In today’s world, major global trade routes are facing a noticeable decline in traffic. Traditional international maritime corridors—such as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal—are seeing reduced trade flows as a result of escalating geopolitical tensions. The Russia–Ukraine war, the Iran–Israel conflict and broader instability across the Middle East, the intensifying strategic rivalry between China and the United States, and prolonged conflicts between India and Pakistan have all contributed to disruptions in maritime commerce. Due to the war in Ukraine, trade routes between Russia and Europe have shrunk by as much as 60 percent. At the same time, economic sanctions imposed between Iran and Western nations have severely disrupted energy exports from the Persian Gulf region. As a result of such conflicts, global trade is rapidly shifting away from traditional routes and toward alliance-based networks. Initiatives such as the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC), and the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) have emerged as major overland and multimodal routes connecting allied nations along north–south and east–west axes.
At the same time, efforts to expand and identify new geopolitical and geo-economic corridors have brought increasing attention to the Arctic Ocean along the world’s northern rim. This region is emerging as a potential hub for the shortest strategic Lines of Communication (LOCs), offering new possibilities for global connectivity and trade. Russia’s strategic development of its northern maritime routes—particularly its efforts to expand and operationalize the Maritime Multilateral Collegium, a naval consortium among allied nations—highlights the growing significance of Sea Power in the contemporary era. These developments represent some of the most notable transformations in global trade dynamics. Analyses indicate that by 2030, up to 40 percent of international trade could be rerouted through these emerging corridors, reflecting their rapid rise in strategic and economic importance.
With major neighboring countries advancing their own connectivity initiatives—China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Thailand’s “One Port, Two Sides” project, and India’s various international trade corridor plans—Myanmar has a strategic opportunity to leverage its advantageous geopolitical location. By acting at the right moment and utilizing these regional frameworks, the country could establish itself as a key node in Asia’s emerging trade architecture.
Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC)
Eastern Maritime Corridor
During the Eastern Economic Forum held in 2019, Russia and India held bilateral discussions and reached an initial agreement to establish direct maritime connectivity between Russia’s port of Vladivostok and India’s port of Chennai. The primary objective of the Eastern Maritime Corridor is to reduce both transit time and transportation costs for the movement of goods between Russia and India. At present, the western maritime route connecting India and Russia—from India’s Port of Mumbai to Russia’s Port of Saint Petersburg—covers a distance of approximately 8,675 nautical miles, requiring around 40 days of transit. In the future, the Eastern Maritime Corridor connecting India’s Port of Chennai and Russia’s Port of Vladivostok will span approximately 5,647 nautical miles, reducing the transit time to around 28 days. Compared to the current western maritime route, this represents a shortening of nearly 3,000 nautical miles and a saving of roughly 12 days in shipping time.
The Eastern Maritime Corridor will pass through the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea, navigating near the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Malacca Strait, before entering the Bay of Bengal and ultimately reaching Chennai via the Nicobar Islands. If realized, this maritime route could serve as an optimal gateway not only for the countries directly involved but also for Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea region, including Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia, facilitating enhanced trade and connectivity across the region.
International North-South Transport Corridor - INSTC
International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)
Launched in 2018, the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is being developed as a multimodal trade network linking India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, several Central Asian states, and parts of Europe. The corridor integrates maritime, rail, and road systems to facilitate more efficient transport of goods across these regions, creating a comprehensive north–south connectivity framework. The INSTC is designed as a key tri-modal corridor that links Russia and Asia by traversing the Caspian Sea. Along the Eastern Route, overland connections—via rail and road—link Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and India. The Central Route will combine maritime and overland transport, linking Russia, the Caspian Sea, Iran, and India. This route crosses the Caspian Sea, transporting goods from Russia’s Port of Astrakhan to Iran’s Port of Bandar-e-Anzali. The Western Route will link Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and India through overland transport—using rail and road networks. This multimodal transport corridor spans approximately 4,500 miles and is expected to offer significant savings in both time and cost compared with current shipping routes that rely on the Suez Canal. Studies indicate that the INSTC could reduce the transport distance for goods shipped from Russia to India by up to 40 percent. It is also expected to lower overall transportation costs by around 30 percent, while cutting transit time by 25 to 40 days compared with traditional routes.
North-South Corridor
Russia and India are focusing on developing promising production and market-expansion value chains across Eurasia. With the objective of realizing a broader Eurasian trade space, both countries are working to strengthen and interlink the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor and the International North–South Transport Corridor. These combined efforts aim to enhance connectivity and support deeper economic integration throughout the Eurasian region. The corridor is expected to bring substantial benefits to the countries along its route by boosting trade flows. For Myanmar, strategically located between the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, timely and effective utilization of these opportunities could yield significant advantages for national economic development.
India-Middle East-Europe Corridor - IMEC
The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) is an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. The corridor aims to stimulate economic growth by facilitating smoother trade flows and fostering closer commercial linkages across these regions. The corridor is planned as a route from India to Europe, passing through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Greece. At the 2023 G20 Summit held in India, the governments of India, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy, and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The corridor is structured into two separate routes. The eastern route will connect the western coastal port of Mundra in India with Fujairah in the UAE, while goods from Saudi Arabia and Jordan will be transported by rail to Israel’s Port of Haifa. The western route will link Israel’s Port of Haifa to multiple ports in Europe, including Marseille in France, as well as ports in Italy and Greece.
India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC)
The IMEC represents India’s new corridor designed to enhance economic integration by linking Asia with Europe.
Italy has shown a strong inclination to distance itself from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and amid divergences within the G7, the IMEC project has emerged as an alternative framework. The IMEC corridor has evolved into a multimodal initiative, incorporating both rail and maritime routes, that connects India with the Middle East and Europe. The combined GDP of the IMEC countries—including the European Union—is estimated at approximately USD 47 trillion, representing roughly 40 percent of the world’s total GDP.
Within the project, reliable and cost-effective transport systems—including both maritime and rail networks—will be established for the cross-border movement of goods and services. Like the Suez Canal, the north–south transport corridors, and China’s Belt and Road routes, this project will complement existing maritime and rail transport networks by facilitating smoother trade and logistics between India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Europe.
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)
By linking India with the Middle East and Europe, the IMEC corridor strengthens India’s geopolitical influence and positions the country as a more active player in both regional and global affairs. In addition, the corridor could facilitate smoother and more reliable flows of India’s critical natural resources, thereby supporting the country’s energy security and strengthening its capacity to meet domestic and industrial energy demands.
Opportunities and Challenges
The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) has the potential to emerge as a direct competitor to China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for a variety of strategic and economic reasons. The strategic northern alignment of IMEC is designed to facilitate trade between India, the Middle East, and Europe. Analyses suggest that, compared with some of the longer and more complex routes under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), IMEC could offer greater efficiency and lower transportation costs.
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)
The IMEC corridor is expected to boost regional trade while attracting investment into India. By enhancing diplomatic ties and fostering political goodwill, it can strengthen India’s market presence and promote comprehensive economic development across the country. Exports from India to continental Europe could see transportation costs reduced by approximately 30 percent and transit times shortened by around 40 percent compared with the current Suez Canal route. Connecting India’s two largest trade partners—the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—through the IMEC corridor could further bolster India’s position as a major global power.
Just as the IMEC corridor presents significant opportunities, it also comes with its share of challenges that must be addressed. The corridor faces several geopolitical and operational challenges. Some Middle Eastern countries lack well-developed production capacities, business operating costs are high, and key nations such as Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Qatar are not participating. Additionally, certain geographic constraints arising from the corridor’s location present further limitations that need to be managed. Moreover, the corridor will need to navigate a range of regional conflict-related challenges, such as disruptions to maritime trade caused by the Israel–Hamas conflict and the activities of Houthi rebels in Yemen affecting Red Sea shipping. Effectively managing these security risks will be essential to ensuring uninterrupted trade flows. Through the IMEC project, India is not only building new infrastructure but also creating alternative pathways for global partnerships. The corridor facilitates the bridging of differences and the transformation of potential challenges into opportunities, fostering collaboration and enhancing India’s strategic and economic engagement worldwide. The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) represents a strategic advancement that goes beyond a mere economic initiative. By enhancing India’s energy security, strengthening transportation and logistics resilience, promoting economic prosperity, and supporting national security, the corridor positions India as a more active player in both regional and global affairs. It is expected to bolster India’s geopolitical influence and expand its strategic footprint across Eurasia.
The Maritime Collegium of the Russian Federation
On August 13, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed and officially announced the establishment of the “Russian Maritime Collegium.” Today, Russia’s Maritime Collegium seeks to fully develop the Blue Economy by connecting global maritime trade routes and economic corridors. To achieve this, it is working to establish a “Multilateral Maritime Collegium” that brings together partner countries, creating an integrated framework for international maritime cooperation. The envisioned Multilateral Maritime Collegium is expected to include key countries from Russia-led groupings such as BRICS, SCO, and CIS. It aims to facilitate coordinated connectivity across the Indo-Pacific region, the Middle East, East and Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa, promoting harmonized maritime cooperation among participating nations.
Russian transport routes
Russia has established the Multilateral Maritime Collegium with the objective of enhancing its control and influence over Arctic and northern maritime routes, which are central to its national maritime interests. The initiative is also intended to integrate these routes with international maritime networks, creating a coordinated framework for global maritime economic engagement. Furthermore, following the inauguration of President Donald Trump’s administration, Russia observed U.S. efforts to assert control over Greenland and advance a “unipolar world” strategy. In response, Russia sought to promote a “multipolar world” by establishing the Multilateral Maritime Collegium, a framework designed to unite partner countries around shared national economic interests and foster coordinated engagement in global maritime affairs.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a significant framework of cooperation for Myanmar, offering numerous opportunities in economic development, transportation connectivity, and regional infrastructure expansion. By linking with this major global initiative, Myanmar has the opportunity to leverage its strategic geographic position to establish itself as a central hub for regional connectivity and trade. In particular, the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) serves as a central pillar of this connectivity, with the potential to drive development across ports, highways, railways, energy infrastructure, and special economic zones.
China-Myanmar Economic Corridor
These developments could provide critical support for modernizing Myanmar’s essential infrastructure sector, helping to upgrade and expand the country’s foundational facilities to meet current and future needs. Improved stability in electricity supply and enhanced transportation infrastructure will boost domestic production capacity and create a favorable environment to attract foreign investment. Moreover, the corridor is expected to open major gateways for Myanmar’s abundant yet underutilized natural resources, agricultural products, and human capital to access global markets.
For Myanmar, linking with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could provide significant leverage in terms of strategic geopolitical importance and offer substantial economic opportunities. Myanmar shares an extensive border with China and occupies a strategically advantageous position with direct access to the Indian Ocean. It is precisely because of this strategic advantage that Myanmar plays a crucial role as a key focal point within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), serving as a central component of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The CMEC projects include the development of deep-sea ports such as Kyaukpyu, the construction of major energy transmission lines, and the enhancement of transportation infrastructure. These initiatives are expected not only to enhance Myanmar’s domestic economy but also to function as a land bridge, facilitating smoother trade and investment flows to neighboring countries such as China and other Southeast Asian nations. Especially, projects related to Kyaukpyu Port are expected to elevate Myanmar’s status as a major port on the Indian Ocean, positioning it as a key player in regional maritime trade and enhancing its significance in the broader logistics and shipping network.
Thailand’s "One Port, Two Sides"
Thailand’s proposed land bridge project
The Thai government has issued a draft law for a new land bridge project—a high-value overland transport corridor linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. This initiative, valued at several billion dollars, aims to establish a strategic trade route facilitating faster and more efficient regional commerce. The project is slated for completion by 2030 and is estimated to require an investment of approximately 1 trillion baht (around USD 29 billion). The new overland corridor project includes two deep-sea ports in Thailand: one at Ranong District on the western coast along the Andaman Sea, and another at Chon Phon District on the eastern coast along the Gulf of Thailand. These two ports will be connected by both railway and road networks, ensuring seamless overland transportation along the corridor. The total estimated cost for the entire project is approximately USD 35.6 billion. Foreign investors will be allowed to hold more than 50 percent ownership in joint ventures and domestic companies involved in the project. The Thai government aims to avoid relying solely on China for investment, actively seeking to attract capital from Saudi Arabia and other countries as well. The initiative also aims to establish the “Southern Special Economic Corridor” to further promote economic development in Thailand’s southern region. The Thai government has attracted interest from over 100 international investors, including some of the world’s largest shipping companies. Construction for the project is planned to begin in the third quarter of 2026, with completion targeted for 2030.
Myanmar Strategic Pivot ....
Myanmar Strategic Pivot
Amid the rapidly evolving geopolitical and economic landscape, the emergence of new international trade route networks presents Myanmar with significant opportunities. It is crucial for the country to strategically position itself to leverage these developments and maximize the benefits for national growth and regional integration. Russia, leveraging its strategic geographic position, is actively developing new north-to-south trade corridors. Currently, it is collaborating with India, Iran, and Azerbaijan to advance the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, which will connect eastern Russian cities by sea to India. Additionally, Russia is engaging in cooperative initiatives with China within the Arctic region, further enhancing its reach and influence in global maritime trade networks.
From China’s perspective, leveraging its strategic geographic position, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is being implemented as a major east-to-west international trade corridor. When combined with Russia’s emerging north-to-south trade routes, these corridors are creating critical junctions where the two networks intersect. Myanmar, due to its strategic location, sits squarely at one of these pivotal points, positioning the country as a key regional hub for trade and connectivity. In future global trade networks, Myanmar’s strategically located zones—such as Thilawa Deep-Sea Port and its associated special economic zones—are well-positioned to generate significant opportunities in maritime trade and related economic activities. Myanmar’s Thilawa Deep-Sea Port occupies a strategically important location along the maritime route connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, underscoring the country’s critical geopolitical and economic position. For example, from Thilawa Deep-Sea Port, Myanmar’s strategic location allows overland connections to key cities such as Bangkok in Thailand, Phnom Penh in Cambodia, and Ho Chi Minh City and Vũng Tàu in Vietnam, ultimately linking to the South China Sea. By overland distance, the route spans approximately 800 kilometers, compared with the more than 2,000 nautical miles by sea from Thilawa Deep-Sea Port to Vũng Tàu Port in Vietnam, making it roughly one-third the distance. In other words, this corridor represents the shortest route connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.
The Shortest Route Connecting the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean
Thus, by strategically leveraging Myanmar’s geographic pivot point, the country can effectively participate in international overland and maritime trade corridor projects connecting partner and neighboring countries. This coordinated engagement can serve as a key catalyst for building a sovereign state that is not only sustainable and resilient but also comprehensive and prosperous in its long-term development.
မောင်မိုး| ၂၅-၈-၂၀၂၅
In today’s world, major global trade routes are facing a noticeable decline in traffic. Traditional international maritime corridors—such as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal—are seeing reduced trade flows as a result of escalating geopolitical tensions. The Russia–Ukraine war, the Iran–Israel conflict and broader instability across the Middle East, the intensifying strategic rivalry between China and the United States, and prolonged conflicts between India and Pakistan have all contributed to disruptions in maritime commerce. Due to the war in Ukraine, trade routes between Russia and Europe have shrunk by as much as 60 percent. At the same time, economic sanctions imposed between Iran and Western nations have severely disrupted energy exports from the Persian Gulf region. As a result of such conflicts, global trade is rapidly shifting away from traditional routes and toward alliance-based networks. Initiatives such as the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC), and the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) have emerged as major overland and multimodal routes connecting allied nations along north–south and east–west axes.
At the same time, efforts to expand and identify new geopolitical and geo-economic corridors have brought increasing attention to the Arctic Ocean along the world’s northern rim. This region is emerging as a potential hub for the shortest strategic Lines of Communication (LOCs), offering new possibilities for global connectivity and trade. Russia’s strategic development of its northern maritime routes—particularly its efforts to expand and operationalize the Maritime Multilateral Collegium, a naval consortium among allied nations—highlights the growing significance of Sea Power in the contemporary era. These developments represent some of the most notable transformations in global trade dynamics. Analyses indicate that by 2030, up to 40 percent of international trade could be rerouted through these emerging corridors, reflecting their rapid rise in strategic and economic importance.
With major neighboring countries advancing their own connectivity initiatives—China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Thailand’s “One Port, Two Sides” project, and India’s various international trade corridor plans—Myanmar has a strategic opportunity to leverage its advantageous geopolitical location. By acting at the right moment and utilizing these regional frameworks, the country could establish itself as a key node in Asia’s emerging trade architecture.
Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC)
Eastern Maritime Corridor
During the Eastern Economic Forum held in 2019, Russia and India held bilateral discussions and reached an initial agreement to establish direct maritime connectivity between Russia’s port of Vladivostok and India’s port of Chennai. The primary objective of the Eastern Maritime Corridor is to reduce both transit time and transportation costs for the movement of goods between Russia and India. At present, the western maritime route connecting India and Russia—from India’s Port of Mumbai to Russia’s Port of Saint Petersburg—covers a distance of approximately 8,675 nautical miles, requiring around 40 days of transit. In the future, the Eastern Maritime Corridor connecting India’s Port of Chennai and Russia’s Port of Vladivostok will span approximately 5,647 nautical miles, reducing the transit time to around 28 days. Compared to the current western maritime route, this represents a shortening of nearly 3,000 nautical miles and a saving of roughly 12 days in shipping time.
The Eastern Maritime Corridor will pass through the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea, navigating near the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Malacca Strait, before entering the Bay of Bengal and ultimately reaching Chennai via the Nicobar Islands. If realized, this maritime route could serve as an optimal gateway not only for the countries directly involved but also for Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea region, including Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia, facilitating enhanced trade and connectivity across the region.
International North-South Transport Corridor - INSTC
International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)
Launched in 2018, the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is being developed as a multimodal trade network linking India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, several Central Asian states, and parts of Europe. The corridor integrates maritime, rail, and road systems to facilitate more efficient transport of goods across these regions, creating a comprehensive north–south connectivity framework. The INSTC is designed as a key tri-modal corridor that links Russia and Asia by traversing the Caspian Sea. Along the Eastern Route, overland connections—via rail and road—link Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and India. The Central Route will combine maritime and overland transport, linking Russia, the Caspian Sea, Iran, and India. This route crosses the Caspian Sea, transporting goods from Russia’s Port of Astrakhan to Iran’s Port of Bandar-e-Anzali. The Western Route will link Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and India through overland transport—using rail and road networks. This multimodal transport corridor spans approximately 4,500 miles and is expected to offer significant savings in both time and cost compared with current shipping routes that rely on the Suez Canal. Studies indicate that the INSTC could reduce the transport distance for goods shipped from Russia to India by up to 40 percent. It is also expected to lower overall transportation costs by around 30 percent, while cutting transit time by 25 to 40 days compared with traditional routes.
North-South Corridor
Russia and India are focusing on developing promising production and market-expansion value chains across Eurasia. With the objective of realizing a broader Eurasian trade space, both countries are working to strengthen and interlink the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor and the International North–South Transport Corridor. These combined efforts aim to enhance connectivity and support deeper economic integration throughout the Eurasian region. The corridor is expected to bring substantial benefits to the countries along its route by boosting trade flows. For Myanmar, strategically located between the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, timely and effective utilization of these opportunities could yield significant advantages for national economic development.
India-Middle East-Europe Corridor - IMEC
The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) is an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. The corridor aims to stimulate economic growth by facilitating smoother trade flows and fostering closer commercial linkages across these regions. The corridor is planned as a route from India to Europe, passing through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Greece. At the 2023 G20 Summit held in India, the governments of India, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy, and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The corridor is structured into two separate routes. The eastern route will connect the western coastal port of Mundra in India with Fujairah in the UAE, while goods from Saudi Arabia and Jordan will be transported by rail to Israel’s Port of Haifa. The western route will link Israel’s Port of Haifa to multiple ports in Europe, including Marseille in France, as well as ports in Italy and Greece.
India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC)
The IMEC represents India’s new corridor designed to enhance economic integration by linking Asia with Europe.
Italy has shown a strong inclination to distance itself from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and amid divergences within the G7, the IMEC project has emerged as an alternative framework. The IMEC corridor has evolved into a multimodal initiative, incorporating both rail and maritime routes, that connects India with the Middle East and Europe. The combined GDP of the IMEC countries—including the European Union—is estimated at approximately USD 47 trillion, representing roughly 40 percent of the world’s total GDP.
Within the project, reliable and cost-effective transport systems—including both maritime and rail networks—will be established for the cross-border movement of goods and services. Like the Suez Canal, the north–south transport corridors, and China’s Belt and Road routes, this project will complement existing maritime and rail transport networks by facilitating smoother trade and logistics between India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Europe.
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)
By linking India with the Middle East and Europe, the IMEC corridor strengthens India’s geopolitical influence and positions the country as a more active player in both regional and global affairs. In addition, the corridor could facilitate smoother and more reliable flows of India’s critical natural resources, thereby supporting the country’s energy security and strengthening its capacity to meet domestic and industrial energy demands.
Opportunities and Challenges
The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) has the potential to emerge as a direct competitor to China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for a variety of strategic and economic reasons. The strategic northern alignment of IMEC is designed to facilitate trade between India, the Middle East, and Europe. Analyses suggest that, compared with some of the longer and more complex routes under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), IMEC could offer greater efficiency and lower transportation costs.
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)
The IMEC corridor is expected to boost regional trade while attracting investment into India. By enhancing diplomatic ties and fostering political goodwill, it can strengthen India’s market presence and promote comprehensive economic development across the country. Exports from India to continental Europe could see transportation costs reduced by approximately 30 percent and transit times shortened by around 40 percent compared with the current Suez Canal route. Connecting India’s two largest trade partners—the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—through the IMEC corridor could further bolster India’s position as a major global power.
Just as the IMEC corridor presents significant opportunities, it also comes with its share of challenges that must be addressed. The corridor faces several geopolitical and operational challenges. Some Middle Eastern countries lack well-developed production capacities, business operating costs are high, and key nations such as Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Qatar are not participating. Additionally, certain geographic constraints arising from the corridor’s location present further limitations that need to be managed. Moreover, the corridor will need to navigate a range of regional conflict-related challenges, such as disruptions to maritime trade caused by the Israel–Hamas conflict and the activities of Houthi rebels in Yemen affecting Red Sea shipping. Effectively managing these security risks will be essential to ensuring uninterrupted trade flows. Through the IMEC project, India is not only building new infrastructure but also creating alternative pathways for global partnerships. The corridor facilitates the bridging of differences and the transformation of potential challenges into opportunities, fostering collaboration and enhancing India’s strategic and economic engagement worldwide. The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) represents a strategic advancement that goes beyond a mere economic initiative. By enhancing India’s energy security, strengthening transportation and logistics resilience, promoting economic prosperity, and supporting national security, the corridor positions India as a more active player in both regional and global affairs. It is expected to bolster India’s geopolitical influence and expand its strategic footprint across Eurasia.
The Maritime Collegium of the Russian Federation
On August 13, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed and officially announced the establishment of the “Russian Maritime Collegium.” Today, Russia’s Maritime Collegium seeks to fully develop the Blue Economy by connecting global maritime trade routes and economic corridors. To achieve this, it is working to establish a “Multilateral Maritime Collegium” that brings together partner countries, creating an integrated framework for international maritime cooperation. The envisioned Multilateral Maritime Collegium is expected to include key countries from Russia-led groupings such as BRICS, SCO, and CIS. It aims to facilitate coordinated connectivity across the Indo-Pacific region, the Middle East, East and Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa, promoting harmonized maritime cooperation among participating nations.
Russian transport routes
Russia has established the Multilateral Maritime Collegium with the objective of enhancing its control and influence over Arctic and northern maritime routes, which are central to its national maritime interests. The initiative is also intended to integrate these routes with international maritime networks, creating a coordinated framework for global maritime economic engagement. Furthermore, following the inauguration of President Donald Trump’s administration, Russia observed U.S. efforts to assert control over Greenland and advance a “unipolar world” strategy. In response, Russia sought to promote a “multipolar world” by establishing the Multilateral Maritime Collegium, a framework designed to unite partner countries around shared national economic interests and foster coordinated engagement in global maritime affairs.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a significant framework of cooperation for Myanmar, offering numerous opportunities in economic development, transportation connectivity, and regional infrastructure expansion. By linking with this major global initiative, Myanmar has the opportunity to leverage its strategic geographic position to establish itself as a central hub for regional connectivity and trade. In particular, the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) serves as a central pillar of this connectivity, with the potential to drive development across ports, highways, railways, energy infrastructure, and special economic zones.
China-Myanmar Economic Corridor
These developments could provide critical support for modernizing Myanmar’s essential infrastructure sector, helping to upgrade and expand the country’s foundational facilities to meet current and future needs. Improved stability in electricity supply and enhanced transportation infrastructure will boost domestic production capacity and create a favorable environment to attract foreign investment. Moreover, the corridor is expected to open major gateways for Myanmar’s abundant yet underutilized natural resources, agricultural products, and human capital to access global markets.
For Myanmar, linking with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could provide significant leverage in terms of strategic geopolitical importance and offer substantial economic opportunities. Myanmar shares an extensive border with China and occupies a strategically advantageous position with direct access to the Indian Ocean. It is precisely because of this strategic advantage that Myanmar plays a crucial role as a key focal point within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), serving as a central component of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The CMEC projects include the development of deep-sea ports such as Kyaukpyu, the construction of major energy transmission lines, and the enhancement of transportation infrastructure. These initiatives are expected not only to enhance Myanmar’s domestic economy but also to function as a land bridge, facilitating smoother trade and investment flows to neighboring countries such as China and other Southeast Asian nations. Especially, projects related to Kyaukpyu Port are expected to elevate Myanmar’s status as a major port on the Indian Ocean, positioning it as a key player in regional maritime trade and enhancing its significance in the broader logistics and shipping network.
Thailand’s "One Port, Two Sides"
Thailand’s proposed land bridge project
The Thai government has issued a draft law for a new land bridge project—a high-value overland transport corridor linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. This initiative, valued at several billion dollars, aims to establish a strategic trade route facilitating faster and more efficient regional commerce. The project is slated for completion by 2030 and is estimated to require an investment of approximately 1 trillion baht (around USD 29 billion). The new overland corridor project includes two deep-sea ports in Thailand: one at Ranong District on the western coast along the Andaman Sea, and another at Chon Phon District on the eastern coast along the Gulf of Thailand. These two ports will be connected by both railway and road networks, ensuring seamless overland transportation along the corridor. The total estimated cost for the entire project is approximately USD 35.6 billion. Foreign investors will be allowed to hold more than 50 percent ownership in joint ventures and domestic companies involved in the project. The Thai government aims to avoid relying solely on China for investment, actively seeking to attract capital from Saudi Arabia and other countries as well. The initiative also aims to establish the “Southern Special Economic Corridor” to further promote economic development in Thailand’s southern region. The Thai government has attracted interest from over 100 international investors, including some of the world’s largest shipping companies. Construction for the project is planned to begin in the third quarter of 2026, with completion targeted for 2030.
Myanmar Strategic Pivot ....
Myanmar Strategic Pivot
Amid the rapidly evolving geopolitical and economic landscape, the emergence of new international trade route networks presents Myanmar with significant opportunities. It is crucial for the country to strategically position itself to leverage these developments and maximize the benefits for national growth and regional integration. Russia, leveraging its strategic geographic position, is actively developing new north-to-south trade corridors. Currently, it is collaborating with India, Iran, and Azerbaijan to advance the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, which will connect eastern Russian cities by sea to India. Additionally, Russia is engaging in cooperative initiatives with China within the Arctic region, further enhancing its reach and influence in global maritime trade networks.
From China’s perspective, leveraging its strategic geographic position, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is being implemented as a major east-to-west international trade corridor. When combined with Russia’s emerging north-to-south trade routes, these corridors are creating critical junctions where the two networks intersect. Myanmar, due to its strategic location, sits squarely at one of these pivotal points, positioning the country as a key regional hub for trade and connectivity. In future global trade networks, Myanmar’s strategically located zones—such as Thilawa Deep-Sea Port and its associated special economic zones—are well-positioned to generate significant opportunities in maritime trade and related economic activities. Myanmar’s Thilawa Deep-Sea Port occupies a strategically important location along the maritime route connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, underscoring the country’s critical geopolitical and economic position. For example, from Thilawa Deep-Sea Port, Myanmar’s strategic location allows overland connections to key cities such as Bangkok in Thailand, Phnom Penh in Cambodia, and Ho Chi Minh City and Vũng Tàu in Vietnam, ultimately linking to the South China Sea. By overland distance, the route spans approximately 800 kilometers, compared with the more than 2,000 nautical miles by sea from Thilawa Deep-Sea Port to Vũng Tàu Port in Vietnam, making it roughly one-third the distance. In other words, this corridor represents the shortest route connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.
The Shortest Route Connecting the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean
Thus, by strategically leveraging Myanmar’s geographic pivot point, the country can effectively participate in international overland and maritime trade corridor projects connecting partner and neighboring countries. This coordinated engagement can serve as a key catalyst for building a sovereign state that is not only sustainable and resilient but also comprehensive and prosperous in its long-term development.
မောင်မိုး| ၂၅-၈-၂၀၂၅
When people think of Xinjiang, they picture vast deserts and scorching summers. After all, it is the region with the largest desert area in China, including the Taklamakan Desert. Dry and sandy landscapes are indeed one side of Xinjiang’s identity.
Yet it’s not the whole story. The region is rich in freshwater and saline resources, with diverse lakes and rivers feeding thriving ecosystems. The Tarim River, China’s longest inland river and the world’s fifth largest, stretches 2,179 kilometres across an immense basin. Bosten Lake, the country’s largest inland freshwater lake, covers 1,646 square kilometres and yields about 5,000 tonnes of freshwater fish annually.
In this land of contrasts, salmon farming has found an unlikely home. In 2024, Xinjiang produced over 8,000 tonnes of salmon, with exports reaching Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The question is: how did salmon thrive so far from the ocean?
Ideal natural conditions nurture salmon
Counterintuitively, Xinjiang’s natural environment is perfect for salmon farming. Surrounded by mountains, the region collects pure glacial meltwater in its basins, with temperatures between 8° and 18°C throughout the year and high oxygen levels. These are ideal conditions for cold-water fish to thrive. According to Xinjiang’s Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, a Spanish trader once praised Xinjiang salmon for its freshness, clean taste, and well-distributed fat, making it especially well-suited for sashimi.
Green tech powers salmon farming
In Nilka County, northwest Xinjiang, salmon have been raised through cage aquaculture in the Jilintai Reservoir since 2014. After imported fish eggs hatch and the fry grow, the little fish are sorted into different cages by size once they reach around 150 grammes. Over time, cage farming has now evolved into a smarter, greener model.
The eco-friendly net cage farming system addresses the pollution issues of traditional cages, maintaining excellent water quality both upstream and downstream. At the farming base, real-time electronic screens track oxygen, temperature, and cleanliness of the water. Underwater cleaning robots, equipped with sonar imaging and optical zoom cameras, can remove waste with precision. Outside the cages, filter-feeding fish further help consume uneaten feed drifting in the water, creating a natural cleanup procedure.
Feeding has also gone high-tech. A smart delivery system determines how much food the fish need at each growth stage, cutting down on waste and reducing labour costs.
In early 2025, the farming base in Nilka released 9.1 million fish fry, with an expected annual output of 8,000 tonnes.
From reservoir to dining tables
After three years, fully grown salmon are harvested. Workers use a fish pump to gently move the salmon through a tube directly onto the assembly line, a method that minimizes injury and preserves quality. The fish are then rapidly cooled to below 5°C before being transported to the processing plant, where they are transformed into a variety of products, including fresh-cut and quick-frozen salmon.
With the support of the government, local farms work with research institutes to expand product lines. Today, Xinjiang salmon not only reach tables across China but are also exported to Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. At Yining customs in Xinjiang, chilled salmon can now pass inspection in just 30 minutes, ensuring freshness for domestic and overseas markets.
Salmon farming lifts lives
Today, more than 800 professionals are employed at the salmon farming base in Nilka County, with 60 per cent being local Xinjiang people. Many of them once relied on traditional farming or herding, which are easily affected by the weather. Now, frontline workers at the base earn over $840 a month, about $100 higher than the local average wage. Thanks to these opportunities, 609 families have been lifted out of poverty, and nearly 400 individuals have obtained licences as professional aquaculture workers.
To help staff establish themselves and feel a sense of belonging, the central government invested nearly $7 million in building dormitories last year. Another $2.8 million has been allocated for staff housing in the county, enabling workers to purchase their own homes with subsidies ranging from $20,000 to $40,000.
Beyond salmon: Broader aquaculture potential
Salmon farming is part of a bigger vision for fisheries in Xinjiang. Developing aquaculture not only boosts food supply but also improves fragile ecosystems. On saline-alkali lands, authorities are applying a model known as “fish to reduce salinity and alkalinity”, which increases biodiversity while rehabilitating soils.
The results are already visible. At Swan Lake, after fish farming was introduced, the number of bird species rose sharply, attracting more wild birds to settle in the area. This demonstrates how aquaculture is contributing to both economic and environmental sustainability.
Salmon farming mirrors Xinjiang’s growth
Chinese President Xi Jinping has urged thorough, meticulous, and sustained efforts to build a beautiful Xinjiang, where ecosystems thrive and people live and work in contentment, as part of China’s broader modernization.
The salmon industry is a microcosm of this vision by leveraging the region’s natural advantages, cutting-edge green technology, and strong community support. Xinjiang may be home to China’s largest desert, but it is also a land of rivers, lakes, and ingenuity. By turning unlikely conditions into opportunities, the region has transformed salmon farming from an improbable dream into a sustainable industry, proving that even in the desert, new life can flourish.
GNLM
When people think of Xinjiang, they picture vast deserts and scorching summers. After all, it is the region with the largest desert area in China, including the Taklamakan Desert. Dry and sandy landscapes are indeed one side of Xinjiang’s identity.
Yet it’s not the whole story. The region is rich in freshwater and saline resources, with diverse lakes and rivers feeding thriving ecosystems. The Tarim River, China’s longest inland river and the world’s fifth largest, stretches 2,179 kilometres across an immense basin. Bosten Lake, the country’s largest inland freshwater lake, covers 1,646 square kilometres and yields about 5,000 tonnes of freshwater fish annually.
In this land of contrasts, salmon farming has found an unlikely home. In 2024, Xinjiang produced over 8,000 tonnes of salmon, with exports reaching Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The question is: how did salmon thrive so far from the ocean?
Ideal natural conditions nurture salmon
Counterintuitively, Xinjiang’s natural environment is perfect for salmon farming. Surrounded by mountains, the region collects pure glacial meltwater in its basins, with temperatures between 8° and 18°C throughout the year and high oxygen levels. These are ideal conditions for cold-water fish to thrive. According to Xinjiang’s Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, a Spanish trader once praised Xinjiang salmon for its freshness, clean taste, and well-distributed fat, making it especially well-suited for sashimi.
Green tech powers salmon farming
In Nilka County, northwest Xinjiang, salmon have been raised through cage aquaculture in the Jilintai Reservoir since 2014. After imported fish eggs hatch and the fry grow, the little fish are sorted into different cages by size once they reach around 150 grammes. Over time, cage farming has now evolved into a smarter, greener model.
The eco-friendly net cage farming system addresses the pollution issues of traditional cages, maintaining excellent water quality both upstream and downstream. At the farming base, real-time electronic screens track oxygen, temperature, and cleanliness of the water. Underwater cleaning robots, equipped with sonar imaging and optical zoom cameras, can remove waste with precision. Outside the cages, filter-feeding fish further help consume uneaten feed drifting in the water, creating a natural cleanup procedure.
Feeding has also gone high-tech. A smart delivery system determines how much food the fish need at each growth stage, cutting down on waste and reducing labour costs.
In early 2025, the farming base in Nilka released 9.1 million fish fry, with an expected annual output of 8,000 tonnes.
From reservoir to dining tables
After three years, fully grown salmon are harvested. Workers use a fish pump to gently move the salmon through a tube directly onto the assembly line, a method that minimizes injury and preserves quality. The fish are then rapidly cooled to below 5°C before being transported to the processing plant, where they are transformed into a variety of products, including fresh-cut and quick-frozen salmon.
With the support of the government, local farms work with research institutes to expand product lines. Today, Xinjiang salmon not only reach tables across China but are also exported to Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. At Yining customs in Xinjiang, chilled salmon can now pass inspection in just 30 minutes, ensuring freshness for domestic and overseas markets.
Salmon farming lifts lives
Today, more than 800 professionals are employed at the salmon farming base in Nilka County, with 60 per cent being local Xinjiang people. Many of them once relied on traditional farming or herding, which are easily affected by the weather. Now, frontline workers at the base earn over $840 a month, about $100 higher than the local average wage. Thanks to these opportunities, 609 families have been lifted out of poverty, and nearly 400 individuals have obtained licences as professional aquaculture workers.
To help staff establish themselves and feel a sense of belonging, the central government invested nearly $7 million in building dormitories last year. Another $2.8 million has been allocated for staff housing in the county, enabling workers to purchase their own homes with subsidies ranging from $20,000 to $40,000.
Beyond salmon: Broader aquaculture potential
Salmon farming is part of a bigger vision for fisheries in Xinjiang. Developing aquaculture not only boosts food supply but also improves fragile ecosystems. On saline-alkali lands, authorities are applying a model known as “fish to reduce salinity and alkalinity”, which increases biodiversity while rehabilitating soils.
The results are already visible. At Swan Lake, after fish farming was introduced, the number of bird species rose sharply, attracting more wild birds to settle in the area. This demonstrates how aquaculture is contributing to both economic and environmental sustainability.
Salmon farming mirrors Xinjiang’s growth
Chinese President Xi Jinping has urged thorough, meticulous, and sustained efforts to build a beautiful Xinjiang, where ecosystems thrive and people live and work in contentment, as part of China’s broader modernization.
The salmon industry is a microcosm of this vision by leveraging the region’s natural advantages, cutting-edge green technology, and strong community support. Xinjiang may be home to China’s largest desert, but it is also a land of rivers, lakes, and ingenuity. By turning unlikely conditions into opportunities, the region has transformed salmon farming from an improbable dream into a sustainable industry, proving that even in the desert, new life can flourish.
GNLM
Russia and Belarus are already in the deep. China and India have done it long ago. So have some countries of Southeast Asia. ASEAN is now doing it using a different approach. Trump and the USA have done it too. Hey, we are talking about engaging the Myanmar government. So, who is left to engage the current legitimate government now?
Aussies
Australia has been supportive of Myanmar since its opening up in 2011. They have participated in offshore oil and gas tenders and many other businesses dealing with the government. With many underground resources in Myanmar, it would be a lose-lose situation if Aussies remain aloof to engagement.
They wanted the market economy, competitive pricing and democracy. How to have a market economy, if all the resources can only be sold to one buyer, i.e., China. So that itself is a dilemma. How can Myanmar be helped to move more towards a more market and competitive economy if Australia refuses to participate in the economy, especially in the natural resources sector?
Gangnam
Korea is one of the few countries that the Myanmar people love, admire and look forward to working there. Korea and Japan are consistently ranked as countries with the best labour conditions based on a survey of Myanmar workers. Korea took a step higher with the legislation that foreign workers in Korea cannot be paid lower than Koreans with equal qualifications and experience, hence providing the highest take-home pay for foreign workers.
The Korean government also wants to engage, but they have to rely on the US in case of war with its super-friendly northern neighbour, i.e., watch US actions before their initiation. Their reliance on Uncle Sam becomes even more inevitable, as they rightly worry that North Korea sent fighters to join the Russian Army to fight against Ukraine. And Myanmar, being the long-time ally of Russia, is not making the initiation of engagement any easier.
Rising Sun
Japan, like Korea, is continuing all engagement at the humanitarian and general public level, from continuing recruitment of Myanmar workers to donating to the quake victims through various associations. And it has to take cues from the USA, too.
With many Japanese entities running away from Myanmar, the ‘first to leave and last to arrive’ nation is exactly looking after its own interests, despite its affinity to Myanmar.
The old rich
The diplomats stationed locally do want to engage more, in a private capacity, with the top decision makers of the nation. Yet the Union is not keen. So the only way out seems to be to entice the Union leaders far away with some tenable deeds and get the green light from them to take the engagement to the next level.
Why non-engagement is bad for Myanmar and the World
Let’s give the example using Wa and the rare earth. Wa, an independent state, is the largest self-administrative region in the eastern Shan State. Even the Myanmar military cannot go into their region without prior approval from them. According to the CIA Handbook 2019, Wa is already the third largest exporter of rare earth in the world and 100 per cent of its rare earth is exported to China. Kachin and Shan state armies are also contributing to China’s stockpile of rare earth through their respective exports. The result is that now China is controlling 90+ per cent of the global rare earth inventory.
The USA, the EU and Australia could have participated to absorb the supply, thereby retaining some form of control over the rare earth global supply. Without engaging Myanmar, they are deprived of that unique opportunity. And Myanmar lose out too as it loses competitive pricing due to having only one monopolistic buyer. Simple argument perhaps, but the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Russia and Belarus are already in the deep. China and India have done it long ago. So have some countries of Southeast Asia. ASEAN is now doing it using a different approach. Trump and the USA have done it too. Hey, we are talking about engaging the Myanmar government. So, who is left to engage the current legitimate government now?
Aussies
Australia has been supportive of Myanmar since its opening up in 2011. They have participated in offshore oil and gas tenders and many other businesses dealing with the government. With many underground resources in Myanmar, it would be a lose-lose situation if Aussies remain aloof to engagement.
They wanted the market economy, competitive pricing and democracy. How to have a market economy, if all the resources can only be sold to one buyer, i.e., China. So that itself is a dilemma. How can Myanmar be helped to move more towards a more market and competitive economy if Australia refuses to participate in the economy, especially in the natural resources sector?
Gangnam
Korea is one of the few countries that the Myanmar people love, admire and look forward to working there. Korea and Japan are consistently ranked as countries with the best labour conditions based on a survey of Myanmar workers. Korea took a step higher with the legislation that foreign workers in Korea cannot be paid lower than Koreans with equal qualifications and experience, hence providing the highest take-home pay for foreign workers.
The Korean government also wants to engage, but they have to rely on the US in case of war with its super-friendly northern neighbour, i.e., watch US actions before their initiation. Their reliance on Uncle Sam becomes even more inevitable, as they rightly worry that North Korea sent fighters to join the Russian Army to fight against Ukraine. And Myanmar, being the long-time ally of Russia, is not making the initiation of engagement any easier.
Rising Sun
Japan, like Korea, is continuing all engagement at the humanitarian and general public level, from continuing recruitment of Myanmar workers to donating to the quake victims through various associations. And it has to take cues from the USA, too.
With many Japanese entities running away from Myanmar, the ‘first to leave and last to arrive’ nation is exactly looking after its own interests, despite its affinity to Myanmar.
The old rich
The diplomats stationed locally do want to engage more, in a private capacity, with the top decision makers of the nation. Yet the Union is not keen. So the only way out seems to be to entice the Union leaders far away with some tenable deeds and get the green light from them to take the engagement to the next level.
Why non-engagement is bad for Myanmar and the World
Let’s give the example using Wa and the rare earth. Wa, an independent state, is the largest self-administrative region in the eastern Shan State. Even the Myanmar military cannot go into their region without prior approval from them. According to the CIA Handbook 2019, Wa is already the third largest exporter of rare earth in the world and 100 per cent of its rare earth is exported to China. Kachin and Shan state armies are also contributing to China’s stockpile of rare earth through their respective exports. The result is that now China is controlling 90+ per cent of the global rare earth inventory.
The USA, the EU and Australia could have participated to absorb the supply, thereby retaining some form of control over the rare earth global supply. Without engaging Myanmar, they are deprived of that unique opportunity. And Myanmar lose out too as it loses competitive pricing due to having only one monopolistic buyer. Simple argument perhaps, but the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
With the first meeting between China and US trade officials in Geneva over, the two global giants agree to continue to negotiate without setting specific deadlines or targets. The Trump administration, as usual, exaggerates to claim empty victory over successful negotiations, yet the battle is far from over. Trump has given in, lowering the tariffs from the impossibly high 145 per cent. The trade war talk is taking its toll on US consumers, with Walmart, the US’s largest retailer, raising prices every month, citing Trump’s tariffs as a reason.
The prediction
In the end, when the dust settles, the world trading system will go forward with or without the US. The US is already getting isolated even from its closest allies, such as Canada, Mexico and the EU, and it would end up getting isolated from the rest of the world too. The world with continue with the renewed commitment to the formal rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The rules may not be perfect, but they are the best we have at present.
The Trump version is slightly different. He wants the US to remain at the centre of power, the system and the US dollar as the main trade currency. The officials have been quite explicit about that, saying other countries would fall in line with the US against China, i.e., join the US side in its trade war against China. Totally unreachable dream, knowing how much homework China has already done in the past five years in the global south, for most of them to be on the Chinese side. Being on the Chinese side means development, being on the Western and US side means ideologies and systems that have no proven record of making any developing countries prosper.
The reasons
If you look at what real economic power the US maintains today, it is a far cry from the rhetoric that the Trump administration touted. The idea that the US market is central to every economy and using the threat of cutting exporting countries out of the US market would make them kowtow to all their whims and whistles is as outdated nowadays. It may have been true 25 years ago, but the consumer power is no longer centralized in the US alone. The numbers simply do not support that theory. The US imports are no longer substantial enough for most countries to alter their whole foreign policy and economic orientation because of that threat, barring Mexico, Germany (~70 per cent of their exports to the US) perhaps.
The US imports only 12 per cent or so of the world’s exports. It’s just not that significant anymore at this point in time, after the enormous growth of China and some countries of the global south.
The counter to all these facts and figures was that when the US blocks China’s exports, China would be forced to flood the EU with its wares, forcing Europe to eventually put up barriers against China, which would be equivalent to joining the trade war with the US. That could be what the Trump people are hoping for, but again, the figures do not support that either.
China currently only exports about $450 billion a year to the US. Its total export to the whole world is $3,600 billion. The exports to the US have come down significantly in the past ten years because of anti-China policies. The long-term master planner, China, has already diversified its trade. What do you think the same Chinese leadership under President Xi has been doing in the past ten years? Just ignoring US threats and not preparing for any eventual possibilities? So the idea that China would flood the world markets with its inexpensive goods if the US market is cut off is merely a fantasy. The US simply does not have the power to do that anymore.
Another factor is that China’s favour is the US being a deficit country with a lot, really a lot of debts. These debt instruments are being held by their major trading partners/adversaries like China, Japan, etc. In the event of a real tit for tat war, once these countries sell their bond holdings, the demand for US debt will be cut significantly, thereby raising interest rates and receiving downward credit ratings, causing it to pay more interest (in billions of $). With current yearly deficits in trillions, it’s a bitter pill that the US simply cannot swallow. A recent anecdote of Japan and China selling US bonds in response to Trump’s threats forces the treasury rates above five per cent, causing markets to free-fall in US stocks. These directly affect 401K (US pension schemes) and make the retirement funds of US workers smaller.
If we use Trump’s words on Zelensky, ‘Trump simply does not have the cards’. Trump does not have a strong hand against China. He is overestimating his hand in his bluff. When Trump was barking from afar, Xi again did his work by visiting some Southeast Asian countries, further augmenting their trade ties with these countries.
The US is now just a shadow of its past. It is a diminishing superpower in the world now. China’s economy has overtaken the US in the past two years, and the reversal of fortunes is not in sight. The US is no longer indispensable in the world economy.
With the non-US dollar trades on the uptrend and with BRICS planning a new global currency (BRICS pay is already in place), the privileged position and sanction-imposing power of the US$ would be over in less than 10 years.
What about us?
The current position of multilateralism in international relations might serve Myanmar good before the year 2000. Maybe it is time to rethink this guiding principle for the coming decades. Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, etc., have become richer than Myanmar by sticking to and getting help from their northern friendly neighbour. Instead of appeasing the West, Western puppets and the US, where the help comes with attachments, ideologies and dogmas of faith, our orientation might require readjustment, to cater for the need to at least catch up with our neighbours and get out of the poverty trap.
GNLM
With the first meeting between China and US trade officials in Geneva over, the two global giants agree to continue to negotiate without setting specific deadlines or targets. The Trump administration, as usual, exaggerates to claim empty victory over successful negotiations, yet the battle is far from over. Trump has given in, lowering the tariffs from the impossibly high 145 per cent. The trade war talk is taking its toll on US consumers, with Walmart, the US’s largest retailer, raising prices every month, citing Trump’s tariffs as a reason.
The prediction
In the end, when the dust settles, the world trading system will go forward with or without the US. The US is already getting isolated even from its closest allies, such as Canada, Mexico and the EU, and it would end up getting isolated from the rest of the world too. The world with continue with the renewed commitment to the formal rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The rules may not be perfect, but they are the best we have at present.
The Trump version is slightly different. He wants the US to remain at the centre of power, the system and the US dollar as the main trade currency. The officials have been quite explicit about that, saying other countries would fall in line with the US against China, i.e., join the US side in its trade war against China. Totally unreachable dream, knowing how much homework China has already done in the past five years in the global south, for most of them to be on the Chinese side. Being on the Chinese side means development, being on the Western and US side means ideologies and systems that have no proven record of making any developing countries prosper.
The reasons
If you look at what real economic power the US maintains today, it is a far cry from the rhetoric that the Trump administration touted. The idea that the US market is central to every economy and using the threat of cutting exporting countries out of the US market would make them kowtow to all their whims and whistles is as outdated nowadays. It may have been true 25 years ago, but the consumer power is no longer centralized in the US alone. The numbers simply do not support that theory. The US imports are no longer substantial enough for most countries to alter their whole foreign policy and economic orientation because of that threat, barring Mexico, Germany (~70 per cent of their exports to the US) perhaps.
The US imports only 12 per cent or so of the world’s exports. It’s just not that significant anymore at this point in time, after the enormous growth of China and some countries of the global south.
The counter to all these facts and figures was that when the US blocks China’s exports, China would be forced to flood the EU with its wares, forcing Europe to eventually put up barriers against China, which would be equivalent to joining the trade war with the US. That could be what the Trump people are hoping for, but again, the figures do not support that either.
China currently only exports about $450 billion a year to the US. Its total export to the whole world is $3,600 billion. The exports to the US have come down significantly in the past ten years because of anti-China policies. The long-term master planner, China, has already diversified its trade. What do you think the same Chinese leadership under President Xi has been doing in the past ten years? Just ignoring US threats and not preparing for any eventual possibilities? So the idea that China would flood the world markets with its inexpensive goods if the US market is cut off is merely a fantasy. The US simply does not have the power to do that anymore.
Another factor is that China’s favour is the US being a deficit country with a lot, really a lot of debts. These debt instruments are being held by their major trading partners/adversaries like China, Japan, etc. In the event of a real tit for tat war, once these countries sell their bond holdings, the demand for US debt will be cut significantly, thereby raising interest rates and receiving downward credit ratings, causing it to pay more interest (in billions of $). With current yearly deficits in trillions, it’s a bitter pill that the US simply cannot swallow. A recent anecdote of Japan and China selling US bonds in response to Trump’s threats forces the treasury rates above five per cent, causing markets to free-fall in US stocks. These directly affect 401K (US pension schemes) and make the retirement funds of US workers smaller.
If we use Trump’s words on Zelensky, ‘Trump simply does not have the cards’. Trump does not have a strong hand against China. He is overestimating his hand in his bluff. When Trump was barking from afar, Xi again did his work by visiting some Southeast Asian countries, further augmenting their trade ties with these countries.
The US is now just a shadow of its past. It is a diminishing superpower in the world now. China’s economy has overtaken the US in the past two years, and the reversal of fortunes is not in sight. The US is no longer indispensable in the world economy.
With the non-US dollar trades on the uptrend and with BRICS planning a new global currency (BRICS pay is already in place), the privileged position and sanction-imposing power of the US$ would be over in less than 10 years.
What about us?
The current position of multilateralism in international relations might serve Myanmar good before the year 2000. Maybe it is time to rethink this guiding principle for the coming decades. Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, etc., have become richer than Myanmar by sticking to and getting help from their northern friendly neighbour. Instead of appeasing the West, Western puppets and the US, where the help comes with attachments, ideologies and dogmas of faith, our orientation might require readjustment, to cater for the need to at least catch up with our neighbours and get out of the poverty trap.
GNLM
This year's first-half growth was boosted by government stimulus and a temporary pause in the US-China trade war, which allowed exporters rush out shipments ahead of new tariffs.
China's economy grew 5.2% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2025 amid ongoing trade tensions with the United States, official data showed on Tuesday.
The second quarter growth was slightly below the 5.4% pace in the first, but keeping on track to meet the government's full-year target of "around 5%."
The first-half performance was supported by state stimulus and a pause in US-China trade war escalations that allowed exporters to rush out shipments ahead of potential tariff hikes.
"China achieved growth above the official target of 5% in Q2 partly because of front loading of exports," said Zhiwei Zhang, chief economist at Pinpoint Asset Management.
Sustained growth not sustainable
Analysts, however, warn that the growth may not be sustainable. Weakened consumer confidence, falling prices, and a deepening property crisis continue to weigh on demand.
"The real estate crisis remains a major medium-term drag on local government budgets," said Dan Wang, economist at the Eurasia Group.
Investors, meanwhile, are bracing for a weaker second half even as additional stimulus are expected to be considered at the upcoming Politburo meeting in July.
At the same time, according to economic research and consulting firm Prognos Institute, Chinese companies now account for 16% of global exports, double that of Germany, raising the stakes in an increasingly competitive global trade landscape.
What is the trade war between China and the US?
Tensions are simmering between Washington and Beijing as the two nations clash over a range of issues, including Taiwan, emerging technologies and most importantly, trade.
Escalating trade tensions, US President announced 145% tariffs on Chinese goods in April. However, negotiations between the two significant economies in May led to lowering of US tariffs to 30% for 90 days to allow for talks, while China also reduced its taxes on US goods from 125% to 10%.
US-China competition is already substantially impacting global economy and politics.
If the trade war between the two escalates once again, China might try to use the EU market to absorb Chinese production overcapacity.
In turn, the US could also redefine goods manufactured in the EU through Chinese direct investment as Chinese products and demand higher levies from EU businesses.
Meanwhile, as the US tightens trade restrictions with some Latin American countries, China is expanding its influence across South America.
https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-economy-grows-52-in-q2-despite-us-tariffs/a-73279510
This year's first-half growth was boosted by government stimulus and a temporary pause in the US-China trade war, which allowed exporters rush out shipments ahead of new tariffs.
China's economy grew 5.2% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2025 amid ongoing trade tensions with the United States, official data showed on Tuesday.
The second quarter growth was slightly below the 5.4% pace in the first, but keeping on track to meet the government's full-year target of "around 5%."
The first-half performance was supported by state stimulus and a pause in US-China trade war escalations that allowed exporters to rush out shipments ahead of potential tariff hikes.
"China achieved growth above the official target of 5% in Q2 partly because of front loading of exports," said Zhiwei Zhang, chief economist at Pinpoint Asset Management.
Sustained growth not sustainable
Analysts, however, warn that the growth may not be sustainable. Weakened consumer confidence, falling prices, and a deepening property crisis continue to weigh on demand.
"The real estate crisis remains a major medium-term drag on local government budgets," said Dan Wang, economist at the Eurasia Group.
Investors, meanwhile, are bracing for a weaker second half even as additional stimulus are expected to be considered at the upcoming Politburo meeting in July.
At the same time, according to economic research and consulting firm Prognos Institute, Chinese companies now account for 16% of global exports, double that of Germany, raising the stakes in an increasingly competitive global trade landscape.
What is the trade war between China and the US?
Tensions are simmering between Washington and Beijing as the two nations clash over a range of issues, including Taiwan, emerging technologies and most importantly, trade.
Escalating trade tensions, US President announced 145% tariffs on Chinese goods in April. However, negotiations between the two significant economies in May led to lowering of US tariffs to 30% for 90 days to allow for talks, while China also reduced its taxes on US goods from 125% to 10%.
US-China competition is already substantially impacting global economy and politics.
If the trade war between the two escalates once again, China might try to use the EU market to absorb Chinese production overcapacity.
In turn, the US could also redefine goods manufactured in the EU through Chinese direct investment as Chinese products and demand higher levies from EU businesses.
Meanwhile, as the US tightens trade restrictions with some Latin American countries, China is expanding its influence across South America.
https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-economy-grows-52-in-q2-despite-us-tariffs/a-73279510
Thailand is set to overhaul its tax system by 2025, proposing taxation of residents’ worldwide income and introducing a 15 percent global minimum corporate tax for multinationals, aligning with international standards. These changes aim to broaden the tax base but may impact foreign investment and compliance costs.
Thailand is preparing to overhaul its taxation framework with a proposed amendment to Section 41 of the Revenue Code, aiming to tax the worldwide income of residents. Under this draft legislation, individuals who spend 180 days or more in Thailand would be required to pay taxes on their global earnings, irrespective of whether the income is transferred to Thailand.
This marks a significant departure from the current system, which taxes foreign income only if it is brought into the country within the same calendar year it is earned. The proposal, expected to take effect in 2025, has drawn mixed reactions.
While it reflects Thailand’s alignment with international tax norms, concerns are mounting among expatriates and foreign chambers of commerce over its potential impact on long-term residency and foreign direct investment.
As discussions around the draft legislation unfold, it is crucial to explore its implications for Thailand’s economic landscape, expatriate community, and global competitiveness.
Changes in 2024: A shift in taxation of foreign-sourced income
On January 1, 2024, a new tax rule was introduced, altering the way foreign-sourced income is taxed. Under the previous tax system, individuals in Thailand who were tax residents (spending 180 days or more in the country) were only taxed on their foreign income if it was brought into Thailand within the same year it was earned.
However, under the new rule, Thai nationals and foreigners who have been in the country for at least 180 days will be taxed on all foreign income, even if it is not brought into Thailand within the year.
This policy change significantly expands the scope of taxable income for residents, including income from employment, business operations, and passive income such as interest, dividends, and rental income from foreign sources. These new rules represent a marked shift from the current approach, making it important for individuals residing in Thailand to reassess their tax obligations, particularly about their overseas earnings.
These changes signal a broader move toward aligning Thailand’s tax policies with global standards, but they also raise concerns about the potential impact on foreign investment and expatriate residents who may now face higher tax liabilities on their global income.
ကိုးကား- ASEAN Briefing
Thailand is set to overhaul its tax system by 2025, proposing taxation of residents’ worldwide income and introducing a 15 percent global minimum corporate tax for multinationals, aligning with international standards. These changes aim to broaden the tax base but may impact foreign investment and compliance costs.
Thailand is preparing to overhaul its taxation framework with a proposed amendment to Section 41 of the Revenue Code, aiming to tax the worldwide income of residents. Under this draft legislation, individuals who spend 180 days or more in Thailand would be required to pay taxes on their global earnings, irrespective of whether the income is transferred to Thailand.
This marks a significant departure from the current system, which taxes foreign income only if it is brought into the country within the same calendar year it is earned. The proposal, expected to take effect in 2025, has drawn mixed reactions.
While it reflects Thailand’s alignment with international tax norms, concerns are mounting among expatriates and foreign chambers of commerce over its potential impact on long-term residency and foreign direct investment.
As discussions around the draft legislation unfold, it is crucial to explore its implications for Thailand’s economic landscape, expatriate community, and global competitiveness.
Changes in 2024: A shift in taxation of foreign-sourced income
On January 1, 2024, a new tax rule was introduced, altering the way foreign-sourced income is taxed. Under the previous tax system, individuals in Thailand who were tax residents (spending 180 days or more in the country) were only taxed on their foreign income if it was brought into Thailand within the same year it was earned.
However, under the new rule, Thai nationals and foreigners who have been in the country for at least 180 days will be taxed on all foreign income, even if it is not brought into Thailand within the year.
This policy change significantly expands the scope of taxable income for residents, including income from employment, business operations, and passive income such as interest, dividends, and rental income from foreign sources. These new rules represent a marked shift from the current approach, making it important for individuals residing in Thailand to reassess their tax obligations, particularly about their overseas earnings.
These changes signal a broader move toward aligning Thailand’s tax policies with global standards, but they also raise concerns about the potential impact on foreign investment and expatriate residents who may now face higher tax liabilities on their global income.
ကိုးကား- ASEAN Briefing
Company says higher duties on Chinese cranes would just increase costs for American ports. The US ports association agrees
A leading Chinese manufacturer has taken the rare step of publicly criticising US plans to hike tariffs on made-in-China cranes, warning that the proposal would only raise costs for American ports.
Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries – China’s top producer of container gantry cranes – denied it was a threat to US national security in comments submitted to the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) on Monday, adding that levies on Chinese products would not help revive American manufacturing.
China’s ship-to-shore cranes “pose no alleged cybersecurity risk, and the proposed tariffs are not a legitimate remedy”, it said in the statement.
The company’s comments come amid growing industry backlash against the US trade office’s proposal to slap a 100 percent tariff on Chinese-made cranes, which has also provoked criticism from a major US ports association.
USTR first proposed the levy in late April, along with new duties of 20 percent to 100 percent on containers and chassis made in China.
The measures are part of Washington’s broader push to revive US manufacturing and push back against China’s dominance in the maritime sector, which has also seen the introduction of steep port fees targeting Chinese-linked vessels.
The American Association of Port Authorities echoed those comments in its own submission to USTR, warning that the tariffs were doomed to fail due to a lack of alternatives to Chinese-made cranes in the market.
Applying the tariff “will not create a domestic crane manufacturing industry out of thin air. It will only increase costs for public port authorities,” the association said.
There are currently no American producers of ship-to-shore cranes, it noted.
Only three non-Chinese companies are active in the international market: Japan’s Mitsui and the European firms Konecranes and Liebherr.
But none of them have the production capacity to replace China’s market share, the association said.
Shanghai Zhenhua reportedly accounts for about 70 per cent of the global market for quay cranes, with products sold to 108 countries and regions.
The Shanghai-listed company generated about 4.8 per cent of its revenue in North America last year, down more than 30 per cent year on year, according to the firm’s financial statement.
In 2024, the administration of US President Joe Biden imposed a 25 per cent tariff on Chinese STS cranes.
US ports currently have 55 cranes on order and expect to need another 151 over the next six to 10 years. If the tariffs go ahead, they could cost America’s ports up to US$6.7 billion over the next decade, the association estimated.
The Port of Houston in Texas has eight cranes from Shanghai Zhenhua contracted for delivery in spring 2026, at a price of US$14 million each. That means the port would owe a whopping US$302.4 million in taxes if it is forced to pay the full tariffs, the association said.
Though the AAPA said it strongly supported efforts to reshore crane manufacturing, it added that it would take time to rebuild the industry due to a range of factors, including higher domestic steel prices, a shortage of skilled American welders, and a shortage of supplies of key crane components.
The port association suggested that the US Congress pass a bill establishing a tax credit to encourage domestic manufacturing, and called on USTR to hold off on any further tariffs on cranes until such legislation is enacted.
It also called for a delay of one to two years in implementing the proposed 100 percent tariff and requested that cranes ordered or contracted before the proposal’s publication on April 17, 2025, be exempted.
Company says higher duties on Chinese cranes would just increase costs for American ports. The US ports association agrees
A leading Chinese manufacturer has taken the rare step of publicly criticising US plans to hike tariffs on made-in-China cranes, warning that the proposal would only raise costs for American ports.
Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries – China’s top producer of container gantry cranes – denied it was a threat to US national security in comments submitted to the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) on Monday, adding that levies on Chinese products would not help revive American manufacturing.
China’s ship-to-shore cranes “pose no alleged cybersecurity risk, and the proposed tariffs are not a legitimate remedy”, it said in the statement.
The company’s comments come amid growing industry backlash against the US trade office’s proposal to slap a 100 percent tariff on Chinese-made cranes, which has also provoked criticism from a major US ports association.
USTR first proposed the levy in late April, along with new duties of 20 percent to 100 percent on containers and chassis made in China.
The measures are part of Washington’s broader push to revive US manufacturing and push back against China’s dominance in the maritime sector, which has also seen the introduction of steep port fees targeting Chinese-linked vessels.
The American Association of Port Authorities echoed those comments in its own submission to USTR, warning that the tariffs were doomed to fail due to a lack of alternatives to Chinese-made cranes in the market.
Applying the tariff “will not create a domestic crane manufacturing industry out of thin air. It will only increase costs for public port authorities,” the association said.
There are currently no American producers of ship-to-shore cranes, it noted.
Only three non-Chinese companies are active in the international market: Japan’s Mitsui and the European firms Konecranes and Liebherr.
But none of them have the production capacity to replace China’s market share, the association said.
Shanghai Zhenhua reportedly accounts for about 70 per cent of the global market for quay cranes, with products sold to 108 countries and regions.
The Shanghai-listed company generated about 4.8 per cent of its revenue in North America last year, down more than 30 per cent year on year, according to the firm’s financial statement.
In 2024, the administration of US President Joe Biden imposed a 25 per cent tariff on Chinese STS cranes.
US ports currently have 55 cranes on order and expect to need another 151 over the next six to 10 years. If the tariffs go ahead, they could cost America’s ports up to US$6.7 billion over the next decade, the association estimated.
The Port of Houston in Texas has eight cranes from Shanghai Zhenhua contracted for delivery in spring 2026, at a price of US$14 million each. That means the port would owe a whopping US$302.4 million in taxes if it is forced to pay the full tariffs, the association said.
Though the AAPA said it strongly supported efforts to reshore crane manufacturing, it added that it would take time to rebuild the industry due to a range of factors, including higher domestic steel prices, a shortage of skilled American welders, and a shortage of supplies of key crane components.
The port association suggested that the US Congress pass a bill establishing a tax credit to encourage domestic manufacturing, and called on USTR to hold off on any further tariffs on cranes until such legislation is enacted.
It also called for a delay of one to two years in implementing the proposed 100 percent tariff and requested that cranes ordered or contracted before the proposal’s publication on April 17, 2025, be exempted.
On May 12, 2025, the Trump administration announced a mutual reduction in trade measures between the United States and China. This includes not only a reduction in tariffs—bringing U.S. rates down from 145 percent to 30 percent (which is on top of sectoral and Section 301 tariffs), and Chinese tariffs on U.S. goods from 125 percent to 10 percent—but also the relaxation of the critical minerals export restrictions China put in place following “Liberation Day.”
While many details remain unresolved, this tariff rollback marks a welcome step that could help ease inflation and bolster economic prospects. However, it does not undo the significant damage already inflicted by elevated costs, disrupted supply chains, heightened uncertainty, and weakened U.S. credibility with allies. The ongoing reliance on an erratic trade policy—marked by temporary fixes, strategic inconsistency, and persistent unpredictability—continues to undermine long-term economic resilience and U.S. global leadership, while imposing avoidable costs on consumers and businesses alike.
A Step in the Right Direction . . .
First things first: Tariffs are lower today than they were yesterday, and that is undeniably a positive step. Over the medium term, this reduction should help ease inflationary pressures in the United States, improve the odds of avoiding a recession, and support the capital investment needed to compete strategically with China. Compared to where things stood just 24 hours ago, this is real progress.
. . . But Damage Has Already Been Done
While the rollback is welcome, tariffs were set at punishing levels for more than a month. U.S. firms dependent on imports were either forced to absorb these elevated costs or delay purchases altogether. This caused immediate pain for businesses and consumers and set the stage for future price spikes, potential shortages, and in the long term, lower employment and output. Recent research underscores this point, finding that U.S. tariffs, especially those enacted on Liberation Day, will reduce real income in the United States by $300 billion annually by 2028.
Tariffs Are Still Too High
Even after the temporary rollback, U.S. tariffs remain well above what most economists consider welfare-maximizing levels. A recent report published by the National Bureau of Economic Research argues that the optimal tariff structure would involve lower rates overall and a reallocation away from intermediate goods. This structure would reduce costs for domestic producers, increase the competitiveness of U.S. products in global markets, and likely lead to higher productivity and higher wages here at home. Evidence suggests that fixing just this one inefficiency in the current tariff structure could raise income considerably.
As it stands, nearly 60 percent of Trump-era tariffs target inputs used by U.S. firms—not finished goods from strategic rivals. This distorts supply chains at home while offering little strategic advantage. Even post-reduction, many of these distortions persist.
The Uncertainty Tax on the Economy
Crucially, today’s rollback is not permanent. Despite statements about a “shared interest” in reducing trade barriers, both sides agreed only to another 90-day pause. Firms remain in limbo as they try to plan long-term sourcing and investment decisions. This stop-and-start approach continues to generate instability and uncertainty which acts as a deadweight on investment. Firms will be less willing to commit capital in the United States or China if the viability of the investment hinges on the unpredictable swings of tariff policy.
This fairly obvious point is backed up by academic literature, including Handley and Limão (2017), who demonstrate that trade policy uncertainty can hurt investment as much as actual tariffs. Volatility becomes a tax on planning, especially in capital-intensive sectors like automobiles, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing.
Credibility Is Eroding—and That’s Dangerous
The administration warned that trade retaliation would carry consequences. But after China’s counter, it appears to have emerged with a lower effective tariff rate than it faced the morning of April 2. This sequence undermines the administration’s preferred posture that it can always “out-escalate” its way to victory in trade disputes. That proposition has now been disproven, and U.S. credibility is weaker for it.
Threat-based trade policy without consistency or follow-through is not just ineffective, it is counterproductive, which is detrimental to administration’s goals and risky for everyday Americans. What happens when the administration feels the need to regain credibility by following through on a threat—regardless of the consequences?
Favoring Adversaries, Alienating Allies
Beyond credibility, the administration is draining trust from longstanding allies. While the deal with the United Kingdom reduced the cost of Land Rovers and Jaguars for American consumers, it did little for broader working-class constituencies. Meanwhile, other allies are growing frustrated with what increasingly resembles economic coercion: “Deal with us or suffer.”
This approach imposes reputational costs and undermines long-term cooperation. Freund, Mattoo, Mulabdic, and Ruta (2023) find that as the United States and China weaponize trade ties, third countries have begun to hedge. Their analysis of post-2018 trade flows show growing “policy-driven divergence,” as supply chains shift based on perceived reliability, not efficiency.
Since 2018, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union have all expanded regional trade agreements—often without U.S. involvement. If the United States continues treating allies more harshly than competitors, that trend will only accelerate.
Two Truths at Once
Like many reversals from this administration, today’s tariff cut requires accepting two truths at once. First, it is a necessary and overdue correction to a damaging policy. Second, the costs of the reversal—higher inflation, weaker investment, and strained alliances—are still unfolding.
The evidence increasingly tells a consistent story: Politically motivated tariff shocks may serve short-term goals, but they weaken long-term economic resilience, degrade institutions, and undermine U.S. global leadership. The price of unpredictability is high—and rising.
Consider the Consumer
Hopefully, this rollback signals something else: The administration may be remembering the importance of the American consumer. Since April 2, there has been a worrying drumbeat of rhetoric portraying the American people solely as producers of physical goods—implying there is no need to worry about who is able to consume them.
That message is hard to reconcile with the administration’s own campaign promises. But this change in course is an opportunity to reaffirm a basic principle: Government should improve the material well-being of its people. That means raising, not lowering, living standards.
So, to end on a somewhat hopeful note, with this pause in trade hostilities, the administration seems more open to the idea that boiling the U.S. consumer alive to bring back “traditional jobs” may not be the best path forward. That is a good thing.
Source - https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-temporary-de-escalation-us-china-trade-war
On May 12, 2025, the Trump administration announced a mutual reduction in trade measures between the United States and China. This includes not only a reduction in tariffs—bringing U.S. rates down from 145 percent to 30 percent (which is on top of sectoral and Section 301 tariffs), and Chinese tariffs on U.S. goods from 125 percent to 10 percent—but also the relaxation of the critical minerals export restrictions China put in place following “Liberation Day.”
While many details remain unresolved, this tariff rollback marks a welcome step that could help ease inflation and bolster economic prospects. However, it does not undo the significant damage already inflicted by elevated costs, disrupted supply chains, heightened uncertainty, and weakened U.S. credibility with allies. The ongoing reliance on an erratic trade policy—marked by temporary fixes, strategic inconsistency, and persistent unpredictability—continues to undermine long-term economic resilience and U.S. global leadership, while imposing avoidable costs on consumers and businesses alike.
A Step in the Right Direction . . .
First things first: Tariffs are lower today than they were yesterday, and that is undeniably a positive step. Over the medium term, this reduction should help ease inflationary pressures in the United States, improve the odds of avoiding a recession, and support the capital investment needed to compete strategically with China. Compared to where things stood just 24 hours ago, this is real progress.
. . . But Damage Has Already Been Done
While the rollback is welcome, tariffs were set at punishing levels for more than a month. U.S. firms dependent on imports were either forced to absorb these elevated costs or delay purchases altogether. This caused immediate pain for businesses and consumers and set the stage for future price spikes, potential shortages, and in the long term, lower employment and output. Recent research underscores this point, finding that U.S. tariffs, especially those enacted on Liberation Day, will reduce real income in the United States by $300 billion annually by 2028.
Tariffs Are Still Too High
Even after the temporary rollback, U.S. tariffs remain well above what most economists consider welfare-maximizing levels. A recent report published by the National Bureau of Economic Research argues that the optimal tariff structure would involve lower rates overall and a reallocation away from intermediate goods. This structure would reduce costs for domestic producers, increase the competitiveness of U.S. products in global markets, and likely lead to higher productivity and higher wages here at home. Evidence suggests that fixing just this one inefficiency in the current tariff structure could raise income considerably.
As it stands, nearly 60 percent of Trump-era tariffs target inputs used by U.S. firms—not finished goods from strategic rivals. This distorts supply chains at home while offering little strategic advantage. Even post-reduction, many of these distortions persist.
The Uncertainty Tax on the Economy
Crucially, today’s rollback is not permanent. Despite statements about a “shared interest” in reducing trade barriers, both sides agreed only to another 90-day pause. Firms remain in limbo as they try to plan long-term sourcing and investment decisions. This stop-and-start approach continues to generate instability and uncertainty which acts as a deadweight on investment. Firms will be less willing to commit capital in the United States or China if the viability of the investment hinges on the unpredictable swings of tariff policy.
This fairly obvious point is backed up by academic literature, including Handley and Limão (2017), who demonstrate that trade policy uncertainty can hurt investment as much as actual tariffs. Volatility becomes a tax on planning, especially in capital-intensive sectors like automobiles, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing.
Credibility Is Eroding—and That’s Dangerous
The administration warned that trade retaliation would carry consequences. But after China’s counter, it appears to have emerged with a lower effective tariff rate than it faced the morning of April 2. This sequence undermines the administration’s preferred posture that it can always “out-escalate” its way to victory in trade disputes. That proposition has now been disproven, and U.S. credibility is weaker for it.
Threat-based trade policy without consistency or follow-through is not just ineffective, it is counterproductive, which is detrimental to administration’s goals and risky for everyday Americans. What happens when the administration feels the need to regain credibility by following through on a threat—regardless of the consequences?
Favoring Adversaries, Alienating Allies
Beyond credibility, the administration is draining trust from longstanding allies. While the deal with the United Kingdom reduced the cost of Land Rovers and Jaguars for American consumers, it did little for broader working-class constituencies. Meanwhile, other allies are growing frustrated with what increasingly resembles economic coercion: “Deal with us or suffer.”
This approach imposes reputational costs and undermines long-term cooperation. Freund, Mattoo, Mulabdic, and Ruta (2023) find that as the United States and China weaponize trade ties, third countries have begun to hedge. Their analysis of post-2018 trade flows show growing “policy-driven divergence,” as supply chains shift based on perceived reliability, not efficiency.
Since 2018, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union have all expanded regional trade agreements—often without U.S. involvement. If the United States continues treating allies more harshly than competitors, that trend will only accelerate.
Two Truths at Once
Like many reversals from this administration, today’s tariff cut requires accepting two truths at once. First, it is a necessary and overdue correction to a damaging policy. Second, the costs of the reversal—higher inflation, weaker investment, and strained alliances—are still unfolding.
The evidence increasingly tells a consistent story: Politically motivated tariff shocks may serve short-term goals, but they weaken long-term economic resilience, degrade institutions, and undermine U.S. global leadership. The price of unpredictability is high—and rising.
Consider the Consumer
Hopefully, this rollback signals something else: The administration may be remembering the importance of the American consumer. Since April 2, there has been a worrying drumbeat of rhetoric portraying the American people solely as producers of physical goods—implying there is no need to worry about who is able to consume them.
That message is hard to reconcile with the administration’s own campaign promises. But this change in course is an opportunity to reaffirm a basic principle: Government should improve the material well-being of its people. That means raising, not lowering, living standards.
So, to end on a somewhat hopeful note, with this pause in trade hostilities, the administration seems more open to the idea that boiling the U.S. consumer alive to bring back “traditional jobs” may not be the best path forward. That is a good thing.
Source - https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-temporary-de-escalation-us-china-trade-war
The highly consequential meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kazan on the side lines of the BRICS summit is opening exciting new opportunities. The ripple effects of this key interaction between strong leaders of the two civilizational states will naturally be felt on the bilateral terrain. Apart from promising stability along their disputed border, the benefits of the Kazan conversation go far beyond security. For instance, the dialogue between the two tall leaders has opened the door to a new phase of geo-economic engagement between New Delhi and Beijing. Chinese investments in In dia and Indian exports to China in the services sector, especially Information Technology and pharmaceutical and agri-sectors can be the new template for en gagement in the post-Kazan era. After the 2014 summit between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi in India, Beijing pledged a US$20 billion investment pack age in India. That included setting up an industrial park for manufacturing electrical equipment. If everything had gone according to plan, this equipment would have been exported to China, thus easing the adverse balance of payments, which India has chronically faced in its trade relations with China. Following Kazan, if the bilateral economic track takes off, it can encourage the two, to consider joint partnerships in third countries, especially in the Global South under the India-China+ formula. In the future, this formulation could mutate into a Russia-India-China+ idea where the three giants of the multipolar world can work together in the Global South. As the dust settles on the Modi-Xi talks — an event that took place after a gap of five years during which military tensions soared along the high mountain ranges of eastern Ladakh, it is now possible that both Beijing and New Delhi pick up the threads and explore possibilities of joint forays in Myanmar — a key nation on the cusp of South and Southeast Asia.
Why Myanmar?
There are at least four compelling reasons why India needs to reengage with Myanmar. First, Myanmar’s geography makes it a natural candidate for a deeper partnership. Myanmar is India’s gateway to Southeast Asia — indeed the pivot of New Delhi’s Act East policy. It presents a contiguous corridor for greater connectivity between Northeast India and ASEAN. Unsurprisingly, Myanmar is the fulcrum of the Asian Highway that will link India with Thailand, opening the possibility of a northern hookup with Danang in Vietnam. Trade and investments along the corridor can become a new engine for creating jobs, prosperity, and a surge in people-to-people connectivity. Second, Myanmar possesses a unique geo-strategic maritime location, along the Bay of Bengal. India has been Myanmar’s partner in building the Sittway Port. An outlet with huge potential, it is the natural gateway to channel trade from India’s northeast axis with the rest of the world, including ASEAN. On its part, China has constructed the deep-sea port in Kyaukpyu co-located with an industrial park. This port is of prime strategic importance as it lowers China’s trade dependence on the US-dominated Malacca straits, a key chokepoint that can be leveraged for the containment of China. Third, Myanmar possesses huge natural resources. These include significant deposits of precious and semiprecious stones, including rubies, sapphires, jade, and other gem stones. It also has deposits of silver, lead, zinc, gold, tin, tungsten, and barite. Besides, My anmar has substantial reserves of petroleum and natural gas, apart from huge hydropower potential, which can make it energy surplus. Myanmar can also be a major player in guaranteeing regional food security as its fertile land supports the cultivation of various crops, including rice, pulses, and other agricultural products, complementing marine resources such as fisheries. The country’s forests are also a major source of timber, fuel wood, and other forest products. Finally, as a neighbour of the two giants of the multipolar world order, Myanmar is a vital bridge between India and China, spurring the demand for a new regional initiative. Consequently, as a follow-up to the Kazan conversation between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi, a new China-India-Myanmar (CIM) economic corridor can be trilaterally considered a derivative of the BCIM plan. More so, such a standalone project can be kept out of the BRI framework, as its roots can be traced to the pre-BRI era. China has already flagged off the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which can be rebooted as a new project, with nodes firmly extending into India. (Atul Aneja is a strategic analyst based in New Delhi, India.)
Source: Global New Light of Myanmar
The highly consequential meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kazan on the side lines of the BRICS summit is opening exciting new opportunities. The ripple effects of this key interaction between strong leaders of the two civilizational states will naturally be felt on the bilateral terrain. Apart from promising stability along their disputed border, the benefits of the Kazan conversation go far beyond security. For instance, the dialogue between the two tall leaders has opened the door to a new phase of geo-economic engagement between New Delhi and Beijing. Chinese investments in In dia and Indian exports to China in the services sector, especially Information Technology and pharmaceutical and agri-sectors can be the new template for en gagement in the post-Kazan era. After the 2014 summit between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi in India, Beijing pledged a US$20 billion investment pack age in India. That included setting up an industrial park for manufacturing electrical equipment. If everything had gone according to plan, this equipment would have been exported to China, thus easing the adverse balance of payments, which India has chronically faced in its trade relations with China. Following Kazan, if the bilateral economic track takes off, it can encourage the two, to consider joint partnerships in third countries, especially in the Global South under the India-China+ formula. In the future, this formulation could mutate into a Russia-India-China+ idea where the three giants of the multipolar world can work together in the Global South. As the dust settles on the Modi-Xi talks — an event that took place after a gap of five years during which military tensions soared along the high mountain ranges of eastern Ladakh, it is now possible that both Beijing and New Delhi pick up the threads and explore possibilities of joint forays in Myanmar — a key nation on the cusp of South and Southeast Asia.
Why Myanmar?
There are at least four compelling reasons why India needs to reengage with Myanmar. First, Myanmar’s geography makes it a natural candidate for a deeper partnership. Myanmar is India’s gateway to Southeast Asia — indeed the pivot of New Delhi’s Act East policy. It presents a contiguous corridor for greater connectivity between Northeast India and ASEAN. Unsurprisingly, Myanmar is the fulcrum of the Asian Highway that will link India with Thailand, opening the possibility of a northern hookup with Danang in Vietnam. Trade and investments along the corridor can become a new engine for creating jobs, prosperity, and a surge in people-to-people connectivity. Second, Myanmar possesses a unique geo-strategic maritime location, along the Bay of Bengal. India has been Myanmar’s partner in building the Sittway Port. An outlet with huge potential, it is the natural gateway to channel trade from India’s northeast axis with the rest of the world, including ASEAN. On its part, China has constructed the deep-sea port in Kyaukpyu co-located with an industrial park. This port is of prime strategic importance as it lowers China’s trade dependence on the US-dominated Malacca straits, a key chokepoint that can be leveraged for the containment of China. Third, Myanmar possesses huge natural resources. These include significant deposits of precious and semiprecious stones, including rubies, sapphires, jade, and other gem stones. It also has deposits of silver, lead, zinc, gold, tin, tungsten, and barite. Besides, My anmar has substantial reserves of petroleum and natural gas, apart from huge hydropower potential, which can make it energy surplus. Myanmar can also be a major player in guaranteeing regional food security as its fertile land supports the cultivation of various crops, including rice, pulses, and other agricultural products, complementing marine resources such as fisheries. The country’s forests are also a major source of timber, fuel wood, and other forest products. Finally, as a neighbour of the two giants of the multipolar world order, Myanmar is a vital bridge between India and China, spurring the demand for a new regional initiative. Consequently, as a follow-up to the Kazan conversation between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi, a new China-India-Myanmar (CIM) economic corridor can be trilaterally considered a derivative of the BCIM plan. More so, such a standalone project can be kept out of the BRI framework, as its roots can be traced to the pre-BRI era. China has already flagged off the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which can be rebooted as a new project, with nodes firmly extending into India. (Atul Aneja is a strategic analyst based in New Delhi, India.)
Source: Global New Light of Myanmar