirement funds of US workers smaller.
If we use Trump’s words on Zelensky, ‘Trump simply does not have the cards’. Trump does not have a strong hand against China. He is overestimating his hand in his bluff. When Trump was barking from afar, Xi again did his work by visiting some Southeast Asian countries, further augmenting their trade ties with these countries.
The US is now just a shadow of its past. It is a diminishing superpower in the world now. China’s economy has overtaken the US in the past two years, and the reversal of fortunes is not in sight. The US is no longer indispensable in the world economy.
With the non-US dollar trades on the uptrend and with BRICS planning a new global currency (BRICS pay is already in place), the privileged position and sanction-imposing power of the US$ would be over in less than 10 years.

What about us?
The current position of multilateralism in international relations might serve Myanmar good before the year 2000. Maybe it is time to rethink this guiding principle for the coming decades. Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, etc., have become richer than Myanmar by sticking to and getting help from their northern friendly neighbour. Instead of appeasing the West, Western puppets and the US, where the help comes with attachments, ideologies and dogmas of faith, our orientation might require readjustment, to cater for the need to at least catch up with our neighbours and get out of the poverty trap.

GNLM

U AC

With the first meeting between China and US trade officials in Geneva over, the two global giants agree to continue to negotiate without setting specific deadlines or targets. The Trump administration, as usual, exaggerates to claim empty victory over successful negotiations, yet the battle is far from over. Trump has given in, lowering the tariffs from the impossibly high 145 per cent. The trade war talk is taking its toll on US consumers, with Walmart, the US’s largest retailer, raising prices every month, citing Trump’s tariffs as a reason.

The prediction
In the end, when the dust settles, the world trading system will go forward with or without the US. The US is already getting isolated even from its closest allies, such as Canada, Mexico and the EU, and it would end up getting isolated from the rest of the world too. The world with continue with the renewed commitment to the formal rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The rules may not be perfect, but they are the best we have at present.
The Trump version is slightly different. He wants the US to remain at the centre of power, the system and the US dollar as the main trade currency. The officials have been quite explicit about that, saying other countries would fall in line with the US against China, i.e., join the US side in its trade war against China. Totally unreachable dream, knowing how much homework China has already done in the past five years in the global south, for most of them to be on the Chinese side. Being on the Chinese side means development, being on the Western and US side means ideologies and systems that have no proven record of making any developing countries prosper.

The reasons
If you look at what real economic power the US maintains today, it is a far cry from the rhetoric that the Trump administration touted. The idea that the US market is central to every economy and using the threat of cutting exporting countries out of the US market would make them kowtow to all their whims and whistles is as outdated nowadays. It may have been true 25 years ago, but the consumer power is no longer centralized in the US alone. The numbers simply do not support that theory. The US imports are no longer substantial enough for most countries to alter their whole foreign policy and economic orientation because of that threat, barring Mexico, Germany (~70 per cent of their exports to the US) perhaps.
The US imports only 12 per cent or so of the world’s exports. It’s just not that significant anymore at this point in time, after the enormous growth of China and some countries of the global south.
The counter to all these facts and figures was that when the US blocks China’s exports, China would be forced to flood the EU with its wares, forcing Europe to eventually put up barriers against China, which would be equivalent to joining the trade war with the US. That could be what the Trump people are hoping for, but again, the figures do not support that either.
China currently only exports about $450 billion a year to the US. Its total export to the whole world is $3,600 billion. The exports to the US have come down significantly in the past ten years because of anti-China policies. The long-term master planner, China, has already diversified its trade. What do you think the same Chinese leadership under President Xi has been doing in the past ten years? Just ignoring US threats and not preparing for any eventual possibilities? So the idea that China would flood the world markets with its inexpensive goods if the US market is cut off is merely a fantasy. The US simply does not have the power to do that anymore.
Another factor is that China’s favour is the US being a deficit country with a lot, really a lot of debts. These debt instruments are being held by their major trading partners/adversaries like China, Japan, etc. In the event of a real tit for tat war, once these countries sell their bond holdings, the demand for US debt will be cut significantly, thereby raising interest rates and receiving downward credit ratings, causing it to pay more interest (in billions of $). With current yearly deficits in trillions, it’s a bitter pill that the US simply cannot swallow. A recent anecdote of Japan and China selling US bonds in response to Trump’s threats forces the treasury rates above five per cent, causing markets to free-fall in US stocks. These directly affect 401K (US pension schemes) and make the retirement funds of US workers smaller.
If we use Trump’s words on Zelensky, ‘Trump simply does not have the cards’. Trump does not have a strong hand against China. He is overestimating his hand in his bluff. When Trump was barking from afar, Xi again did his work by visiting some Southeast Asian countries, further augmenting their trade ties with these countries.
The US is now just a shadow of its past. It is a diminishing superpower in the world now. China’s economy has overtaken the US in the past two years, and the reversal of fortunes is not in sight. The US is no longer indispensable in the world economy.
With the non-US dollar trades on the uptrend and with BRICS planning a new global currency (BRICS pay is already in place), the privileged position and sanction-imposing power of the US$ would be over in less than 10 years.

What about us?
The current position of multilateralism in international relations might serve Myanmar good before the year 2000. Maybe it is time to rethink this guiding principle for the coming decades. Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, etc., have become richer than Myanmar by sticking to and getting help from their northern friendly neighbour. Instead of appeasing the West, Western puppets and the US, where the help comes with attachments, ideologies and dogmas of faith, our orientation might require readjustment, to cater for the need to at least catch up with our neighbours and get out of the poverty trap.

GNLM

China’s Desert-to-Farmland Transformation Offers Lessons for Myanmar’s Agricultural Development
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As a PhD student at China Agricultural University (CAU), I had the privilege of visiting the Shiyanghe Experimental Station in Gansu Province, where groundbreaking agricultural innovations are turning barren deserts into thriving green fields. This experience offered profound insights into water-saving technologies, drought-resistant farming, and sustainable land rehabilitation practices that could revolutionize agriculture in Myanmar’s Central Dry Zone, where water scarcity and desertification pose similar challenges.Innovation, Transformation, and Resilience for Sustainable AgricultureThe Shiyanghe Experimental Station was conducted by China Agricultural University (CAU), located in Wuwei City, Gansu Province, in northwest China (37°51′ N, 102°52′ E; 1,581 metres above sea level). The area is characterized by low precipitation (around 164 millimetres annually) and high evaporation rates up to 2,000 millimetres, and is also known for high temperatures in summer, windy and dry weather. This station serves as a landmark of forward-thinking design and steadfast resilience.I was particularly impressed by the innovative research being conducted to address drought and salinity stress. This research mainly contributes to a better understanding of drought resistance and supports sustainable water management systems in arid regions. This study focuses on the challenge of maintaining maize productivity in arid regions facing water shortages and soil salinization. Among all research, the one that uses maize genotypes (Xianyu 335 and Zhengdan 958) under different irrigation, drought, and salinity treatments this kind of research is a pivotal role in identifying drought-resistant crop varieties and optimizing agricultural practices in extreme climates. Myanmar can adopt similar research methodologies; it will be immensely improved by the Myanmar Climate Smart Agricultural Strategy (MCSAS).Shiyanghe, mainly focuses on advanced water-saving technology such as drip irrigation, rainwater harvesting, mulching, and soil moisture monitoring. The precision irrigation (like smart drip irrigation) delivers water directly to the roots, improving moisture consistency and nutrient absorption. These techniques have significantly enhanced crop performance, demonstrating that effective management strategies can overcome climate limitations. Promoting research on drought-resistant crops and advanced monitoring technologies would enhance agricultural resilience.My field observations extended to the long-term agricultural experiments, where innovative water conservation strategies are making a significant impact. Applying advanced technologies like shallow drip tape irrigation technology and smart pipeline robotic frames to monitor crop health and photosynthesis rates under drought conditions. By applying these water-saving techniques and research methodologies will leverage initiatives, such as Climate Smart Agriculture Myanmar and the Pyawt Ywar Pump Irrigation ongoing project. I learned how community efforts can transform from dune into green land. Policies supporting such research and advanced technology support to local farmers would empower them to better withstand drought conditions, ultimately improving productivity.This long-term field experiment was established (since 2003), one of the experiments, which was a randomized complete block design with three replicates. Mainly focuses on the wheat, maize and faba bean. The experiment treatments include: (1) monoculture, (2) rotational intercropping, and (3) continuous intercropping. In the early four years (2003-2006) of field experiments, maize overyielded by 43 per cent and faba beans overyielded by 26 per cent when intercropped on a low-phosphorus but high-nitrogen soil.Compared with conventional farming methods, the intercropping system can save approximately 200 cubic metres of water per mu. This success long term experiments offer valuable lessons for Myanmar.Huarui Farm (华瑞农场) in Minle County, Gansu Province, China, is known for its modern agricultural practices, particularly in maize, soybean production and other high-value crops. It is also promoting water-saving irrigation technologies, including drip irrigation and a fertigation system in sandy soil. Fertigation integrates fertilizers into irrigation water, delivering nutrients directly to the plant root zone. Up to 30-50 per cent less fertilizer waste compared to broadcasting. Drip fertigation reduces evaporation and runoff. These modern techniques place as a role model to save water and fertilizer runoff in the dry zone.My journey to Gansu Province was more than just an educational experience; it was eye-opening. I learned how innovative practices and community-driven efforts can transform even arid environments into lush farmland. The central dry zone of Myanmar shares many similarities with Gansu’s topography, making the lessons from the experimental station invaluable for enhancing Myanmar’s agriculture. By embracing these strategies, Myanmar can overcome its challenges and achieve long-term economic growth while improving livelihoods for its communities.GNLM

As a PhD student at China Agricultural University (CAU), I had the privilege of visiting the Shiyanghe Experimental Station in Gansu Province, where groundbreaking agricultural innovations are turning barren deserts into thriving green fields. This experience offered profound insights into water-saving technologies, drought-resistant farming, and sustainable land rehabilitation practices that could revolutionize agriculture in Myanmar’s Central Dry Zone, where water scarcity and desertification pose similar challenges.

Innovation, Transformation, and Resilience for Sustainable Agriculture
The Shiyanghe Experimental Station was conducted by China Agricultural University (CAU), located in Wuwei City, Gansu Province, in northwest China (37°51′ N, 102°52′ E; 1,581 metres above sea level). The area is characterized by low precipitation (around 164 millimetres annually) and high evaporation rates up to 2,000 millimetres, and is also known for high temperatures in summer, windy and dry weather. This station serves as a landmark of forward-thinking design and steadfast resilience.
I was particularly impressed by the innovative research being conducted to address drought and salinity stress. This research mainly contributes to a better understanding of drought resistance and supports sustainable water management systems in arid regions. This study focuses on the challenge of maintaining maize productivity in arid regions facing water shortages and soil salinization. Among all research, the one that uses maize genotypes (Xianyu 335 and Zhengdan 958) under different irrigation, drought, and salinity treatments this kind of research is a pivotal role in identifying drought-resistant crop varieties and optimizing agricultural practices in extreme climates. Myanmar can adopt similar research methodologies; it will be immensely improved by the Myanmar Climate Smart Agricultural Strategy (MCSAS).
Shiyanghe, mainly focuses on advanced water-saving technology such as drip irrigation, rainwater harvesting, mulching, and soil moisture monitoring. The precision irrigation (like smart drip irrigation) delivers water directly to the roots, improving moisture consistency and nutrient absorption. These techniques have significantly enhanced crop performance, demonstrating that effective management strategies can overcome climate limitations. Promoting research on drought-resistant crops and advanced monitoring technologies would enhance agricultural resilience.
My field observations extended to the long-term agricultural experiments, where innovative water conservation strategies are making a significant impact. Applying advanced technologies like shallow drip tape irrigation technology and smart pipeline robotic frames to monitor crop health and photosynthesis rates under drought conditions. By applying these water-saving techniques and research methodologies will leverage initiatives, such as Climate Smart Agriculture Myanmar and the Pyawt Ywar Pump Irrigation ongoing project. I learned how community efforts can transform from dune into green land. Policies supporting such research and advanced technology support to local farmers would empower them to better withstand drought conditions, ultimately improving productivity.

This long-term field experiment was established (since 2003), one of the experiments, which was a randomized complete block design with three replicates. Mainly focuses on the wheat, maize and faba bean. The experiment treatments include: (1) monoculture, (2) rotational intercropping, and (3) continuous intercropping. In the early four years (2003-2006) of field experiments, maize overyielded by 43 per cent and faba beans overyielded by 26 per cent when intercropped on a low-phosphorus but high-nitrogen soil.
Compared with conventional farming methods, the intercropping system can save approximately 200 cubic metres of water per mu. This success long term experiments offer valuable lessons for Myanmar.
Huarui Farm (华瑞农场) in Minle County, Gansu Province, China, is known for its modern agricultural practices, particularly in maize, soybean production and other high-value crops. It is also promoting water-saving irrigation technologies, including drip irrigation and a fertigation system in sandy soil. Fertigation integrates fertilizers into irrigation water, delivering nutrients directly to the plant root zone. Up to 30-50 per cent less fertilizer waste compared to broadcasting. Drip fertigation reduces evaporation and runoff. These modern techniques place as a role model to save water and fertilizer runoff in the dry zone.
My journey to Gansu Province was more than just an educational experience; it was eye-opening. I learned how innovative practices and community-driven efforts can transform even arid environments into lush farmland. The central dry zone of Myanmar shares many similarities with Gansu’s topography, making the lessons from the experimental station invaluable for enhancing Myanmar’s agriculture. By embracing these strategies, Myanmar can overcome its challenges and achieve long-term economic growth while improving livelihoods for its communities.

GNLM

Yu Yu Htay

As a PhD student at China Agricultural University (CAU), I had the privilege of visiting the Shiyanghe Experimental Station in Gansu Province, where groundbreaking agricultural innovations are turning barren deserts into thriving green fields. This experience offered profound insights into water-saving technologies, drought-resistant farming, and sustainable land rehabilitation practices that could revolutionize agriculture in Myanmar’s Central Dry Zone, where water scarcity and desertification pose similar challenges.

Innovation, Transformation, and Resilience for Sustainable Agriculture
The Shiyanghe Experimental Station was conducted by China Agricultural University (CAU), located in Wuwei City, Gansu Province, in northwest China (37°51′ N, 102°52′ E; 1,581 metres above sea level). The area is characterized by low precipitation (around 164 millimetres annually) and high evaporation rates up to 2,000 millimetres, and is also known for high temperatures in summer, windy and dry weather. This station serves as a landmark of forward-thinking design and steadfast resilience.
I was particularly impressed by the innovative research being conducted to address drought and salinity stress. This research mainly contributes to a better understanding of drought resistance and supports sustainable water management systems in arid regions. This study focuses on the challenge of maintaining maize productivity in arid regions facing water shortages and soil salinization. Among all research, the one that uses maize genotypes (Xianyu 335 and Zhengdan 958) under different irrigation, drought, and salinity treatments this kind of research is a pivotal role in identifying drought-resistant crop varieties and optimizing agricultural practices in extreme climates. Myanmar can adopt similar research methodologies; it will be immensely improved by the Myanmar Climate Smart Agricultural Strategy (MCSAS).
Shiyanghe, mainly focuses on advanced water-saving technology such as drip irrigation, rainwater harvesting, mulching, and soil moisture monitoring. The precision irrigation (like smart drip irrigation) delivers water directly to the roots, improving moisture consistency and nutrient absorption. These techniques have significantly enhanced crop performance, demonstrating that effective management strategies can overcome climate limitations. Promoting research on drought-resistant crops and advanced monitoring technologies would enhance agricultural resilience.
My field observations extended to the long-term agricultural experiments, where innovative water conservation strategies are making a significant impact. Applying advanced technologies like shallow drip tape irrigation technology and smart pipeline robotic frames to monitor crop health and photosynthesis rates under drought conditions. By applying these water-saving techniques and research methodologies will leverage initiatives, such as Climate Smart Agriculture Myanmar and the Pyawt Ywar Pump Irrigation ongoing project. I learned how community efforts can transform from dune into green land. Policies supporting such research and advanced technology support to local farmers would empower them to better withstand drought conditions, ultimately improving productivity.

This long-term field experiment was established (since 2003), one of the experiments, which was a randomized complete block design with three replicates. Mainly focuses on the wheat, maize and faba bean. The experiment treatments include: (1) monoculture, (2) rotational intercropping, and (3) continuous intercropping. In the early four years (2003-2006) of field experiments, maize overyielded by 43 per cent and faba beans overyielded by 26 per cent when intercropped on a low-phosphorus but high-nitrogen soil.
Compared with conventional farming methods, the intercropping system can save approximately 200 cubic metres of water per mu. This success long term experiments offer valuable lessons for Myanmar.
Huarui Farm (华瑞农场) in Minle County, Gansu Province, China, is known for its modern agricultural practices, particularly in maize, soybean production and other high-value crops. It is also promoting water-saving irrigation technologies, including drip irrigation and a fertigation system in sandy soil. Fertigation integrates fertilizers into irrigation water, delivering nutrients directly to the plant root zone. Up to 30-50 per cent less fertilizer waste compared to broadcasting. Drip fertigation reduces evaporation and runoff. These modern techniques place as a role model to save water and fertilizer runoff in the dry zone.
My journey to Gansu Province was more than just an educational experience; it was eye-opening. I learned how innovative practices and community-driven efforts can transform even arid environments into lush farmland. The central dry zone of Myanmar shares many similarities with Gansu’s topography, making the lessons from the experimental station invaluable for enhancing Myanmar’s agriculture. By embracing these strategies, Myanmar can overcome its challenges and achieve long-term economic growth while improving livelihoods for its communities.

GNLM